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ABSTRACT 
The full importance of investment and capital as a 
driving force in American life and the development of 
landscapes is only beginning to be understood by mainstream 
American geography. The regional approach, important in 
testing theories and uncovering linkages in life processes 
has the potential to contribute to the understanding of how 
capitalism shapes landscapes. It is perhaps in the 
formation of regional economies and landscapes that 
capitalism most thoroughly influences the worlds in which 
people live; it determines their housing, their jobs, their 
environs. 
This dissertation examines the impact of different 
phases of capitalism on the Upper Tennessee River Valley; 
present-day Roane and Loudon Counties, Tennessee. The 
Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1995 is in many ways a 
fairly ordinary rural area, similar to many locales in the 
Great Valley of the eastern United States: the region is 
not in the immediate hinterland of any major metropolitan 
area; agriculture and small-scale industry are predominant; 
employment opportunities are limited. Yet, if we take a 
look at the region's history, the period between the close 
of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century emerges as one 
of interest and importance. It was during this time that 
factory-scale industrial production began in the region, 
vii 
and that its present-day central places -- Rockwood, 
Harriman, and Lenoir City -- were established. The story 
of the Upper Tennessee River Valley reveals much about late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century America, and 
especially about how regions and cities develop during 
different phases of capitalism. 
Most of the capital for regional development during 
the study period came from outside of the region. Northern 
businessmen and financiers were drawn to the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley by natural resources, a positive 
investment environment, and key development proponents. As 
the brand of capitalism practiced in the region became more 
advanced during the latter 19th century, its effects became 
more pervasive. Industrial capitalists had access to 
limited amounts of capital, and were content with 
establishing communities to shelter workers needed for 
production. Corporate capitalism was characterized by 
comprehensive development projects designed to accrue 
profit from a multitude of activities. Thus, the 
urbanization process was more thoroughly planned, 
administered, and orchestrated during this phase. 
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Introduction 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT and REGIONAL PLACE-MAKING 
At the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Geographers, John Fraser Hart devoted his 
presidential address to regional geography. In it, Hart 
stated: "regional geography is the proving ground where 
theories are tested empirically ... the region provides the 
essential unifying theme that integrates the diverse 
subdisciplines of geography. 111 Regional historical 
geography has the potential to uncover the linkages in a 
region at a certain time (synchronic analysis), as well as 
elucidate the mechanisms of change and their transmission 
(diachronic analysis) . 2 
The full importance of investment and capital as a 
driving force in American life and the development of 
landscapes is only beginning to be understood by mainstream 
American geography. Much of the contemporary analysis of 
the influence of capitalist activity on spatial patterns 
has been conducted by Marxist geographers, who have sought 
to elucidate the "specific patterns and processes [that] 
characterize capitalist society, and ... how they change with 
the further development of capitalism. 113 They have argued 
1John Fraser Hart, "The Highest Form of the Geographer's Art", Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 72 (4): 1982, 557-559. 
2Aaron Kellerman, "Structuration Theory and Attempts at Integration 
in Human Geography", The Professional Geographer 39: 1987, 267-274. 
3Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production 
of Space (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990), xii. 
1 
that under capitalism, the economic system is dominant and 
is the basic organizer of space, and that therefore 
"changing any part of society ... involves changing the 
relations of production that guide human development." 4 A 
variation on this view is expressed by Massey, who 
advocates a transition from analyzing geographical space as 
a passive surface to recognizing its role in influencing 
investment patterns and concomitant social conditions. 5 
Recently, geographers who do not fully embrace Marxist 
arguments have also begun to explore the importance of 
capital to the formation of spatial development patterns. 
Mosher, in her study of Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, analyzed 
the impact of corporate capitalist business methods on 
urban development, settlement patterns, and industrial 
production in a local context. 6 Researchers from other 
disciplines, such as Olivier Zunz and Alfred Chandler, Jr. 
have explored the ramifications of corporate capitalism, 
focusing on business organizational framework and the 
development of the managerial class, respectively. 7 
The regional approach, important in testing theories 
and uncovering linkages in life processes, has the 
4Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, "Political Economy and Human 
Geography," in R. Peet and N. Thrift, Eds., New Models in Geography, 
Volume One (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 13. 
5ooreen Massey, Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and 
the Geography of Production (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1984). 
6Anne Mosher, "Capital Transformation and the Restructuring of Place: 
The Creation of a Model Industrial Town." Ph.D. dissertation, The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1989. 
7olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990); Alfred Chandler, Jr. The Visible 
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1977). 
2 
potential to contribute to the understanding of how 
capitalism shapes landscapes. It is perhaps in the 
formation of regional economies and landscapes that 
capitalism most thoroughly influences the worlds in which 
people live; it determines their housing, their jobs, and 
their environs. As Smith states "capitalism transforms the 
shape of the entire world ... no God-given stone is left 
unturned ... no living thing is unaffected. 118 
Moreover, it is within regions that one might expect 
to see capital investment's relationships to culture, 
folkways, and collective mores work themselves out. Harvey 
believes that "capital ... reaches out to dominate the living 
process -- the reproduction of labor power -- because it 
must. 119 This requires innovation that "must extend to 
lifestyles, organizational forms (political, cultural, and 
ideological as well as bureaucratic, commercial, and 
administrative) and spatial configurations. 10 The regional 
approach provides for the analysis of capitalism's impact 
on these types of phenomena within a defined, relatively 
cohesive spatial area. 
8smith, Uneven Development, xvi. 
9oavid Harvey, The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History 
and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), 27. 
lOibid., 126-27. 
3 
Economic Transformation and Phases of capitalism 
Capitalism is not monolithic or unchanging. It is 
constantly evolving in an effort to "meet the urgent 
demands of ... crisis to open up new opportunities for 
super-profits, to find the new ways to maintain social 
control, to stimulate increased production and 
consumption. 1111 The nineteenth century was an era of 
particularly rapid change, in that capitalism seems to have 
gone through three distinct stages: mercantile, industrial, 
and corporate. 12 
Mercantile capitalism, the economic system under which 
the European settlement of the North American continent 
took place, was involved in the buying and selling of 
various commodities but had little if any connection to 
their production. It created a supranational space economy 
within which resources, people, and products could be 
mobilized through the operation of price-fixing markets. 13 
Merchants bought cheap in order to sell high, and 
mediated between geographically-dispersed producers at low 
levels of development. Their role was to lower the cost 
and speed up the circulation of commodities (as well as 
capital) by specializing in the marketing function. 
11Edward w. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in 
Critical Social Theozy (New York: Verso, 1989), 34. 
12 Ibid., 3-5. 
13oavid Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward Arnold 
Ltd., 1973). 
4 
Profits were accrued in the efficient performance of this 
role . 14 
The early phases of the industrial capitalist system 
which emerged out of the mercantile system in the United 
States after 1830 were marked by a sustained effort on the 
part of capitalists to control production and to buy labor 
in the same way in which raw materials were bought: as a 
definite quantity of work, completed and embodied in the 
finished product. 15 The basic components of the industrial 
capitalist economic system were factories, mills, and 
workshops which provided employment to thousands of 
workers, and in doing so stimulated the urbanization 
process. 
Within the industrial capitalist system "proprietary-
competitive" business entities were the predominant form of 
productive property organization. These were partnerships 
or proprietorships that owned and managed single productive 
facilities. Success in competition between these 
enterprises depended upon the exploitation of labor and 
natural resources as productive inputs, the invention of 
increasingly efficient and profitable mass production 
technologies, and the conception of products that would 
meet market demand. 16 The balance of these components for 
success varied by industry. While the production costs of 
14Harvey, The Urbanization of Capital, 37-40. 
15Harry Braverman, Labor Monopoly and Capital: The Degradation of 
Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). 
16Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 
1890-1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
5 
some manufacturers were dominated by the costs of obtaining 
resources or labor, others required large amounts of 
investment capital to fund the construction of production 
facilities and technical innovation. 
Manufacturers in the most capital-intensive industries 
such as iron and steel, railroads, and textiles began to 
increase production capacity in order to achieve economies 
of scale. They also began to integrate resource 
acquisition, production facilities, and marketing within 
single business entities in order to improve production and 
distribution. Forward integration by manufacturers took 
the form of expansion into the warehousing and sales of 
products. Backward integration was attained by gaining 
control over the processes that preceded manufacturing, 
such as resource extraction and refining. 17 
Vertical integration was an expensive proposition for 
manufacturers and was dependent upon increased capital 
accumulation. As the problems of capital inflexibility 
converged with the intensely competitive conditions of the 
late nineteenth century, pressures began to develop that 
were too great to be withstood by old-style business 
institutions. Capital-intensive producers began to 
reorganize legally into ownership structures that had large 
umbrella companies owning smaller subsidiaries. The 
business entity that emerged from this process, the 
corporation, was based upon limited-liability ownership by 
17 zunz, Making Americ3 Corporate,. 
6 
several individuals. Investment capital was generated by 
the corporation as potential owners purchased corporate 
stock, and in turn provided funds for vertical integration, 
facility retooling, or product development. 18 The 
emergence of a national market for industrial securities 
was a key development, for without it the spread of stock 
ownership would have been delayed, and the creation of 
large industrial mergers would have been very much more 
difficult. 19 
As the corporate business form emerged, other 
organizational changes occurred within business 
enterprises. One of the most significant of these was the 
functional separation between owner-stockholders and 
managers within companies. Corporations developed 
management structures that were hierarchical in nature with 
stockholders and board directors at the top, and plant 
managers, superintendents, foremen, skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers following respectively at lower 
levels. To coordinate the flow of information through this 
hierarchical management structure, management practices and 
accounting procedures were routinized and standardized. 
Headquarters and regional management planned production 
strategies and oversaw the movement of raw, semi-finished 
and finished materials to and from various resource 
18Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy; and Zunz, Making 
America Corporate. 
19Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, "The Rise of a Market for 
Industrial Securities, 1887-1902," Business History Review Vol. XIX 
(June 1955), 105-138. 
7 
extraction areas, production points, and markets on a 
weekly basis. Top echelon company managers and directors 
assembled periodically to assess business performance and 
formulate future production and marketing policy. Through 
this corporate system information moved upward to top-level 
management, and policy flowed downward from the top through 
the hierarchy to individual production and work sites. 
This constant flow of information and policy was ensured by 
the growing number of white-collar middle managers and 
clerical workers employed by companies. 20 
The impact of corporate systems in the United States 
were felt on both large and small scales. From a large 
scale perspective, corporate systems translated spatially 
into the creation of linkages between corporate 
headquarters and production sites as well as those between 
resource extraction sites, production points, distribution 
and marketing facilities. Control over the system emanated 
from corporate headquarters usually located in large 
cities. Production sites and other corporate facilities, 
although sometimes located close to corporate headquarters, 
were more often widely dispersed. It was during this 
period of corporate integration of production and marketing 
functions that American cities and surrounding regions 
became economically linked and functionally interdependent 
within the national economic system. 21 At smaller scales, 
20zunz, Making Americ2 Corporate. 
21Michael P. Conzen, "The Maturing Urban System in the United States, 
1840-1910" Annals of the Association of American Geographers 67 
(1977): 88-108. 
8 
the advent of corporate capitalism spurred physical and 
social change that transformed localities and societies. 
Accompanying the modification of production processes 
and technological innovation was a reevaluation of labor. 
Corporate efficiency experts and managers began to see 
labor as a production cost to be minimized. New production 
technologies and the accompanying reassessment of labor 
intentionally deskilled the workforce. Consequently, 
occupations within many productive facilities became skewed 
toward semi-skilled and unskilled positions (which paid 
less) as new production techniques were introduced. 22 
The advent of the corporate economy met with protest. 
Tensions existed between the new corporate mores and pre-
existing economic and social practices. Skilled craftsmen 
who once had powerful roles within the production process 
were often reluctant to accept corporate wage scales and 
work regimes. They organized unions and disrupted 
production. Corporations also found that some production 
sites did not fit very well into their schemes, when local 
attributes such as property ownership patterns conflicted 
with company goals. The corporate system combatted 
resistance to its agenda on two fronts. Within the 
productive realm, plants were rebuilt and the work 
structure was modified to phase out troublesome jobs and 
work relationships. In relation to labor itself, some 
22Jeffery Haydu, Between Craft and Class: Skilled Workers and Factory 
Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-1922 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988); and Hannah, The Rise of the 
Corporate Economy. 
9 
manufacturers attempted to influence social relations away 
from the workplace in the community and home by providing 
housing, building infrastructural facilities, and 
controlling commercial functions on tracts of land adjacent 
to their factories. In the extreme, some manufacturers 
built company towns, where not only the built environment 
was under the control of the corporation, but also the 
political, social and religious institutions. 
capitalist systems and Place Making 
Spatial or regional inequality has always existed in 
relation to the attractiveness of a particular area or 
areas to the dominant form of economic activity. At any 
given point in time, there is an uneven distribution of the 
conditions and resources necessary for profitable 
production. This uneveness plays a major role in.the 
distribution of investment, as some places attract capital 
and others don't according to the needs of specific 
economic and production technologies. 
This geographic inequality is relative. It will 
respond to changes in the geographic distribution of the 
requirements of production. Examples of such change would 
be things such as actual changes in the distribution of 
population (labor force), input resources, or changes in 
relative distances caused by innovations in transport 
and/or communication. Also, the pattern of spatial 
10 
inequality may be altered as a result of changes in the 
requirements of the production process itself. In other 
words, technological innovation may cause change in the 
locational demands of profitable economic and productive 
activity over time. Such innovations and changes in the 
requirements of production are usually the direct result of 
actors operating in response to the profit motive in 
capitalist economies. 
During any particular period, new investment in 
economic activity will be geographically distributed in 
response to the pattern of spatial differentiation which is 
based on the aforementioned factors. This response by 
actors in capitalist economies to the inequality of 
geographic opportunities will vary as different forms of 
economic activity incorporate or use the uneven spatial 
surface in order to maximize profits. The response to 
geographic inequality may also deviate according to the 
structure of the ownership of capital (for example, small 
single production plants versus integrated industrial 
complexes under single ownership). The use of the earth's 
spatial surface will be a product of the interaction 
between the existing characteristics of spatial 
differentiation and the requirements at a particular time 
of the particular process of production. Also, since 
different industries will use geographic variation in 
different ways, it follows that those industries will 
11 
subsequently contribute to the formation of different 
patterns of spatial inequality.23 
The mercantile capitalist system dominated the initial 
era of settlement in the United States. Merchants were the 
driving force of the early American economy, buying and 
selling goods in regions. They were, in effect, middlemen 
who gauged supply and demand of commodities, and attempted 
to obtain profit from the buying-selling process. 24 
During the colonial and early post-colonial era, the 
largest cities that were products of this system were 
coastal (Boston, New York, Philadelphia) and geared towards 
international trade. Large numbers of settlers had moved 
westward by the turn of the nineteenth century, however, 
and frontier regional economies began to develop. The 
urban places that were established at interior locations 
during the early 1800s were those accessible by river or 
road. Farmers brought surplus agricultural goods such as 
corn, wheat, eggs, cotton, and meat to town by wagon, or 
down river by flatboat. Merchants at country stores paid 
or extended credit to farmers for these items. Later, the 
merchant sold agricultural and other goods to incoming 
23Richard Walker, "Class, Division of Labour and Employment in 
Space," in D. Gregory and J. Urry, eds., Social Relations and Spatial 
Structures (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1985), 164-189. Massey, 
Spatial Divisions of Labour; Massey, "In What Sense a Regional 
Problem?," Regional Studies 13 (1979), 233-243. 
24william N. Parker, Europe, America, and the Wider World: Essays on 
the Economic History of Western Capitalism, Volume 2 - America and 
the Wider World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 112-
115; Peter d'A. Jones, The Consumer Society: A History of American 
Capitalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 19-23, 31-34. 
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settlers, and to those passing through on their way west. 25 
Merchants were not explicitly involved in place-making, per 
se, as they had relatively small amounts of excess capital 
and little stake in urban aspects other than the market 
function. 
The transition from mercantile to industrial 
capitalism was spurred by the realization that the 
subcontracting and putting out systems of production were 
inherently inefficient, as well as by the development of 
new types of machinery. Problems of irregularity of 
production, loss of materials in transit, slowness of 
manufacture, lack of uniformity, and uncertainty of the 
quality of products manufactured were frequent. 
Centralization of industrial employment was a solution, 
because it allowed for the development and enforcement of 
regular hours of ~ork, and the monitoring of worker 
efficiency and the quality of commodities produced. 26 
In order for centralized production to be successful, 
a stable labor force was needed, preferably proximate to 
the production facility. In established urban places, 
factory owners responded to worker need for housing by 
providing shelter that would provide the right mix of skill 
types for production. In and around nineteenth century 
American cities, mill owners built a variety of housing 
25sam B. Hilliard, "A Robust New Nation, 1783-1820," in Robert D. 
Mitchell and Paul A. Groves, Eds., North America: The Historical 
Geography of a Changing Continent (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.), 170-171. 
26Braverman, Labor Monopoly and Capital, 63-67. 
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types to be used by workers. In a typical town or city, 
for instance, rows of small uniform structures were built 
on land adjacent to the mills. Larger houses were 
constructed for foremen at advantageous positions, from 
which the home activities of mill workers could be 
monitored and bosses could easily keep track of work 
attendance. 27 The result was the creation of distinct 
districts of company housing, which were added to 
preexisting urban patterns. 
The involvement of factory owners in providing housing 
was not limited to large urban areas. Throughout the 
nineteenth centur~, manufacturers located their production 
facilities at rural sites near raw materials and power 
sources. In these cases, pools of labor and housing stock 
were limited or nonexistant. Workers and independent 
developers might eventually produce sufficient housing, but 
in many instances industrialists took matters into their 
own hands, recruiting labor and providing housing for them 
in isolated and often self-contained company towns. 
Industrial capitalists spent time and money establishing 
these places because they believed that their efforts would 
be rewarded through more efficient industrial production 
and increased profits. 28 
27oaniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory 
System in the United States, 1880-1920 (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1975), 90-95. 
28 Ibid; Crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in 
Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 33-38. 
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The scale of capitalist enterprise increased 
significantly as corporate capitalism emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. The concentration and centralization 
of capital in the corporate structure created situations 
which had not previously existed. Corporate management 
became responsible for the administration of a myriad of 
activities, at disparate locations. 29 Among the activities 
important to corpcrations was the creation and 
administration of places, where business functions such as 
production could be undertaken with the utmost efficiency. 
Because corporations had developed innovative ways of 
increasing their access to capital (such as open ownership 
structure), they had larger amounts of money to spend on 
place-making than their industrial capitalist predecessors. 
Industrial capitalists hoped to increase efficiency and 
profit margin through gathering labor and machinery in one 
place, and closely monitoring the production process. 
Thus, their access to capital limited by personal wealth, 
place-making was usually unplanned and undertaken on a 
cost-minimization basis. Corporations, on the other hand, 
viewed place-making as an integral part of their profit-
making strategies. Large industrial corporations, 
confronted with the logistical demands of coordinating 
multiple locations, dispersed resources, and distant and 
sizable markets, sought to shape and control production 
29chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand; Sklar, The Corporate 
Reconstruction of American Capitalism; Zunz, Making America 
Corporate. 
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sites. This was accomplished through the preplanning of 
communities, as well as investment in other aspects of the 
reproductive sphere30 (such as housing, public 
infrastructure, stores, churches) . 31 Some corporations 
utilized variations of this strategy, to accrue profit from 
the place-making process itself. 
Despite the previous discussion, place-making is still 
a largely unexplored process. The capital phases model is 
a general framework that provides some explanation of the 
process, however, it still needs confirmation as well as 
more developed details and nuances to provide satisfactory 
explanation. The goal of this study is to shed light on 
capitalist urbanization and development processes. The 
analysis uses the synthesizing and integrative 
characteristics of the regional approach to gain a better 
understanding of capitalist place-making, and ultimately, 
of the operation of capitalism itself. 
30The term reproductive sphere refers to the those activities 
undertaken by institutions in order to enforce a particular order 
and/or a particular vision of reality (for example, companies 
intentionally creating conditions they believe are conducive to the 
continuance of efficient industrial production). See Richard Peet 
and Nigel Thrift, "Political Economy and Human Geography," in R. 
Peet and N. Thrift, Eds., New Models in Geography, Volume One 
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3-29; Ray Hudson and David Sadler, 
"Contesting Works Closures in Western Europe's Old Industrial 
Regions: Defending Place or Betraying Class?," in M. Storper and A.J. 
Scott, Eds., Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of 
Industrial Capitalism (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 172-193. 
·31clyde Griffin, "Community Studies and the Investigation of 
Nineteenth Century Social Relations," Social Sciences History 10 
(1986), 315-338; Frances G. Couvares, The Remaking of Pittsburgh: 
Class and Culture in an Industrializing City, 1877-1919 (Albany: The 
State University of New York Press, 1984); Stanley Buder, Pullman: An 
Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967). 16 
The study Area 
This study examines the impact of the different phases 
of capitalism on the Upper Tennessee River Valley; present-
day Roane and Loudon Counties, Tennessee (Figures I.1, 
I.2). The Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1995 is in many 
ways a fairly ordinary rural area, similar to many locales 
in the Great Valley of the eastern United States: the 
region is not in the immediate hinterland of any major 
metropolitan area; agriculture and small-scale industry are 
predominant; employment opportunities are limited. Yet, if 
we take a look at the region's history, the period between 
the close of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century 
emerges as one of interest and importance. It was during 
this time that factory-scale industrial production began in 
the region, and that its present-day central places --
Rockwood, Harriman, and Lenoir City -- were established. 
The story of the Upper Tennessee River Valley reveals much 
about late nineteenth and early twentieth century America, 
and especially about how regions and cities develop during 
different phases of capitalism. 
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was profoundly shaped 
by the three phases of capitalism which were dominant in 
the nineteenth century, and these phases are relatively 
easy to isolate when analyzing its history. The mercantile 
capitalist phase was dominant in the Upper Tennessee River 










l·\~ Y/ t.;,,;;, ;; -# 1 -~C, 
_§, '~- .-· ~- "'..,;· ., ,. , * .... -9 ~,....... ..f .j 
-.,rt,··-' '···· ····•·'%...,.#~-"' 
~ '····,... . ---~ ~,: 





/ \ .. -·· 
BRADLEY 
..... h ' . 
<,_,,,.~~~---.✓.-------- .... "Ji-s-t 4~: 
POLK • I · ... _. 7 I O 2s 
1(;"~'-., j • r mi~, • I 
¼,. / ;____~ 
TENNESSEE . \.. J (I·, N. CAROLINA ~ 
··-··-··-··-··~- ■■--o••-··----··-··-··-·•,·:··:-■-GEORGIA ; ', GEORGIA · .. 
t ,,_:: 



















MEL TON HILL L. 









The Regional Context: The Upper Tennessee River Valley 
antebellum era, the Appalachian Mountains were a barrier to 
inmigration from the east. Settlers who traveled into the 
region via the Great Valley found little flat, fertile 
land. Many of these migrants moved on, farther to the 
south and west, in search of better opportunities. The 
ones that stayed engaged in mixed-use agriculture on small 
valley farms. This agricultural economy was administered 
by a few important merchants in small towns close to the 
region's three connected rivers -- the Clinch, the Emory, 
and the Tennessee (Figures I.1, I.2). 
The industrial capitalist phase in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley began with the activities of former Union 
soldiers, who initiated the first factory-scale industrial 
production in the region in 1867. These industrialists 
were enticed to invest in the region by the availability of 
coal and iron ore deposits in and around Walden's Ridge. 
They constructed manufacturing facilities close to these 
mineral deposits, and established a community in an effort 
to facilitate the production process. 
Land companies began the corporate or advanced capital 
phase in the region in 1889. Attracted by industrial 
possibilities, they came into the Upper Tennessee River 
Valley and purchased hundreds of thousands of acres of land 
as part of their development schemes. Each land company 
had access to large amounts of capital to use for 
development, and each initiated comprehensive development, 
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including resource extraction, industrial production, and 
the establishment of cities. 
The Transformation of a Region 
Prior to the Civil War, the economy of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley was dominated by agriculture. In 
1860, the total cash value of farms in Roane County, 
Tennessee was over 3.4 million dollars, while the capital 
invested in all manufacturing establishments was less than 
$338,000. 32 The industry that did exist at this time was 
largely involved in the processing of agricultural 
products. Agriculture-based industries such as flour 
milling, liquor distillation, leather production, and wool 
carding accounted for about fifty-five percent of the 
slightly less than $294,975 in manufacturing goods produced 
in Roane County in 1860.33 
By 1890, the estimated value of manufactured goods 
almost doubled that of agricultural goods in Roane County. 
The cash value of farms in the county and the value of 
crops produced on them had leveled off since 1870, while 
the capital invested in manufacturing had risen sharply 
over the same period. 34 Moreover, by 1880, Roane County 
32u.s., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, 
1860: Agriculture (Government Printing Office, 1865), 136; U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, 1860: 
Manufactures of the United States in 1860 (Goverment Printing Office, 
1865), 572. 
33Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, 1860: Manufactures, 572. 
34Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census, 1870, Tenth Census, 1880, 
Eleventh Census, 1890: Agriculture; Ninth Census, 1870, Tenth Census, 
1880, Eleventh Census, 1890: Manufactures. 
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had more capital invested in iron and steel production 
facilities ($700,000), and more workers employed in the 
production of those commodities (400) than all other 
counties in the state of Tennessee except for Hamilton 
County, where the city of Chattanooga was growing 
rapidly. 35 Twenty years later in 1900, the ce_nsus reported 
that the county ranked eighth in capital invested in 
manufacturing establishments in the state, but only twenty-
eighth in population. 36 
These statistics illuminate the fundamental changes 
that took place in the region during the decades following 
the Civil War. They do little to indicate why these 
changes occurred or what their economic and spatial 
consequences were. They also give no hint of the nature of 
the places created, or of their people. These unanswered 
questions provide the structure for a geographical 
interpretation of regional transformation and place making 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
35sureau of the Census, Tenth Census, 1880: The Manufacture of Iron 
and Steel, 30-31. 
36 Bureau of the CensJs, Twelveth Census, 1900: Population, 
Manufactures. 22 
A conceptual context for understanding Regional 
Transformation and Place Formation 
Harriman, Rockwood, and Lenoir City are a few of many 
small cities found in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
northeast of Chattanooga and southwest of Knoxville (Figure 
I.1, I.2). These places are different from their neighbors 
in that they are all company towns. They were created by 
business enterprises that, to varying degrees, owned 
production sites, housing, infrastructure, and commercial 
facilities. Rockwood began as a by-product of the Roane 
Iron Company, the first large-scale manufacturing facility 
to locate in the region, founded by former Union 
army officers in 1867. Harriman, Lenior City, and Cardiff 
were planned towns, developed as part of large proposed 
industrial complexes by land companies during the 1890s. 
The common thread among these towns is that their 
development was based almost solely on the intended 
exploitation of the minerals of the region for use in the 
large-scale production of iron, steel and other heavy 
industrial products. Each was a product of the economic 
transformation that was taking place in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley during the post-Civil War period. 
The economy of the region was transformed from one 
that was agriculture-based to one that was industry-based. 
This change was a product of successive "rounds" of capital 
investment. The rationale and actions of business 
23 
organizations: the Roane Iron Company, the East Tennessee 
Land Company, the Lenior City Company, and the Cardiff Coal 
and Iron Company, were responses to and products of the 
economic, political, social, historical, and geographic 
contexts in which they operated. The regional 
transformation that took place in the Upper Tennessee River 
Valley must be explained in terms of the varying situations 
within the iron and steel industry, the national financial 
market, and the national transportation network, as well 
as prevailing societal attitudes and values as they emerged 
in East Tennessee and the industrializing Northeastern 
United States after 1865. 
The transformation of the economy of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley between the close of the Civil War 
and the beginning of the twentieth century can be viewed as 
the result of three distinct rounds of capital investment. 
The first was in effect in the region prior to the Civil 
War, and was predicated upon the buying and selling 
activities of merchants. Little resource processing was 
undertaken during this round. The second round, which took 
place in the period between 1865 and 1885, had 
characteristics of early industrial capitalism: in general, 
industrial companies had restricted access to capital and 
operated on thin margins of profit. It resulted in the 
operation of an iron production facility (the Roane Iron 
Company) and the founding of a community (Rockwood, 
Tennessee). The third, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, 
24 
exhibited more sophisticated use of capital, and produced 
three resource-based industrial complexes and three 
communities (Cardiff, Harriman, and Lenoir City). I argue 
that the different ways in which capitalists operated 
during the three rounds determined why capital was funneled 
into the Upper Tennessee River Valley, and how capital was 
used differently during the three respective investment 
periods to ultimately create different types of places 
(i.e. Rockwood, Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City) . 37 
This chapter presents an outline of regional 
transformation as it occurred within the context of the 
advent of corporate capitalism in the United States in the 
period between the close of the Civil War and the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In this outline, I identify two 
conceptual and spatial themes that tie regional 
transformation and place making to the way in which capital 
is accumulated and utilized. The ways in which these 
themes were played out in various industries and the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries are investigated in subsequent 
chapters. 
37 rt should be noted that although these rounds of investment are 
being viewed as distinct and separate, it is recognized that they are 
related. The success of the earlier capital outlay in production and 
accumulating profit served as an impetus to the second later period 
of investment. They stand out in the region's history because no 
other capital investment of any magnitude has occurred there in the 
last century, leaving a settlement landscape in large part created in 
the mid to late nineteenth century. 
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Spatial Themes in Regional Transformation and the Creation 
o:= urban- Industrial Places 
Two interlocking spatial themes emerge from this 
discussion of capital phases and place-making. 
Theme I: Access to Capital and Urban-Industrial Development 
The rise of corporate capitalism encompassed changes 
in the organization makeup, management, financing, and 
spatial arrangement of American business. Between the 
small, single plant company which predominated in the early 
part of this period (the late 1860s and early 1870s), and 
the large, integrated corporate system which came to the 
fore in the early twentieth century, there were variations 
in business operation methods and techniques which were 
attempts to accrue profit more efficiently. Not the le~st 
among these were methods of financing business operations. 
An analysis of regional change in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley indicates that companies involved in 
transforming the economy and landscape of the region were 
intermediate variations in the spectrum of movement toward 
corporate capitalist financing methods. The second round 
of capital investment in the region, which occurred during 
the late 1860s and early 1870s, basically followed the 
early industrial capitalist model in which small businesses 
and production facilities were owned by one family or a 
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small group of pecple and produced for local and regional 
markets. The capital for this round of investment came from 
outside the region, mostly from former Union soldiers that 
were exposed to the area during the Civil War. These men 
had access to personal capital, and that of smaller 
regional financial institutions (Chattanooga and 
Indianapolis banks, for example). Also, however, local 
actors and the Tennessee state government created an 
environment that encouraged industrial capital investment 
during the early post-Civil War period. 
Nevertheless, small businessmen faced two general 
financing problems. 
difficult to obtain. 
First, risk capital for expansion was 
Owners of small industrial 
enterprises frequently had to borrow short-term money for 
long-term investment, in the hope they could repay their 
loans out of large immediate earnings. This accounts for 
the fact that th~y frequently went bankrupt during bad 
times. Yet access to long-term financing from outside 
sources was nearly impossible because few investors were 
willing to put money into small enterprises and few owners 
would let contributors have any voice in the business. 
Second, it was difficult for an owner of fixed capital to 
transfer any part of his/her investment to an outsider. 
Even a highly successful business enterprise might not 
attract buyers, because to run a such a business required 
specialized skills in addition to capital. These skills 
were usually possessed only by persons already involved in 
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the industry. Consequently, potential buyers were to be 
found only among rivals, which limited the opportunity to 
sell to a merger with the firm of a competitor. 38 Clearly, 
then, the owners of American industrial business concerns 
during this period were in a disadvantageous position with 
respect to obtaining capital for expansion or liquidating 
their fixed investment. 
The search for capital flexibility by American 
businessmen led to, among other things, the "trust" 
movement of the 1880s. The first American industry to 
develop the trust form of organization was oil refining 
under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil. 
In 1882, the owneis of several refineries agreed to turn 
their stock over to a group of trustees, receiving in 
exchange as evidence of ownership, pieces of paper known as 
"trust certificates." The board of trustees was then 
specifically authorized to act as a board of managers with 
the power to make operating and investment decisions in the 
best interests of the holders of the trust certificates 
(the former refinery owners). Several advantages were to 
spring from this arrangement. Strength from unity was an 
one, both against other refiners and against violent price 
fluctuations. Also, the trust arrangement was thought to 
be a method of circumventing the restrictions of the common 
law against corporations doing business in several states. 
Not among Standard Oil's original objectives was the search 
38Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities." 28 
for capital liquidity. The organization never sought an 
active public market for its trust certificates. Standard 
Oil had started a trend, however, and other businessmen, 
recognizing the marketable value of the new financial 
instrument, seized the opportunity to raise capital and 
sold their certificates to the public. 39 
Access to large reserves of capital, specifically 
through dealings with trust companies in American financial 
centers40 , made possible the larger-scale economic 
transformation and place formation that occurred in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley during the second round of 
capital investment which occurred during the early 1890s. 
Land companies, which were the agents of industrial 
development and community formation during the second 
investment round, were able to operate at a large-scale 
because they had the capital to do so. This is no small 
point, because in general capitalists and industrialists in 
Tennessee and the Upland South did not have very large 
reserves of capital during this period, nor did they have 
access to any institutions that did. The land companies 
obtained their capital from important American financial 
centers outside the region, where large sums of money could 
be obtained using sophisticated financial methods. The 
39Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,"; 
Chandler, The Visible Hand, 318-319. 
40Trust companies were offshoots of the original trust organizational 
concept. Their general function can be explained as follows. If a 
man trusted another, he placed his money in a trust fund in the other 
man's care. When the other man established a company to handle a 
number of trust funds, he called it a trust company. 
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availability of large amounts of operating capital made all 
of the difference in regional transformation; it enabled 
the land companies to acquire mineral lands (backward 
integration), pre-plan town sites, and build infrastructure 
as part of their industrial development schemes. This was 
not the case during the first round of capital investment 
in the region. 
A corollary to this is that the land companies, and 
perhaps Roane Iron Company during its later years, had to 
have an avenue of association with these financial 
institutions to gain access to their financial services and 
large potential reserves of capital. As Navin and Sears 
point out, 
It was very important to win the backing of investment bankers, 
for they were the men who had come to occupy, through their 
work with goverment bonds and rail securities, a central 
position in the market for new issues ... We can only suppose in 
the absence of specific evidence, that industrialists had been 
making repeated attempts to attract the assistance of the 
investment banking community ... In general, the only occasions 
when bankers could be induced to handle industrial issues was 
(a) when called in on the conversion of trusts to corporations, 
(b) when a well-established industrial company wished to float 
a bond issue for working capital purposes, or (c) when a 
successful company wished to recapitalize in order to buy out 
its satellite plants. 41 
Thus, it was no easy thing to obtain the services of 
investment bankers and trust companies during the late 
nineteenth century. Companies and business entities that 
wanted to work with them had to be a known quantity or have 
a connection, most likely through financial, railroad or 
industrial business circles. The question is "How many 
41Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities," 
124. 
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businessmen that had investment-business interests in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley would have access to these 
sources of capital?" The odds are that very few would, 
especially with the small amount of development that had 
taken place in the region prior to 1890. This is why I 
believe that a small set of very important businessmen, 
whom I will refer to as "capital injectors" 42 , were in 
large part responsible for the economic transformation of 
the Upper Tennessee River Valley during the mid to late-
nineteenth century. Some men in this group of were local 
and some outsiders, but they can be isolated and their 
connections to outside capital sources and regional 
development analyzed. 
Theme II: The Involvement of Business Organizations in 
Making Places 
The extent of involvement and investment in the 
creation of places was a reflection of the goals that 
companies hoped to achieve by producing housing, services, 
planned developments, and commercial functions. Place-
making was part of a business strategy in which companies 
evaluated their objectives and the economic context in 
which they were operating, and formed places on the 
landscape to meet their needs. Of course, these needs 
42The actors whom I define as "capital injectors" would have been 
those businessmen with both interests in urban-industrial development 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley and access to large financial 
institutions (through various associations) in important financial 
centers such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. 
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might change over time, and new alternatives become 
possible as the economic context of business operation 
changed, and as new methods of production, organization and 
financing were adopted. 
Thus, in their barest essence, places created by 
companies were spatial strategies to accumulating profit 
through the targeting of specific perceived business needs. 
One of the most obvious and constant of these needs, 
especially for industrial producers, was labor supply. At 
rural sites close to resource deposits or power sources, 
pools of labor were almost nonexistant, making it necessary 
for companies to attract and shape their own labor 
supplies. This could be done through the place-making 
process by the supply and mix of housing, the 
availability, size and cost of residential lots for sale, 
or restrictive deed covenants making particular activities 
or land uses illegal. Other various perceived needs such 
as the attraction of new industry, or the enticement of 
real estate investors, could also be addressed by companies 
through various means in their place development process. 
Analysis of the types of places created by companies 
during the two later capital investment periods (Rockwood 
as representative of the industrial period, Harriman, 
Cardiff, and Lenoir City of the corporate) will reveal 
different strategies in place-making. There are several 
reasons for this difference in place-making strategy. 
First, companies operating during the third round of 
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investment were more sophisticated both organizationally 
and financially than those during the second (Theme I). 
This made it much more possible for them to manifest their 
operational needs on the landscape through large-scale land 
acquisition and the construction of pre-planned towns, 
because the new organizational forms and financing methods 
made capital available for this. Companies operating under 
the early industrial capitalism model (such as Roane Iron 
in the late 1860s and early 1870s) would not have had 
access to this capital, and had to create their places from 
thin margins of profit and smaller reserves of local and 
regional loan capital. 
Second, the intentions and needs of companies 
operating during the two periods (in relation to production 
and profit making) were probably somewhat different. The 
Roane Iron Company at its outset was concerned with 
operating a small-scale iron production facility, and 
retaining a small, but constant labor force to work in the 
facility by the construction of an unplanned settlement. 
In contrast, the land companies were umbrella companies 
that administered the acquisition of thousands of acres of 
land, the layout of town plans, and the attraction of 
industry to the towns. 43 These were obviously two 
different business approaches, tempered by the economic 
contexts in which they were undertaken. 
43The vertically integrated business organization of the land 
companies can be viewed as an offshoot of the operating methods which 
were becoming predominant in the rise of corporate capitalism. 
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Third, the companies operating in the two investment 
periods created places having had different amounts of 
exposure to the ideals of the urban reform movement which 
was underway during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. When the town of Rockwood was initially developed 
in 1867, the social and sanitary reform movements in the 
United States were in their infancy, and their tenets had 
not yet become widely known. Because of this, it can be 
assumed that even if the Roane Iron Company had the capital 
necessary and desire to create a "model" town, its 
principals probably would not have been exposed to the 
ideas of these movements. Conversely, the decades of the 
1870s and 1880s were extremely important in the 
dissemination of reform ideals, through the work of 
Frederick Law Olmstead and others. 44 This would have meant 
that the land companies which developed towns in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley in 1890 would most likely have been 
exposed to these ideals, and had the opportunity to 
incorporate them into their plans. 
Scheme 
This study is divided into several chapters. Chapter 
I explores the development of the pre-industrial Tennessee 
Valley, i.e. the region's settlement landscape up until the 
close of the Civil War during the era of mercantile 
44Peterson, "The Impact of the Sanitary Reform Movement upon American 
Urban Planning." 
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capital. Chapter II details the regional situation during 
the Reconstruction period, and provides information 
regarding production techniques and business practices in 
the iron and steel industry during this period. It also 
traces the first major round of capital investment in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley (beginning in the late 1860s), 
which resulted in the Roane Iron Company production 
facility and the town of Rockwood. Chapter III 
investigates the second major round of investment which 
occurred in the region (during the late 1880s and early 
1890s), which resulted in several manufacturing facilities 
and the towns of Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City. 
Chapter IV focuses on the study region after the analysis 
period, lending insight in to the development patterns that 
exist presently. Chapter Vis the summary and conclusion 
section, and discusses the major findings of the study, and 
their implications for our understanding of industrial 
development and Upland South during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
Chapter I 
THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL UPPER TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY 
The pre-industrial Upper Tennessee River Valley was a 
sparsely settled region for much of the eighteenth century. 
The earliest European urban settlements were a product of 
settler struggle against the Cherokee Indians for land. 
The English, and later Americans, built forts for 
protection from French and Indian attacks during the mid-
to-late 1700s. As native Indian groups were displaced by 
Europeans over time, these forts became the focus of 
economic activity. During the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, roads began to be built through the 
region and an agricultural economy began to develop. River 
transport became significant in the region, and spurred the 
growth of towns such as Kingston, which became a break-of-
bulk-point for commodities moved by road and river. By the 
1850s, railroads appeared in the Valley, and played a key 
role in the development of the town of Loudon. The 
economic and settlement patterns created by mercantile 
capitalism prevailed when industrial development of the 
region was initiated in the post-Civil War era. 
Before the Settlers 
In the early eighteenth century, when Europeans first 
moved into the Upper Tennessee River Valley, the area was 
under the control of the Cherokee Indians, who had been 
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living in the region since approximately 1000 A.D. They 
had developed a distinctive culture that included 
complicated mound-building burial rites, pottery-making, a 
major commitment to maize agriculture, and a settlement 
pattern in which groups of permanent villages were 
satellites of larger communities with clearly defined 
ceremonial precincts. 1 
The area controlled by the Cherokees in the early 
1700s was approximately 40,000 square miles, extending from 
the headwaters of the Tennessee River southward to 
approximately the southern edge of the foothills of the 
Appalachians, and east to west from piedmont region of the 
Carolinas and Georgia to the north-flowing Tennessee River 
in middle Tennessee. 2 The Cherokee population was 
distributed in approximately 60 to 80 towns in the early 
1700s, and was estimated to have numbered 16,000 to 17,000. 
Cherokee settlements were found in three distinct 
subregions. These subregions have been described as the 
Piedmont or Lower province of northern Georgia, eastern 
Alabama, and northwestern South Carolina; the Blue Ridge or 
Middle province of western North Carolina, northeastern 
Tennessee, southwestern Virginia, and northwestern South 
Carolina; and the Ridge and Valley or Overhill province of 
northwestern Georgia, northeastern Alabama, and 
1Roy S. Dickens, Jr., "The Origins and Development of the Cherokee 
Culture," in D. King, Ed., The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled 
History (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 3-28. 
2Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingwood, The Chattanooga Country 
1540-1951: From Tomahawks to TVA (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 
1952), 23-24. 37 
southeastern Tennessee. 3 The Cherokee Overhill settlement 
area encompassed the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
At the time of first contact with Europeans, the 
Cherokee had cultivated sophisticated cultural and national 
systems. The entire Cherokee nation was organized under a 
principal chief. However, subregional settlement groups 
functioned as the major units of political, religious, and 
everyday life. Each town and every settlement group had 
its own civil, religious, and military organizations which 
paralleled those of the national institutions. Cherokee 
towns varied in size from a dozen up to two hundred 
dwellings, with the average being about one hundred. In 
any town, seven geneological clans were represented which 
linked all of the town residents by blood or marriage. 
This type of clan relationship prevailed throughout the 
nation and linked all of the Cherokee by kinship bonds. 4 
The towns _settled by the Cherokee were fairly 
permanent, and were mostly located along streams and rivers 
in valley areas. Agriculture was integral to their way of 
life. Corn was their main staple crop, but they also grew 
beans, gourds, and sunflowers as food crops. The Cherokee 
also traveled over large areas in hunting parties in search 
of meat to supplement their diets. The Cherokee Indians 
had only a vague conception of land ownership in the 
3Thomas M.N. Lewis and Madeline Kneberg, Tribes That Slumber: Indians 
of the Tennessee Region (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1960), 156-159; Dickens, Cherokee Culture, 9-13; and Govan and 
Livingood, Chattanooga Country, 23-25. 
4Lewis and Kneberg, Tribes That Slumber, 157-166. 
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European sense. They knew what territory they controlled 
and could utilize for substinence, but individuals did not 
claim land for themselves as property. 
European settlement of the Tennessee Valley 
The end of Cherokee control in the Tennessee Valley 
began with the arrival of Europeans in the area in the 
early eighteenth century. East Tennessee was settled 
rather late compared to the coastal plain and piedmont 
areas of Georgia and North and South Carolina, with only 
few incursions by individual trappers and traders. Until 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Appalachian 
Mountains stood as a barrier to westward advancement from 
English communities along the Atlantic coast. The French 
who had settled to the south and west were likewise 
dissuaded from moving into the Tennessee Valley by the 
impedement of the Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River. 
The first major contact and negotiation that the English 
had with the Cherokees occurred in the South Carolina 
colony in 1721, when the Indians ceded a tract of land in 
that colony. 
The Treaty of 1721 marked the beginning of the gradual 
eviction of the Cherokee from their lands. By 1730, the 
English had won the confidence of the Cherokees, and 
persuaded a party of their leaders to visit England as a 
sign of good will. The visit resulted in a treaty in which 
the Cherokee granted the English exclusive rights to trade 
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and build forts in their territory. 5 The Cherokee served 
as an invaluable ally for the English against the French, 
their principal competitors for land in North America. The 
French had cultivated relationships with other Indian 
tribes, so that each country had Indian allies with which 
to help control territory and sway the balance of power. 
The hostilities between the French and English broke out in 
the French and Indian War in 1754. The English enlisted 
the help of the Cherokee on expeditions against the French 
in the Ohio Valley. They also built the first English fort 
in Cherokee country on the Little Tennessee River during 
the war in 1756, called Fort Loudon. 
At the close of the French and Indian War in 1763, the 
English had defeated both the French and renegade Cherokee 
war parties that had risen up against them during the war. 
With the land west of the Appalachians thoroughly under 
English control, and the danger from Indians minimized, 
settlers began to pour into the valleys of East Tennessee 
from southern coastal areas and down the Great Valley from 
Pennsylvania and Virginia. Over the next sixty years, the 
Cherokee gradually lost their land in a cycle of settler 
encroachment, conflict, and treaty agreement. European 
settlers were constantly settling in Cherokee territory in 
search of the best homesteads. The Cherokee reacted to 
this by attacking settlers, and appealing first to the 
English and later the American government to stop the 
5rbid., 166-167. 40 
encroachment. 6 Settlers were also appealing to government 
authorities to put a stop to indian attacks. Conflicts of 
this type were most often mediated through treaties in 
which the Cherokee sold land to the English or Americans 
for a minimal price. The result was a steady push of the 
Cherokee to the south and west throughout the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
The land of the Upper Tennessee River Valley was 
acquired through several treaties between the Cherokee and 
the United States government beginning in 1791. The first 
of these was the Treaty of Holston in which the Holston and 
Nolichucky river valleys were acquired from the Cherokee 
for a $1,000 payment. The Holston treaty was signed at 
White's Fort, later to become Knoxville, and was the 
groundbreaking agreement in opening up the Tennessee Valley 
for settlement. In fairly quick succession further 
treaties were si_gned. Eight years ·1ater in 1798, the 
Treaties of Tellico were signed in which lands in the 
French Broad and Clinch river valleys were bought by the 
United States for $6,000. In the Third Treaty of Tellico 
of 1805, a large tract of land on the Cumberland Plateau 
which formed the western boundary of the Valley was 
purchased by the federal government for $14,000. The 
southern area of the Tennessee Valley remained under 
6The territory which comprised Tennessee came under the 
administration of the new American government in 1782 after the 
defeat of the English in the Revolutionary War. The Cherokee fought 
on the side of the English during the war, and were persecuted for 
this when the colonists were eventually victorious. 
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Cherokee control until 1819, when the renegade Chickamaugas 
finally gave in to federal government military 
superiority. 7 The final chapter of the Cherokee presence 
in East Tennessee was marked by the infamous Treaty of New 
Echota, which resulted in the cession of all Cherokee land 
east of the Mississippi River. The Treaty of New Echota 
was the basis for the forcible removal of the Cherokee to 
Arkansas and Oklahoma in 1838 by the federal government, 
along what became known as the "Trail of Tears." 
European Settlement Landscape in the Tennessee Valley 
Settler struggle again-st the Cherokee for land in the 
Tennessee Valley produced an initial settlement landscape 
that endured until the mid-nineteenth century. Both the 
English and Americans had built a network of forts for 
protection from French and Indian attacks during the mid to 
late 1700s. These forts often became the focus of economic 
activity during the mercantile capitalist phase, emerging 
as the first towns in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
region. 
Forts were most often located at strategic points 
along river banks, where water transportation could be 
utilized, and movements of the enemy monitored and 
constrained. In the Upper Tennessee River Valley, three 
7Albert C. Holt, The Economic and Social Beginnings of Tennessee 
(Nashville, TN: George Peabody College, 1923), 35-38; and Weston A. 
Goodspeed, Ed., Goodspeed's General History of Tennessee (Nashville, 
TN: Goodspeed Publishing Company, 1887), 93~103. 
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major forts were founded during the Indian period: Fort 
Loudon, Fort White, and Fort Southwest Point. Fort Loudon 
was the oldest of these forts, founded in 1756, and was the 
first European settlement in the Tennessee Valley. It was 
built on the banks of the Little Tennessee River during the 
French and Indian War as a defense for the English and 
their Cherokee allies against French attacks from the south 
and west. 8 The other two forts were built later in the 
century generally as protection for settlers against the 
Cherokee as larger scale settlement took place in the 
Valley. 9 Fort White was constructed in 1786 near the 
origin of the Tennessee River, on a well fortified bluff 
site. 1° Fort Southwest Point was built in 1792 near the 
confluence of the Clinch, Emory, and Tennessee Rivers. It 
became a very important strategic site militarily following 
its construction by General John Sevier, as it served to 
cut off water travel and communication between the Upper 
and Lower Cherokee settlement groups. 11 
8John Haywood, The Civil and Political History of the State of 
Tennessee from its Earliest Settlement up to the Year 1796 (Reprinted 
from 1823 Edition, Knoxville, TN: Tenase Co., 1969), 41-45; P.M. 
Hamer, Fort Loudoun on the Little Tennessee River (Raleigh, NC: 
Edwards & Broughton Printing Co., 1925). 
9Groups of Cherokee Indians by this time had become disenchanted with 
settlers and the American government for constant encroachment on 
their traditional lands. 
10Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History 
of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical 
Society, 1946), 26-27. 
11stanley J. Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell, Eds., 
History of Tennessee, Volume I (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing 
Co., 1960), 194-202; Eugene M. Pickel, "A History of Roane County, 
Tennessee to 1860, "(M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, 
1971), 25-27. 
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The Development of a Regional Economy in the 
~per Tennessee River Valley 
During the pre-Civil War nineteenth century, the 
initial layers of the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
palimpsest were formed by mercantile capitalism, involving 
agriculture, small-scale and unsophisticated industry, and 
the development of successive transportation modes that 
included roads, rivers, and railroads. Settlements that 
had initially been trading posts and ferry crossings became 
markets for agricultural products, and locations for 
mostly home-centered industry. Grist mills, tanneries, 
boot and shoe producers, hatmakers, carriagemakers, 
druggists, general store owners and others relied upon 
resources and customers from the surrounding hinterland. 
The modifications that occurred in this regional hinterland 
relationship during this period were tied to changes in the 
transportation landscape, which enabled both people and 
commodities to move more quickly and easily over space. 
Farming emerged as the dominant activity in the 
region on the fertile lands of the Upper Tennessee River 
Valley soon after settlement began there in the late 
eighteenth century. From its outset, agriculture in the 
region was dominated by corn, wheat, and oats. The limited 
availability of flat, fertile valley land dictated that 
these crops be grown on farms of small to medium size, 
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generally between twenty and five hundred acres. 12 The 
region's farmers were not specialists; besides their staple 
crops they also grew small amounts of many crops for their 
own consumption. This pattern of agriculture did not 
encourage the development of "cash crops" such as tobacco, 
cotton, or peanuts in the Upper Tennessee region. 
Consequently, the smaller-scale, mixed-use regional farms 
never utilized large amounts of slave labor as did their 
contemporaries in Middle and West Tennessee. 13 
By 1860, the agricultural economy of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley had reached its apex. Approximately 
365,000 acres of land in the study area14 , worth 
$3,420,610, was in use for agriculture. 15 In the 
preceding decade, significant advances had been made in 
agricultural methods and organization, and a statewide 
movement to support agrarianism was in full swing. The 
Roane County Agricultural Society was formed as a local 
branch of the Tennessee State Agricultural Bureau. The 
Agricultural Society's mission was the improvement of 
farming methods on the county level. Part of this effort 
was the organization of annual county-wide agricultural 
fairs during the 1850s at which farming methods were 
12united States Eighth Census, Volume II Agriculture (Government 
Printing Office, 1865), 215. 
13Goodspeed, History of Tennessee, 229-232. 
14Roane County in 1860 encompassed the entire study area, and 
therefore its census statistics are applicable to this analysis. 
Loudon County, in which Loudon and eventually Lenoir City were 
located, was formed out of parts of Roane, Monroe, and Blount 
Counties in 1870. 
15united States Eighth Census, Agriculture, 136. 45 
demonstrated, various competitions held, and issues 
debated. 16 These fairs were a manifestation of the 
importance and prestige of agriculture in the State and 
County in the pre-Civil War era. 
The need to market the agricultural produce of this 
rural region stimulated the formation of the first urban 
place in the Upper Tennessee Valley region. The town of 
Kingston, which became the regional focus of commercial and 
political activity in the mercantile capitalist era, was 
established by an act of the state legislature in late 
1799. Founded near the confluence of the Emory, Clinch, 
and Tennessee Rivers, Kingston began as a trading post for 
the federal government's military post at Fort Southwest 
Point. Its functions expanded with the Valley's growing 
population, and as political boundaries began to be placed 
on the landscape of East Tennessee. By the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Kingston had become the marketing 
center for produce from the surrounding valley farms, 
mainly because of its access to river transportation. The 
town also was named the county seat of Roane County in 
1801, bringing formal governmental apparatus in the 
following years. 17 Court facilities, law offices, 
mercantile establishments, and inns were established in 
16pickel, "History of Roane County," 55-60. 
17Jack Shelley, Helen Galloway, Arny Wolfe, and Madge Sneed, "Towns -
Old and New" in Jere Hall and Jack B. Shelley, Eds., Valley of 
Challenge and Change: Roane County, Tennessee, 1860-1900 (Knoxville, 
TN: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1986), 49-51. 46 
Kingston to serve its local political functions and to 
cater to its rural hinterland. 
Despite the steady flow of settlers into the Valley 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the growth of the area was hampered by inadequate 
transportation. The first settlers had floated down the 
Tennessee River or one of its tributaries on flatboats, or 
followed poorly marked and hazardous game trails and Indian 
paths into the region. The region remained without any 
improved routes of land travel until 1792, when the Treaty 
of Holston was signed, providing for a road to be 
constructed westward from Knoxville to the new settlements 
of Middle Tennessee. The route chosen for the new road was 
from Knoxville to Kingston (Fort Southwest Point) where the 
Clinch River was crossed by ferry, west across Indian 
territory for one hundred miles to a ferry crossing of the 
Cumberland River (which became the town of Carthage), and 
on to Nashville via the settlement of Gallatin (Figure 
1.1). The road, which came to be known as Walton Road18, 
was completed in 1795 and improved in 1801 through state 
approprations and the incorporation of the Cumberland 
Turnpike Company. 19 After 1800, the State of Tennessee 
18The road was named for William Walton, a member of the board of 
commissioners of the Cumberland Turnpike Company. 
19Thornas P. Aberethy, Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in 
Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1932), 155-158; Stanley J. Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and 
Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History (Knoxville, TN: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 241-244; Albert C. Holt, The 
Economic and Social Beginnings of Tennessee (Nashville, TN: George 
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Figure 1.1. Early Roads and Settlements of Tennessee 
RI Cumberland Settlement 
increasingly encouraged the construction of roads into 
settlement areas. 
In the early nineteenth century, Walton Road became 
the principal route of overland travel between East and 
Middle Tennessee. Kingston's location along Walton Road, 
and at the confluence of the Emory, Clinch, and Tennessee 
Rivers cemented its primacy as the economic and commercial 
center of the region. Its access to water and land travel 
routes made it a natural break-of-bulk point, and a 
strategic site for the east-west transportation of both 
people and commodities. Many travelers on their way to 
Middle Tennessee and points west stopped in Kingston for 
rest and provisions. Would-be settlers also waited at 
Kingston for military escorts to accompany them on their 
westward journey, as protection from Indian attacks which 
occurred periodically in the territory between the Clinch 
and Cumberland Rivers. 20 
Until approximately 1830, road and unorganized river 
transportation dictated the pattern of commodity flows and 
movement of people through the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
region. As the region was settled, it became evident that 
the upper limits of the Tennessee River contained natural 
obstacles preventing the movement of larger boats between 
Knoxville and important southern ports such as Memphis and 
New Orleans. The most troublesome of these was Muscle 
Shoals in Alabama, a thirty-seven mile stretch of rapids 
20Holt, Economic and Social Beginnings, 70-71. 49 
created by a cumulative vertical drop of 134 feet in the 
river. The shoals were located 260 miles from the 
confluence of the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers. They could be 
traversed only during the high-water season and then only 
by boats small in comparison to those used on the Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers. Muscle Shoals cut East Tennessee off 
from the larger southern economy. By 1822, a regular 
steamboat line was in operation between New Orleans and 
southern boundary of the Muscle Shoals, but the Upper 
Tennessee remained unserved. 
In 1828, however, the steamboat era finally reached 
East Tennessee. During February and March of that year, 
the steamboat Atlas traveled from New Orleans up the 
Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee River to Knoxville. The 
Atlas had crossed Muscle Shoals during a high-water period, 
and arrived in Knoxville with much fanfare. 21 The city 
fathers of Knoxville had much anticipated the arrival of 
steamboat transport, and in fact gave the captain of the 
Atlas a $640 purse for successfully completing the journey. 
It would be another three years, however, before regular 
steamboat service began in the Tennessee Valley. This was 
a result of the successful plea of East Tennesseans to the 
state legislature in 1830 for $60,000 to improve conditions 
for water transport on the Tennessee River. The money was 
used to dredge a navigable channel between Knoxville and 
21 Knoxville Daily Register, March 4, 1828. 
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the Alabama state line. 22 The dredging made steamboat 
travel possible between Knoxville and Decatur, Alabama at 
the head of Muscle Shoals from November until June. 23 
The advent of streamboat transportation brought 
significant growth to the economy of the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley. During the late 1830s and 1840s, there was 
substantial growth in commerce carried on regional rivers. 
Agricultural products were brought down the Clinch and 
Tennessee Rivers in large quantities, and were most often 
transported on to Chattanooga or Decatur, Alabama. 24 
Kingston remained the focus of the emerging mercantile 
agricultural-steamboat-based economy, and its regional 
importance increased accordingly. Produce from the 
agricultural hinterland was assembled in the town, and its 
value improved by reducing bulk and perishability. Corn, 
for example, was shelled and sacked, milled into cornmeal, 
or made into whiskey. A mill ground wheat into flour. 
Kingston's wharf was kept busy with the shipment of 
agricultural products and trade items. To accommodate 
22Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, Chattanooga Country 1540-
1951: From Tomahawks to TVA (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1952), 
121-122. 
23Edwin P. Patton, "Transportation Development" in Lucille Deadrick, 
Ed., Heart of the Valley: A History of Knoxville, Tennessee 
(Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1976), 179-181; 
Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History of 
Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical 
Society, 1946), 96-100. 
241n 1838, a state appropriation was made to improve navigation on 
selected tributaries of the Tennessee River. As a result of this, 
keelboat transport of produce on tributaries such as the Holston, 
Clinch, and Emory Rivers increased, and these agricultural areas were 
connected with steamboat travel on the Tennessee River. 51 
passengers arriving by boat and overland stage, new larger 
hotels and businesses were built during this period. 
Kingston remained the sole urban settlement of any 
consequence in the region until the 1850s, when 
transportation innovation brought advantages to another 
site along the Tennessee River. The village of Blair's 
Ferry had been established by the Blair family, some of the 
earliest settlers to the region, in 1817. The family had 
come to an agreement with the Cherokee Indians, in which 
they obtained permission to operate a ferry across the 
Tennessee River. 25 Blair's Ferry remained a small river 
settlement for the next thirty years, growing only slightly 
with steamboat travel on the river. By the late 1840s, the 
village consisted only of one general store, a steamboat 
landing, and a few houses. Blair's Ferry's future, was 
changed, however, with the first railroad line to East 
Tennessee. The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad ran 
from Dalton, Georgia north to the Blair's Ferry site and 
was completed in 1852. 26 Within two years, Blair's Ferry 
became an important place in the region in association with 
the railroad. 
The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad was a revival 
of the Hiwassee Railroad, which had made an aborted effort 
to build a railroad from Dalton, Georgia to Knoxville 
before its financial collapse in 1842. Following the 
25Ted B. Clark, "The Changing Central Place Function of Loudon, 
Tennessee," (M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Tennessee, 1968), 6-8. 
26Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 104-107; Folrnsbee et. al., 
Tennessee - A Short History, 261-262. 52 
termination of a civil suit against the Hiwassee by the 
State of Tennessee, the company was reorganized and 
obtained its new charter in 1848. Continuation of rail 
line construction north from Dalton was made possible by a 
loan of $350,000 in state bonds by the State of 
Tennessee. 27 By August of 1852, construction of the rail 
line had been completed from Dalton to Blair's Ferry, and 
trains had begun operation. Blair's Ferry became the 
northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia in 1852 
mainly because funds were not available to build a railroad 
bridge across the Tennessee River. 
The fortuitous advantage conferred upon Blair's Ferry 
by the local landscape served as the impetus of its rapid 
growth in the ensuing years. A larger town area was 
planned and platted in 1852, and the planned community was 
renamed Loudon, after the first English fort in the region. 
In the aftermath of the completion of the railroad, a 
"boom-town" atmosphere existed, as Loudon became the only 
railroad-connected, break-of-bulk point28 in the Valley. 
Produce in large quantities was brought from various 
locations on the river, and transferred to the railroad 
where it was shipped to points south. Traffic was so heavy 
during the harvest season that steamboats had to lay over 
several days to discharge cargo. Merchants began selling 
27Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 105. 
28A break-of-bulk point is a location at which there is a transfer of 
commodities from one mode of transportation to another. In the case 
of Loudon, the town became an important break-of-bulk point between 
water and rail transport when the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad 
was completed in 1852. 
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produce and dried goods in new stores, a flouring mill was 
built to refine corn and wheat, and a saw mill and foundry 
were established at the new transportation crossroads. 29 
The population of Blair's Ferry/Loudon grew rapidly in the 
early rail period, propelling it from a frontier settlement 
to an important regional town. 
Loudon's boom town era did not last long, however; 
railroad expansion took away the town's locational 
advantage as quickly as it conferred it. The East 
Tennessee and Georgia Railroad's problem with lack of 
construction funds was solved when the Tennessee State 
Legislature announced in 1854 that it would provide a loan 
for the extension of the line northward. The State 
provided $8,000 per mile of rail line, on the condition 
that the rail line be completed to Knoxville. 30 By June of 
1855, the extension to Knoxville was completed, making it 
the northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia. 
Less than three years later, Knoxville became the 
connection point of the the East Tennessee and Georgia and 
East Tennessee and Virginia Railroads, making it a 
strategic location on a rail network that stretched from 
Richmond, Virginia to Atlanta, Georgia. 31 Although 
29Goodspeed's History of Tennessee: Containing Historical and 
Biographical Sketches of Thirty East Tennessee Counties (Nashville, 
TN: reprinted from Goodspeed's History of Tennessee 1887 by Elder 
Booksellers, 1972), 826-827. 
301t is generally accepted that Knoxville lobbied to become the 
northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from its 
inception It is probable that Knoxvillians used whatever influence 
they could muster to encourage the State to fund the extension of the 
East Tennessee and Georgia to Knoxville. 
31Patton, "Transportation Development", 193-195. 54 
Loudon's boom town phase was over after 1855, it remained a 
locally important marketing center because of its water-
rail connection. 
The civil war in the upper Tennessee River Valley 
The debate over states rights and slavery came to 
Tennessee as it did other southern states in 1860 and 1861. 
A political chasm on the issue of slavery developed between 
the counties of East Tennessee and the rest of the state. 
While East Tennesseeans varied in their attitudes toward 
slavery, they did not identify with the large plantation 
owners of the deeper South who were benefitting to a much 
larger degree frorr the institution. East Tennessee was 
also the last stronghold of the Whig party, whose 
conservative tenets tended to ally it with the Unionist 
cause. 
By February of 1861, the states' rights debate and 
slavery controversy in Tennessee had reached such critical 
proportions that Governor Isham Harris called for a special 
session of the state legislature to decide whether or not 
the State should seceed from the Union. Harris enumerated 
twenty-three grounds of complaint against the Northern 
states, which he believed necessitated and justified the 
removal of Tennessee and other Southern states from the 
Union. 32 The convening of the seccession convention was 
32oliver P. Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War (Cincinnati, OH: 
The Robert Clarke Co., 1899), 167-172; Governor Harris was a stauch 55 
defeated statewide by a margin of 66,000 votes, and in the 
counties of East Tennessee alone the convening of the 
convention lost by over 25,000 votes. This resolution of 
the seccession issue in Tennessee lasted only a few months, 
as Confederate troops opened fire on the federal garrison 
of Fort Sumter in April of 1861. Shortly thereafter, 
~resident Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down 
the rebellious Southern states. The decision by the 
federal government to stop state succession by force 
created a new opportunity for seccessionists in Tennessee. 
They were able to capitalize on President Lincoln's 
decision by stoking fears of northern aggression against 
the South, and once again called for the removal of the 
State from the Union. 
A second seccession referendum vote was called for 
June of 1861 by Governor Harris. The Tennessee State 
Legislature had already adopted a resolution of military 
alliance between the State and the Confederate government 
in the preceding months, and was seeking popular support 
for the decision. As the time for the referendum 
approached, most prominent leaders of church, press, and 
state in Middle and West Tennessee were urging ratification 
of the declaration of independence, while those in East 
Tennessee were arguing against it. The result of this 
second vote was a substantial 50,000 vote majority in favor 
Democrat, and was sympathetic to the cause of the southern planter 
and slave owner. It is widely held that his personal views dictated 
this first attempt to remove the State of Tennessee from the Union 
before the attack on Fort Sumter. 56 
of secession from the Union statewide. 33 There was 
considerable regional variation in the secession vote. The 
traditional Whig districts of East Tennessee, with 
Knoxville as the regional focus, strongly opposed 
separation from the Union. The established Democratic area 
to the northeast followed native son, former governor, and 
United States senator Andrew Johnson in opposing secession 
as well (with the exception of Sullivan County). Middle 
and West Tennessee voted almost solidly for secession. 
The Unionist counties of East Tennessee made a last 
ditch effort to avoid separation from the federal 
government. Meetings of prominent Unionists were held in 
Knoxville, Greeneville, and other towns shortly after the 
vote in order to develop a plan of action. The final 
result was a convention at Greeneville, Tennessee at which 
a plan was proposed for the independence of the East 
Tennessee region as a separate state. The proposal was 
presented to the state legislature, which took no action on 
it, but noted the security problems that Unionist 
sentiments in East Tennessee presented to the Confederacy. 
The eastern part of the state was strategically valuable as 
a principal avenue of travel between the upper and lower 
South, especially because of the East Tennessee and 
Georgia, and East Tennessee and Virginia Railroads which 
stretched from Atlanta, Georgia to the Confederate capital 
33James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee (Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1934), 14-24; 
Abernethy, Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, 338-343; Temple, East 
Tennessee and the Civil War, 196-204. 57 
of Richmond, Virginia. In less than a month, six 
Confederate regiments were sent to East Tennesssee to 
secure the region, commanded by former Knoxvillian General 
Felix Zellicoffer. 3 4 
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was a microcosm of 
events that were taking place throughout East Tennessee 
during the Civil War. The citizens of the region were 
split fairly evenly between support of the Confederacy and 
the Union. Union supporters, however, were being 
increasingly persecuted by local Confederate sympathizers 
and soldiers that had moved into the region. Many Union 
sympathizers left the region and fled to Kentucky or other 
northern states where volunteer units were being organized 
in the latter months of 1861. Some stayed in Tennessee and 
resisted Confederate occupation through guerilla 
activity. 35 Many remaining residents also joined 
Confederate units that were being raised in Knoxville and 
other nearby towns. 
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was controlled by 
occupying Confederate forces until the summer of 1863, when 
Federal forces brcught the shooting war to East Tennessee. 
Since the beginning of hostilities President Lincoln had 
wanted to aid those loyal to the federal government in 
34James w. Fertig, The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1898), 28-32; Folmsbee, 
Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History, 324-325. 
35The most infamous of these guerilla activities was the coordinated 
burning of five railroad bridges between Stevenson, Alabama and 
Bristol, Tennessee, which rendered 265 miles of railway useless and 
impeded the transportation of Confederate troops and supplies to the 
battlefields of Northern Virginia. 
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Tennessee. In August of 1863, General Ambrose Burnside 
directed his Federal Army of the Ohio to begin movement to 
the south from Camp Nelson, Kentucky into East Tennessee. 
Receiving advance notice of the movement of Federal forces, 
Confederate General Simon Buckner elected to abandon the 
Tennessee River Valley in the face of superior numbers. By 
September the region was under Union control. 
Unfortunately, the fighting in the county would not end for 
over a year after this. The defeat of federal forces under 
General William Rosecrans at Chickamauga to the south 
allowed Confederate calvary to roam freely throughout East 
Tennessee. General Nathan Bedford Forrest in particular 
led raids into the region, inflicting heavy losses in terms 
of men and materials. From the fall of 1863 until the end 
of the war, the Valley endured skirmishes between the 
armies several times. 
The economic, social, and intellectual life of the 
Tennessee River Valley suffered greatly during the Civil 
War. As the result of constant troop movements through the 
Valley, the land was stripped of most of its foodstuffs. 
What armies did not forage from the farmsteads, marauders 
stole from the defenseless families that remained. 
Businesses in towns such as Kingston and Loudon were not 
able to replentish their stocks because of the fighting, 
and many were forced out of business. Gold and silver had 
passed completely out of circulation so that any type of 
business had to be done using paper money of questionable 
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value. Many schools and churches had also been damaged and 
destroyed. Farms and property lay idle. Many of the 
Unionists that did return to the region after the war 
wanted retribution, and sought reparations from the estates 
of Confederate officers who had damaged their properties. 
This created an atmosphere of hostility between former 
local Confederates and Unionists in the months and years 
following the close of the war. 3 6 
One important result of the war which would have 
future ramifications for the region was the exposure of 
outside Union soldiers to the area. Their travels though 
the Tennessee Valley during wartime exposed them for the 
first time to the natural resource base of the region. 
Union officers such as General John T. Wilder and Captain 
Hiram S. Chamberlain took notice of the large deposits of 
iron ore and coal along the Cumberland Escarpment which 
formed the western boundary of the valley. Although large-
scale investment in the region would be delayed for a few 
years during the post-war recovery period, the interest of 
these entrepreneurs had been piqued, and it would play a 
large role in the region in the years to come. 
In summary, at the close of the Civil War, the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley continued to be an agriculture-
dominated region. The Civil War had taken its toll on the 
36Jack Mcinnis and William Jarnborsky, "A County in Time of Turmoil", 
in Jere Hall and Jack B. Shelley, Eds., Valley of Challenge and 
Change: Roane County, Tennessee, 1860-1900, (Knoxville, TN: East 
Tennessee Historical Society, 1986), 8-12; Fertig, Unionism and 
Reconstruction in Tennessee, 68-72. 
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area, but the economic balance of agriculture and marketing 
remained, if on a slightly smaller scale. The towns of 
Kingston and Loudon were the marketing centers of the 
mercantile economy, and they provided services for 
residents of the rural hinterland. The Upper Tennessee 
Valley remained a relatively isolated backwater region, 
however, with its only railroad connection being the East 
Tennessee and Georgia which ran through the extreme eastern 
section. The ensuing years would change the region's 
fortunes and its character, bringing it into the larger 
industrial economy. 
Chapter II 
RECONSTRUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE SECOND ROUND 
OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
Reconstruction in Tennessee 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Tennessee was a 
state torn asunder by the atrocities of wartime and the 
rivalries of soldiers returned home. The sufferings of 
Tennesseans, so pronounced during the hostilities, were 
continued into the post-war period with the return of Union 
and Confederate soldiers. Many men returned to land 
damaged and made barren by war, and fought with those they 
held responsible. Added to this were the social and 
economic issues posed by recently freed African- Americans, 
who were adjusting to their new status. 
The State of Tennessee had technically been under 
federal military rule since March of 1862, when federal 
troops forced the evacuation of Confederate forces from 
Nashville and Middle Tennessee. Andrew Johnson, a native 
Tennessean and United States senator, was appointed 
military governor of Tennessee by President Lincoln at this 
time. Johnson's tenure as governor lasted until early 
1865, when his duties as Vice President of the United 
States required his presence in Washington, D.C. His last 
official act as governor of Tennessee was the authorization 
of elections to select officials for a civil state 
government. At the election, held on March 4, 1865, 
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William G. Brownlow was elected governor by a large 
majority. 1 
Brownlow's Republican administration immediately 
undertook a program of harsh retribution against former 
Confederates. Governor Brownlow recommended that the state 
criminal code be strengthened to combat guerilla activity; 
that suffrage be limited to loyal Union men; that freedmen 
be protected from the harrassment of former Confederates; 
and that Confederate officers and bank directors be held 
personally responsible for bank and railroad losses. He 
also announced a reward of $5000 for the arrest of former 
state governor Isham G. Harris, declaring him "responsible 
to a great extent for the war ... 112 
Part of the Brownlow administration's wholesale 
rejection of the Confederate creed was a marked 
reorientation of the government's approach to economic 
development within the state. Prior to the Civil War, 
Tennesseans in general and the state government in 
particular, held firmly to the doctrine of the superiority 
of agriculture to other economic activities. For example, 
in 1854 the Tennessee general assembly, in the preamble of. 
an act establishing a state agricuitural bureau, explicitly 
stated that agriculture was the source and foundation of 
all industry and that the state must continue to rely upon 
1Fertig, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 34-59. Only men 
who took an oath of loyalty to the Union were allowed to vote for 
civil state government positions. This was in large part the reason 
for Brownlow's easy victory. 
2Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History, 353-354. 63 
it for its future prosperity. 3 Brownlow and his fellow 
Radical Republicans that took over post-war state 
leadership saw the war as a clash of economic systems as 
well as armies, and interpreted Confederate defeat as 
evidence that the antebellum South had failed to cultivate 
a strong economic base. Governor Brownlow's new direction 
was evident from his inaugural speech, in which he 
proclaimed " ... that the natural resources of the Southern 
States are being expatiated upon, in order that 
enterprising emigrants may be led to come among us and add 
to our capital and enterprise. Tennessee holds out 
inducements to wealthy and industrious emigrants that no 
other border state affords." 4 The new administration set 
about implementing a program of industrialization that 
would put the state in step with the industial economy that 
was emerging north of the Mason-Dixon line. 
The staple argument of the pro-industrial 
reconstruction government was based upon the doctrine of 
state self-sufficiency. In 1868, a legislative committee 
reported that Tennesseeans were spending more than 
$77,000,000 for imported manufactured goods. To remedy 
this situation, the state government established a State 
Board of Immigration in late 1867, charged with the 
encouragement of immigration from the Northern states and 
3constantine G. Belissary, "The Rise of Industry and the Industrial 
Spirit in Tennessee, 1865-1885," The Journal of Southern History XIX 
(May, 1953), 193-215. 
4Quoted from the Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator, May 5, 1869 in 
W.B. Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpet-baggers," East 
Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 4 (1932) 104. 64 
Europe. The board was funded by state appropriations, and 
was authorized to publish pamphlets, newspaper articles, 
and advertisements, as well as send agents to northern and 
eastern states to tout Tennessee and its resources. 5 The 
theory behind this strategy was that changing from a 
predominantly agrarian to a diversified economy required 
the help of immigrants, skilled in machine labor and 
attuned to the factory system. This is evident in the 
preface of an immigration handbook published by the Board 
of Immigration. In it, author Hermann Bokum described the 
administration's desire to diversify Tennessee's economy: 
"Instead of an almost exclusive attention to agriculture, 
which has prevailed in the South for so many years, there 
is now a general desire that there should be a harmonious 
development of its resources. In consequence of it, 
immigration which was regarded with indifference or 
dislike, is now greatly desired. 116 During the late 1860s, 
various bills were also introduced into the legislature, 
explicitly inviting outside capital and industry to the 
state and establishing an association to encourage 
industry. 
The popular sentiment of Tennesseeans towards industry 
during the post-war period was also improved by the sharp 
regression in prices of agricultural goods beginning in the 
late 1860s. The price of cotton dropped from 23 cents a 
5Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpet-baggers," 108-109; 
Belissary, "The Rise of the Industrial Spirit in Tennessee," 207-208. 
6Hermann Bokum, The Tennessee Handbook and Immigrant's Guide 
(Philadelphia, PA, 1868), 3. 65 
pound in 1868 to 15 cents in 1870 and 9 cents in 1878. 7 
Wheat followed a similar downward spiral, dropping from 
$2.18 a bushel in 1868 to $1.00 in 1870, and bottoming out 
at 77 cents in 1878. 8 As a result of these price 
decreases, many Tennesseeans were forced to activities 
other than farming to make a living and feed their 
families. Another consequence was the erosion of faith in 
agrarianism as the path to post-war social and economic 
regeneration. Industry was becoming more widely viewed not 
only as a feasible alternative for economic development by 
investors and policy makers, but also as a potential 
generator of income and livelihood by the populace. 
Radical Republican rule in Tennessee ended in 1869 
when William Brownlow was elected to the United States 
Senate, and resigned the governor's seat. The ensuing 
election resulted in the victory of the Radical-turned-
Conservative DeWitt C. Senter in the governor's race, and 
Conservative majorities in both houses of the legislature. 9 
Although the conservatives made changes on many fronts 
during the "redemption" period following reconstruction, 
7James E. Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton Exchange: A 
Century of Commercial Evolution (Garden City, NY, 1934), 180-181. 
8James E. Boyle, Chicago Wheat Prices for Eighty-One Years: Daily, 
Monthly, and Yearly Fluctuations and Their Causes (Ithaca, NY, 1922), 
15. 
9The distinction between Radicals and Conservatives began in the 
immediate post-war reconstruction period. Radicals were identified 
as those who wanted to follow a harsh reconstruction program for the 
South that included the exclusion of former Confederates from such 
citizenship rights as voting and holding office. Conservatives in 
general followed the leadership of president Andrew Johnson and 
Washington Conservatives who wished to put into effect the Liincoln-
Johnson plan of leniency in reconstruction. Thus, with the 
Conservatives in power after 1869, former Confederates began to 
return to positions of power within the state. 66 
they continued the radical policy of encouraging industrial 
development. 10 Woodward, in fact, has suggested that 
"Redemption was not a return of an old system nor the 
restoration of an old ruling class. It was rather a phase 
of the revolutionary process begun· in 1865. 1111 The 
dominant element among the conservatives that came to power 
on the heels of reconstruction in the South were middle-
class, with a decidedly industrial, capitalistic outlook. 
They had little connection with the old planter regime, and 
did not share its reproach for outside capital and 
industry. 
An examination of two of Tennessee's early 
Conservative governors confirms Woodward's contentions. 
Former Confederate general John C. Brown took over the 
governorship of the state in 1870 from DeWitt Senter. 
Brown was an active industrialist, who took prominent part 
in the ambitious schemes of Thomas A. Scott for a southern 
transcontinental railway and served as vice president of 
Scott's Texas and Pacific Company. Later he became 
president of the Bon Air Coal Company, and at the time of 
his death he was serving as president of the expanding 
Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company. His successor, 
James D. Porter, was also a Confederate veteran and 
10Redemption was a term applied to the restoration of Conservative 
rule by native southerners in southern states. Many southerners felt 
that they had been unjustly governed by Radical Republican outsiders 
during reconstruction, and hailed the return of Conservative state 
administrations. 
11c. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge, 
LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 21-22. 67 
industrialist. Porter served two full terms in office, 
after which he was elected president of the Nashville, 
Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad. He also served on the 
board of directors of the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and 
Railroad Company, as well as several other financial 
enterprises in Nashville. 12 Brown and Porter were typical 
of the New South Conservatives that dominated Tennessee 
politics during the two decades following reconstruction, 
mixing the mores of the Old South with a recognition that 
industrial capitalism was the wave of the future. 
The pro-industrial policies of the reconstruction 
Radicals and the redemption Conservatives contributed to 
industrial growth in the state. By 1870, despite war 
damages and political turmoil, industry in Tennessee had 
surpassed its pre-war proportions. The number of plants 
had more than doubled since 1860, from 2,500 to 5,300; the 
number of industrial workers had increased from 12,500 to 
19,400; the value added in manufacturing had increased by 
$7,000,000 to $15,000,000 in 1870; and the value of 
industrial goods produced had almost doubled during the 
decade. 13 Leading the industrial emergence was the iron 
industry, upon which most often was placed the hopes of 
Tennessee manufacturing promoters. Iron production in 
Tennessee steadily increased between 1865 and 1870, and 
fueled speculation that the iron ore and coal deposits of 
12Ibid, 3. 
13Tenth Census, 1880: Manufactures (Washington, D.C., 1883), xiv. 68 
the eastern part of the state would be the basis of 
industrial development within the state. 
The Iron Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth century 
Between the late-eighteenth century and the 1870s, 
iron production in the United States was carried out in 
small-scale facilities. Iron was the dominant metal 
building material used during this period, as steelmaking 
was only in its infancy by 1870. Compared to the later 
steel industry, iron production was a disconnected process 
performed by separate companies. 
The primary stage of ironmaking involved the smelting 
of iron ore in a blast furnace to remove impurities from 
the ore. The resulting product, pig iron, was often not 
refined enough to be worked into shapes without breaking; 
the metal requir~d further purification. Skilled iron 
workers called puddlers performed this process, melting, 
stirring, and kneading pig iron ingots inside puddling 
furnaces until slag could be drained and the ingots fused 
to become a 200 pound ball of wrought iron. This ball was 
then sent to a squeezer and muck rolls where remaining 
impurities were removed. The iron was usually put through 
a secondary production stage in which it was reduced into 
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blooms and then processed into finished products such as 
bars, rails, plates or sheets. 14 
Prior to the Civil War, almost all rolling mills were 
of the "two-high" type, in which iron was processed using 
two iron rolls or cylinders. After an initial pass, the 
hot wrought iron was lifted and carried manually over the 
top roll to be reinserted for another pass. With each 
successive pass, the pressure and width of the rolls were 
adjusted by workers called rollers. Through this process 
dependent upon manual labor and numerous reheatings, the 
iron was manipulated into rails, rods, bars, plates, and 
sheets. 
Each of these stages of iron production required a 
specific set of locational attributes. Furnace operators, 
dependent upon a supply of bulky natural resources, located 
their furnaces in rural areas near hardwood forests and 
deposits of iron ore and limestone. Puddling furnaces were 
sometimes found in conjunction with blast furnaces, but 
more often they were associated with rolling mill 
operations. Because of their greater labor requirements, 
their need for access to transportation facilities, and 
their large and constant demand for pig iron ingots, 
rolling mill owners most often located their production 
facilities at the most accessible transportation nodes --
reasonably large towns and cities. 
14Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth-Century America: An 
Economic Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1964), 102-105. 70 
Thus, prior to the 1870s, smelting, puddling and 
rolling operations in the United States were carried out at 
dispersed locations. Few, if any, companies had access to 
the large amount of investment capital required to operate 
a furnace, puddling department and rolling mill. Because 
iron smelting was notoriously unpredictable -- plagued by 
problems with furnaces, temporary labor shortages, and 
variable ore supplies -- pig iron production rates were 
uncertain. Moreover, market demand for pig iron also 
fluctuated. Rolling mills could also break down, rolled 
iron buyers sometimes cancelled their orders, and for both 
furnace and rolling mill there was always the possibility 
of work stoppages because of labor problems. Porter and 
Livesay argue that these fluctuations in supply and demand 
created a difficult situation for iron producers, and a 
need for an intermediary to match suppliers and buyers. 
With respect to this situation, they state "What was needed 
was an intermediate agency which could rationalize the flow 
of material by collecting large supplies from the sporadic 
output of many furnaces and matching them to the demands of 
a multitude of widely scattered foundries, bloomeries, and 
rolling mills. Only one man, the city merchant, was 
capable of performing this function, and iron smelters 
invariably turned to him. 11 15 
15Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers: 
Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth Century Marketing 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 42. 71 
Housing Industrial workers; varying Solutions 
As they became part of the industrializing labor 
force, workers were confronted with the basic need for 
shelter in production areas. Laborers in some cases could 
provide their own shelter, but in many cases they did not 
have the financial resources to build housing and obtain 
the various goods which were needed for everyday life. 
Often, during the early years of factory production, 
independent landowners and/or developers would be the ones 
to respond to this demand for worker housing. 
Large and small landowners hired contractors to build 
up tracts of land into speculative housing ventures. 16 
These developments varied in size from a few houses to 
acres lined with structures. Some developers offered 
rental housing to workers, seeking long-term financial 
returns through monthly payments. Others sought immediate 
returns on their speculative investment by selling houses 
to individuals. Workers in residential areas around the 
factories were thus usually divided into renters and 
owners. 
Low wages limited most workers to inadequate and 
crowded housing close to the workplace. These conditions 
were worsened when the demand for low-skill, low-wage labor 
increased in production facilities. If independent 
developers could not or would not respond rapidly to the 
16sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in 
Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard and MIT Press, 1962). 72 
increased need for new housing, existing dwellings were 
made to accomodate more people. In many American cities 
and towns, large boarding houses and tenements were 
constructed by landowners and in some cases laborers 
themselves to supply the demand. 17 This process created 
severe overcrowding, and overwhelmed the capacity of urban 
infrastructure, resulting in unsanitary and unhealthy 
living conditions. 
The Reaction of Industrialists and Social Reformers 
Sanitary reformers were horrified by these conditions 
and advocated measures that would alleviate crowding and 
prevent the further development of these types of 
residential areas. Throughout the nineteenth century, a 
series of reform movements attempted to alter the physical 
condition of American cities with the goal of making urban 
residents healthier and happier. The dominant philosophy 
of reformers was that of a causal relationship between the 
quality of environmental conditions and the level of human 
physical and mental health. 18 They addressed important 
urban issues of the era, such as sanitation and the need to 
17sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Urban Wilderness: A History of the 
American City (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Robert Ernst, 
"Immigrants and Tenements in New York City, 1825-1863," in R.A. Mohl 
and N. Betten, eds., Urban America in Historical Perspective (New 
York: Weybight and Talley, 1970), 113-126. 
18Thomas Bender, Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1975); Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 73 
expose urban dwellers to uplifting elements of rural 
settings and nature. The ideas of social reformers 
gradually filtered into the public consciousness during the 
nineteenth century, and resulted in organized sanitary 
reform and urban parks movements. 19 
Urban reform movements generally resulted in the 
commitment of governmental resources to the construction of 
infrastructural facilities. Professional civil engineers 
and architects were retained to design sewer and water 
systems, as well public parks for major American 
metropolitan areas such as New York City, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and Chicago. 20 Later, in the 1880s and 
1890s, urban reformers began to recognize the 
interconnected nature of urban problems and that 
infrastructure must also be approached as a group of 
interconnected systems. The comprehensive planning 
movement began to address a wide range of urban issues 
through the planning, construction, and maintenence of many 
infrastructural facilities. 21 
19Jon A. Peterson, "The Impact of Sanitary Reform Upon American Urban 
Planning, 1840-1890," in Donald A. Krueckeberg, ed., Introduction to 
Planning History in the United States (New Brunswick, NJ: The Center 
for Urban Policy Research, 1987), 13-39. 
20Joel A. Tarr, "The Evolution of Urban Infrastructure in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in Royce Hanson, ed., 
Perspectives on Urban Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 1984), 5-66; Ellis Armstrong et. al., History of 
Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976 (Chicago: American 
Public Works Association, 1976). 
21Robert L. Wrigley, Jr., "The Plan of Chicago," in Donald A. 
Krueckeberg, ed., Introduction to Planning History in the United 
States (New Brunswick, NJ: The Center for Urban Policy Research, 
1987), 58-72. 74 
The social reformers' efforts to improve living 
conditions and the quality of life in American urban areas 
during the late nineteenth century placed heavy emphasis 
upon infrastructural solutions. As the views of the 
reformers began to be accepted by American society, they 
also influenced the attitudes of industrialists. 
Originally, manufacturers were concerned with the impact 
that the living conditions of their workers had on 
productivity at the plant. They quickly realized that it 
was in their best interest to work to preserve a pool of 
healthy and loyal workers who knew their jobs and were 
reliable in work attendance. In many cases, manufacturers 
felt that independent developers failed to provide adequate 
housing, which ultimately impacted the operation of 
production facilities. As a result, some manufacturers 
became involved with the provision of housing in urban 
settings and at rural production sites. 
The Development of Company Towns and Model Company Towns 
In established urban places, factory owners responded 
to worker need for housing by providing shelter that would 
provide the right mix of skill types for production. In 
and around nineteenth century American cities, mill owners 
built a variety of housing types to be used by workers. In 
a typical urban situation, for instance, rows of small 
uniform structures were built on land adjacent to the 
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mills. Larger houses were constructed for foremen at 
advantageous positions, from which the home activities of 
mill workers could be monitored and bosses could easily 
keep track of work attendance. Moving down the rows, 
houses became smaller and rents cheaper for semi-skilled 
and unskilled laborers. The result was the creation of 
distinct districts of company housing, which were added to 
preexisting urban patterns. 
The involvement of factory owners in providing housing 
was not limited to large urban areas. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, manufacturers located their production 
facilities at rural sites near raw materials and power 
sources. In these cases, pools of labor and housing stock 
were limited or nonexistant. Workers and independent 
developers might eventually produce sufficient housing, but 
in many instances industrialists took matters into their 
own hands, recruiting labor and providing housing for them 
in isolated and often self-contained company towns. 
Most nineteenth century company towns adhered to a 
basic policy of company ownership of housing, although 
there were variations in the willingness of facility owners 
to go beyond the provision and maintenance of shelter. The 
creators of company towns were confronted with decisions 
regarding the extent to which they would provide needed 
services such as water, sewer, hospitals, libraries and 
other infrastructural facilities. Some maintained control 
of these service systems and assumed total responsibility 
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for the provision of foodstuffs and other consumer goods by 
building and operating company stores. 
The extent of company involvement usually was a direct 
reflection of the goals that manufacturers hoped to achieve 
by providing housing, services, and commercial functions. 
One possible set of anticipated returns on investment was 
economic profit from housing. If a company wished to 
receive immediate returns on housing investment, rents were 
high and were automatically deducted from paychecks. These 
types of rent practices ensured a direct return of wages to 
the company and quickly paid for the initial outlay in 
housing construction. Once the initial investment was 
recovered, a large percentage of the proceeds from rent 
were profit, and company housing became a money-making 
scheme. 
Rental housing was also a method of tying the 
financial fortunes of workers to the company. It imposed 
limitations on the worker's abilities to seek alternative 
housing opportunities, especially home ownership. When 
high rents were deducted directly from wages, little money 
remained for families to provide for other basic needs. 
In this situation, saving for the down payment on a house 
was almost impossible. 22 In many isolated company towns, 
an open housing market did not exist, further limiting 
worker residential choice. 
22Margaret F. Byington, Homestead: The Households of a Mill Town (New 
York: Russell Sage, 1910). 77 
Differences in companies' willingness to commit 
resources to company towns resulted in differences in 
company town environments. When cost minimization was the 
was the major concern in the production of housing, the 
results were often small, unsanitary, poorly constructed 
houses. These types of housing conditions were usually 
accompanied by unpaved streets and a lack of basic 
services. Rents were many times high, housing policies 
were strict, and the range of goods and services were 
limited to what the company would provide and to what 
company scrip could buy. The starkest examples of "cost 
minimization" company towns in the United States were 
"patches" created by coal operators to house miners. Life 
for workers in these places was little, if any, better than 
the boarding house and tenement environments provided by 
independent developers.23 
Some industrialists chose not to go the cost 
minimalization route, and instead created model company 
towns. Larger investments were made to create a pleasant 
environment for workers through the provision of running 
water, appropriate drainage, and adequate light and 
ventilation. Worker housing was part of an ordered and 
usually professionally designed company-owned settlement. 
For all of their differences, model company towns still 
23crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in 
Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville, TN: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 48-49; Richard V. Francaviglia, 
Hard Places: Reading the Landscape of America's Historic Mining 
Districts (Iowa City, IA: The University of Iowa Press, 1991), 80-81. 78 
included the basic staples of all company towns: production 
areas, infrastructural facilities, and commercial 
functions. 24 
The major philosopical similarity between model and 
other company towns was that both were created by 
industrialists to ensure the continuity and stability of 
the labor force. The methods used to achieve this end were 
different in model company towns, however. The reign of 
manufacturers over minimal cost, poorly built houses and 
service facilities was replaced by a more benevelent 
attitude toward labor. Many model company town builders 
viewed labor as more than just another production input 
that needed to be controlled, thus they adopted a more 
humanistic approach towards workers. 
The realization that labor pools were made up of 
people, and that people had lives away from the workplace 
led some industrialists to believe that it was their 
Christian duty to improve the living environment of workers 
by making it ordered and cleanly. As a result, model 
company town builders developed paternalistic attitudes 
towards labor. Paternalistic industrialists believed that 
good housing in concert with educational, cultural, and 
civic awareness would make workers into better individuals, 
citizens, and Christians. Housing was seen by factory 
owners and urban reformers as an opportunity for workers 
and their families to experience a morally uplifting 
24walter L. Creese, The Search for Environment, The Garden City: 
Before and After (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 79 
lifestyle that included religious observance and 
educational attainment. 
Model company town builders had begun to believe in 
their own modified version of environmentalism: that a good 
living environment made better people and better people 
made better workers. 25 Paternalism was not only a way to 
uplift workers, but a way to make them more efficient. 
Industrialists incorporated environmentalism into the model 
company towns that they developed because they believed 
that their manufacturing operations would be made more 
secure and profitable by doing so. Having been influenced 
by their pleasant surroundings, model company town 
residents would be more reliable workers because they could 
cope better with the strenuous nature of industrial life 
than their city or non-model company town contemporaries. 
They would also appreciate the benevolence of industrial 
employers who made it possible for them to live high 
quality surroundings at low cost. Thus factory owners 
aimed to achieve two goals that expanded far beyond the 
mere maintenance of a work force and providing shelter for 
it. They sought to foster a moral code of conduct and 
company loyalty within their workers. 
Model company towns were idealized blueprints that 
allowed capitalists and industrialists to create places 
with better basic urban conditions and to attempt to 
25stanley Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and 
Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967). 80 
influence the population that lived in those places. With 
their emphasis on workplace efficiency and company loyalty, 
they were meant to be orderly and clean alternantives to 
the clutter, corruption, and unsanitary conditions that 
existed in nineteenth century industrial cities. Model 
company towns were model in a scale sense, in almost all 
cases t~ey were planned for only a few thousand inhabitants 
and several hundred houses. This was in part so they could 
be managed more easily as compared to larger urban areas. 
Finding a scale at which it was practical to build was 
important if industrialists wished to take responsibility 
for, and influence the actions of, their labor force away 
from home. 
Company Towns and Model Company Towns as Places 
During the nineteenth century, the concept of the 
model company town was adapted and altered in a variety of 
cultural and environmental contexts. Model company towns 
in the United States mixed company housing, company-owned 
service facilities, and professional architectural and 
urban design. The earliest of these places, such as 
Lowell, Massachusetts (1823), were created to provide 
worker housing near factories that had been built on 
greenfield sites. Gradually these basic goals were expanded 
to include environmentalism. Later towns such as Pullman, 
Illinois (1880) were, in the main, attempts to provide 
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workers with living environments that would promote 
efficiency in production. They were also intended to 
demonstrate to industrialists, politicians, and the public-
at-large how to do away with the negative impacts of 
housing shortages, unfavorable urban conditions, and labor 
unrest on the production process. 
The business considerations underlying American 
company towns were generally played down by industrialists 
and social reformers in lieu of the benevolent aspects of 
environmentalism. The early development of Lowell, 
Massachusetts, one of the first industrial company towns in 
the United States, reflected the importance of the town as 
a business venture. Founded on a rural greenfield site 
during the early 1820s, the town was successful in large 
part because the factory owners, the Merrimack 
Manufacturing Company, were able to attract a work force 
that met their labor requirements. Doing so depended upon 
the company's ability to convince farmers in the New 
England region that their daughters would be living and 
working in a decent environment if they came to Lowell to 
work in the mills. Thus, the provision of a clean, safe 
and pleasant living environment was for the most part a 
response by the company to existing societal attitudes and 
a strategy to attain a specific required labor force. 26 
Later, the Lowell mills were expanded and other 
industries were established in the town. The Merrimack 
26Bender, Toward an Urban Vision, 33-38; Boyer, Urban Masses and 
Moral Order in America, 78-84. 82 
Company continued to provide housing, although their work 
force eventually expanded beyond young female operatives to 
include a significant number of male machinists, 
operatives, and laborers. Consequently, quality housing 
became less of a strategy for attracting labor for 
production. As Lowell grew and agglomeration economies 
attracted other textile manufacturers and large numbers of 
new employees to the community, the Merrimack Company's 
control began to weaken. Many of the new workers were 
unable to obtain housing from the company or other 
landlords, and were forced to build their own shelter on 
unoccupied tracts of land. 27 Thus, by 1845, living 
conditions in Lowell mirrored those that were developing in 
the larger industrial cities of the United States. 
Another example of an early industrial company town 
was Hopedale, Massachusetts, created by the Draper Company 
for the producti9n of textiles and the housing of workers. 
The town was founded as a business proposition, and was 
intended mainly to ensure the presence of a reliable 
workforce. During later periods of growth, however, 
professional architects and planners were retained to 
create "model neighborhoods" within the community. 
Eventually, the town was commended as a model in urban 
social reform; receiving a gold medal for its housing 
exhibit at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition, a silver 
medal at the Paris Exposition of 1900, and other gold 
27Ibid. 83 
medals at expositions in Liege in 1905 and Milan in 1906. 28 
The Draper Company took advantage of these accolades by 
incorporating the model image of Hopedale into its 
advertisements. By publicizing their model town and their 
perceived progressive attitude towards labor, the Draper 
Company hoped to improve its public image. 
Later in the nineteenth century, the town of Pullman, 
Illinois was founded by the Pullman Palace Car Company of 
Chicago. In providing housing, meeting halls, a library, 
and a shopping precinct near his sleeper car works, the 
company's owner George Pullman hoped to 
"attract and retain a superior type of workingman, who 
would in turn be "elevated and refined" by the 
physical setting. This would mean contented employees 
and a consequent reduction in absenteeism, drinking, 
and shirking on the job. Furthermore, such workers 
were expected to be less susceptible to the 
exhortations of "agitators" than the demoralized 
laborers of the city slums. 1129 
Mr. Pullman also believed that in addition to retaining a 
high-quality, controllable work force, that he (and his 
company) could receive a direct return on the housing 
investment made in the community. He attempted to achieve 
these goals through an expert urban design that would 
provide an ordered physical setting for the daily work 
routine. 
When the construction of Pullman was completed in 
1884, the total cost was eight million dollars, an 
28John S. Garner, The Model Company Town: Urban Design Through 
Private Enterprise in Nineteenth Century New England (Amherst, MA: 
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 205-210. 
29Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community 
Planning, 44. 84 
astronomical sum for the period. The large capital 
investment was used to build housing furnished with gas, 
running water, and indoor toilet facilities, macademized 
streets, two large public parks, a municipal sewage system, 
and a large Arcade building which housed a restaurant, post 
office, shopping area, public library, and theater. Much 
consideration was given to landscape and architectural 
design, with manicured flower beds and public buildings in 
the "secular Gothic" and "Queen Anne" styles. The Pullman 
Palace Car Company had begun the production and repair of 
railroad sleeper cars in early 1881, and maintained control 
over the entire physical fabric of the community. Thus, 
the company's reign extended over not only wages, but also 
housing supply, public space, and rent levels. 30 
Most social commentators during the early years of 
Pullman's history sang its praises, not perceiving the 
undercurrent of worker dissatisfaction that had emerged in 
the town over a period of years. By the early 1890s, this 
undercurrent was brought to the surface by the continuation 
of some of the Pullman Company's policies and perturbations 
in the national economy. Because George Pullman and his 
investors had sought a six percent return on housing, rents 
were set at fixed levels. At the same time, the company 
maintained a sliding wage scale in the rail car works based 
on output and current market prices. In tough financial 
30auder, Pullman; Almont Lidsey, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a 
Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1942). 85 
times, such as those following the economic downturn of 
1893, it became very difficult and in some cases 
impossible under these policies for workers to afford 
housing in the Pullman community. The company, however, 
refused to lower rent levels or to fix a minimum wage for 
employees. This left workers with two options, moving to 
another area for housing or rebelling against the policies 
of the company. Worker sentiment was expressed in the 
Pullman Strike of 1894, which resulted directly in a 
prolonged shutdown of the Pullman Palace Car Company's 
works and indirectly in the paralysis of the national rail 
system from Ohio to California with the sympathy walkout of 
the American Railway Union. 31 
The successes and failures of these places created by 
industry had an effect on the development of other places. 
For example, the positive publicity given to the 
communities of L9well, Hopedale, and Pullman at various 
times more than likely encouraged similar "experiments" at 
other production sites in the United States. The labor 
unrest and violence that later resulted from company 
strategy at Pullman no doubt also impacted perspectives 
toward paternalism and the development of model company 
towns. The continuum of this impact is evident when 
analyzing the development of industrial communities during 
this period. 
31Ibid. 86 
The rise of corporate capitalism and the advent of 
company communities signified new strategies in the 
historical and spatial sequence of capital accumulation and 
industrial production. Not only were these strategies 
distinguished by the increasing importance of the corporate 
form, technological innovation, and new social relations, 
but also by the spatial restructuring of economic activity. 
Thus, the geographic significance of how these strategies 
played out on the landscapes of specific regions. 
Industrial capital in the Upper Tennessee River Valley; 
The Establishment of the Roane Iron company 
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, a positive 
environment existed for the establishment of industrial 
enterprises in Tennessee. Governmental leaders were 
touting industry as the state's hope for economic 
development and recovery, and were instituting policies 
that encouraged industrial location within its borders. 
Union soldiers had been exposed to Tennessee during the 
Civil War, and had seen industrial possibilities in its 
regions (East Tennessee in particular) and resources. It 
was in this context that the first large-scale industrial 
activity came to the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
The Roane Iron Company was organized and incorporated 
in 1867, the brainchild of Union General John T. Wilder, 
one of the principal "economic carpetbaggers" of the 
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recontruction era. During the Civil War, as Wilder 
traveled through the region during military operations, he 
took notice of the deposits of coal and iron ore that were 
present along the slopes of Walden's Ridge, and became 
intrigued with the possibility of a business enterprise in 
Tennessee. 
At the close of the Civil War, Wilder and another 
Union officer stationed in East Tennessee, Captain Hiram S. 
Chamberlain, set about establishing an iron production 
facility in the Tennessee Valley. Both men had previous 
experience in the iron industry. Wilder had served an 
apprenticeship at an iron foundry in Columbus, Ohio during 
his formative years, and moved west to Greensburg, Indiana 
in 1857 where he established his own foundry before the 
war. 32 Chamberlain had been the Union chief quartermaster 
of East Tennessee, and while stationed in Knoxville had 
operated a foundry that produced iron products for use by 
Federal forces.33 Their initial step was the purchase of 
928 acres of Roane County land from local land owners in 
September of 1865. 34 It wasn't until almost two years 
later in June of 1867 that the Roane Iron Company was 
officially organized as a branch company of the East 
Tennessee Union Petroleum, Coal, Iron & Salt Company 
32 samuel C. Williams, General John T. Wilder: Commander, The 
Lightening Brigade (Bloomington, IN, 1936), 2. 
33Michael J. McDonald and William B. Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee: 
Continuity and Change in an Appalachian City (Knoxville, TN: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 21. 
34office of the Register of Deeds, Roane County, TN, Deed Book o, 
354-359. Office of the Register of Deeds will hereafter be cited as 
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(ETUPCI&S). The ETUPCI&S, controlled by important 
Knoxville business figures, had procured the land that 
Wilder and Chamberlain had purchased in 1865, and the newly 
formed Roane Iron Company with Wilder and Chamberlain as 
directors, immediately reacquired it. 35 
Wilder and Chamberlain were initially joined by five 
Midwestern capitalists in the venture: W.O. Rockwood, 
Antrim R. Forsythe, David E. Rees, John M. Lord, and Henry 
C. Lord. These men were apparently associated with Wilder 
and Chamberlain either through wartime contacts or through 
business connections in Indiana or Ohio, and were well 
equipped to aid in the acquisition of startup capital for 
the company. W.O. Rockwood was an Indiana native who had 
been a major in the Union army and served under General 
Wilder in East Tennessee. Forsyth was an Indiana railroad 
promoter and banker; Rees was a banker in both Indianapolis 
and Chattanooga; John Lord was a wealthy Mexican War 
veteran from Indianapolis; and Henry Lord was a railroad 
promoter from Ohio. 36 In December of 1867, the Roane Iron 
35Roane Iron Company, Board of Directors Minutes, June 8, 1867. 
Roane Iron Company will hereafter be cited as RIC. In previous 
studies of the Roane Iron Company, it was suggested that no records 
of the Company were still in existence. However, I discovered 
through local citizens that a man named Tom Ward had salvaged the 
board of directors minutes when the rest of the records had been 
hauled off for scrap in the 1950s. Mr. Ward informed me that he had 
donated these records to the University of Tennessee in the early 
1980s, and upon investigating this I found that the Special 
Collections Library at the University indeed had a microfilm copy of 
them. 
36Judge John Allison, Ed. Notable Men of Tennessee, Volume II. 
(Atlanta, GA: Southern Historical Association, 1905), 303-304; Snyder 
Roberts, "Roane County's Industrial Belt, 1868-1932," 11. This is a 
collection of historical essays written by Mr. Roberts and published 
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Company was officially incorporated by the state of 
Tennessee, with a stock capitalization of $100,000. 37 All 
of the stock declared at this time was owned by the 
original seven principals. Thus, although legally 
incorporated, the company was closely held and managed 
along proprietary lines. 
Wilder and Chamberlain had chosen a site for Roane 
Iron that was close to the iron and coal deposits of 
Walden's Ridge, and within five miles of the navigable 
Tennessee River. The Company began activity in the region 
almost immediately in 1867. An additional 1,000 acres of 
land was purchased in December of that year, and a contract 
was drawn up for the construction of a blast furnace to be 
completed by September 1st of 1868. John Lord and W.O. 
Rockwood were to undertake the building of the furnace, and 
they agreed to build the furnace to specifications: a 
furnace to be powered by bituminous coal or coke, with a 
capacity of at least 15 tons of pig iron per day. 38 These 
specifications are significant because charcoal was the 
dominant fuel nationally for iron production, and there 
were no pig iron facilities utilizing mineral fuel in the 
South at this time. They indicate that the management of 
Roane Iron was intent on creating a state-of-the art 
production facility, one on par with leading plants in the 
North. 
31Acts of Tennessee, 1867-1868, Chapter 27, 34-36. 
38oRD, Roane County, TN, Deed Book P, 566-567; RIC, Board of 
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Over the ensuing year and a half, the Roane Iron 
Company laid the groundwork for the efficient production 
and distribution of pig iron. Rights-of-way were secured 
for a rail line to the Tennessee River, and for a road into 
coal extraction areas. The company continued its policy of 
obtaining local land for mineral extraction, either through 
outright purchase or mineral lease agreements. Also, a 
thirteen acre tract was purchased on the Tennessee River to 
serve as a company landing. 39 In December of 1868, the 
Roane Iron Company's first blast furnace was "blown in," 
initiating the production of pig iron. 
Laborers at the rural Roane Iron production site 
required housing, and in response to this need, the company 
founded a settlement adjacent to the production facility. 
The community was named Rockwood, in deference to W.O. 
Rockwood, the first president of the company, and the 
reality that former Confederates in the area might not look 
favorably on the new project if it had been named for the 
more celebrated General Wilder. 40 The fact that the 
establishment of a town was not mentioned at early board of 
directors meetings suggests that the settlement was a 
spontaneous product of needs generated by the production 
facility. The first mention of housing or lot subdivision 
at a meeting was in June of 1869, seven months after the 
startup of production. In this instance, the plant 
superintendent (John Wilder) was authorized by the board of 
39RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, December 18, 1868, June 2, 1869. 
40shelley, Galloway, Wolfe, and Sneed, "Towns - Old and New," 60. 91 
directors to subdivide company land in certain areas, and 
lease it with restrictions. 41 This would suggest that 
company land around the facility had not been subdivided 
previously, and was being divided and leased on a need 
basis. 
Expansion and Integration; The Early Years of Roane Iron 
The Roane Iron Company's early years of operation in 
the Tennessee Valley were both innovative and tenuous. The 
use of mineral fuel at the production facility's Upland 
South location was the company's most significant 
technological breakthrough. The coal found in this part of 
the Tennessee Valley was bituminous, typified by softness 
and high gas content. To be used effectively for iron 
production, bituminous coal had to be put through a process 
which would expel its gases, leaving a denser product which 
more nearly approximated pure carbon -- coke. The coking 
process involved burning the coal in ovens in the absence 
of air to expel the gases and leave the carbon. Coke ovens 
were required to protect the process from outside elements, 
and to retain maximum heat for the operation. Coke had not 
been used as furnace fuel in the South prior to the Civil 
War because of the high sulfur content of coal found there, 
which contaminated iron made from it. 42 The Roane Iron 
Company was able to produce coke of high enough quality by 
41RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, June 2, 1869. 
42 Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 89, 201. 92 
1868 to make acceptable pig iron, the first instance of 
this innovation in the former Confederacy. This enabled 
the Company's facility at Rockwood to turn out from twelve 
to fifteen tons of pig iron per day, three times as much as 
charcoal furnaces could produce. 43 
Upon solving the coke fuel problem, Roane Iron built 
rows of coke ovens between its coal mines on Walden's Ridge 
and the iron furnaces to the east. Coal was brought on 
narrow gauge tracks from the mines to the ovens, and then 
in its coke form was taken to the furnaces for use as fuel. 
Iron ore was transported in the same manner from more 
dispersed areas of the company's holdings to the furnace. 
The pig iron produced was hauled on tracks five miles to 
the Tennessee River, initially by mules and later, after 
1870, by a company-owned locomotive. 
In the Roane Iron Company's early years of operation, 
the Tennessee River provided the only feasible means of 
transporting pig iron to demand points. Because in general 
the production of blast furnaces exceeded the demand of 
single refiners, Roane Iron required more than one steady 
consumer of pig iron. 44 Early on, its principal consumers 
were rolling mills found upriver in Knoxville, Tennessee 
(the Knoxville Iron Company) and downriver in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee (the Southwestern Iron Company). The company 
struggled during this early period with production 
43Morrow Chamberlain, A Brief History of the Pig Iron Industry in 
East Tennessee (Chattanooga, TN, 1942), 6. 
44Porter and Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers, 41-43. 93 
processes and unpredictable markets. Because the coke fuel 
method was new in the region, the company had to experiment 
with the intricacies of the process using Tennessee coal, 
causing irregularities in production. Also, the economy of 
the region was still recovering from the war, making demand 
for pig iron variable at best. 
The Roane Iron Company survived this early period, and 
by 1870, began expanding its operations. From its 
inception, Roane Iron had been backwardly integrated, 
controlling most of its coal, iron, and limestone supplies 
through large land holdings in the Upper Tennessee River 
Valley. In 1870, the company made a move toward forward 
integration by purchasing the Chattanooga Rolling Mills, 
the property of its former customer the Southwestern Iron 
Company. The purchase price was $225,000 in Roane Iron 
stock. In effect, the transaction served as a merger, 
making the principals in Southwestern Iron significant 
stockholders in the company. 45 
The Chattanooga Rolling Mills facility had been 
constructed by the Construction Corp of the United States 
Military Railroads during the Civil War, after Federal 
forces had captured Chattanooga. The mission of the mill 
was to reroll tons of iron rails that had been damaged by 
retreating Confederate armies, so that they could be used 
for repairs on captured Southern rail lines. In 1866, 
45RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, April 22, 1870, May 12, 1870. The 
capital stock of the company was increased at this time to $600,000, 
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shortly after the close of the war, the Southwestern Iron 
Company acquired ownership of the facility, to use it as a 
rerolling operation for used iron rails. During the next 
three years, Southwestern Iron struggled to make the 
Chattanooga mill profitable in the post-war South. 
Southern railroads needed rails repaired and rerolled, but 
did not have enough capital to pay for the service. 
Because of this the supply of used iron rails was not 
steady, and the mill frequently had to operate at less than 
capacity level. In 1869, Southwestern Iron remedied this 
problem by installing puddling furnaces at the Chattanooga 
facility, which allowed the production of rails from both 
old rails and pig iron. 46 This made the rolling mills much 
more versatile, and attractive to a company such as Roane 
Iron looking to expand its operations. 
With the acquisition of the Chattanooga Rolling Mills 
by the Roane Iron Company, the original blast furnace 
operation at Rockwood became part of an integrated iron 
production system. Pig iron produced at Rockwood was 
shipped very cheaply down the Tennessee River by boat to 
Chattanooga, where it increasingly became the dominant 
component in the manufacture of rails. During the 1870s, 
Roane Iron supplied iron rails to railroads that were 
beginning to expand lines into the South. The Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad was constructing significant mileage 
46James F. Doster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill: An Industrial By-
Product of the Civil War," East Tennessee Historical Society's 
Publications, 36 (1964), 45-51. 95 
of rail lines during the early to mid 1870s, as was the 
Cincinnati Southern Railway. 47 The company was able to 
compete successfully for iron rail contracts with northern 
producers because of its efficient integrated production 
system and its proximity to Southern construction areas. 
The creation of an integrated iron production system 
with its relatively steady demand for pig iron necessitated 
further investment at the Rockwood furnace site. In late 
1871, the stock capitalization of the company was increased 
to $1,000,000, with proceeds from the issue dedicated for 
the construction of a second blast furnace at Rockwood. 48 
The company apparently felt that larger supplies of pig 
iron would be needed at Chattanooga in the future with the 
favorable market for iron rails. In addition, negotiations 
were being carried on with the Cincinnati Southern Railroad 
by 1872 for a right-of-way through Roane Iron land holdings 
in Roane County. The company wanted the Cincinnati 
Southern's Cincinnati to Chattanooga route to go through 
Rockwood, providing another transportation outlet for pig 
iron in addition to the Tennessee River. The result of 
these negotiations was Roane Iron's donation of land and 
timber and stone for construction through Roane County, 
land in Rockwood for depot and shop grounds, as well as 
right-of-way over company land in Chattanooga. 49 
47Ibid, 53; R.O. Biggs, "The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Municipal 
Enterprise," East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 7 
(1935), 81-102; RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 22, 1875. 
48RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, December 15, 1871. 
49Ibid, July 10, 1872. 96 
By 1876, the Roane Iron Company was operating 
successfully in the Southern iron rail market. It was 
employing approximately 500 workers at the Chattanooga mill 
and 300 in the two blast furnaces at Rockwood. These 
facilities had output capacities of 28,000 tons of rails 
per year and 24,000 tons of pig iron per year respectively 
at this time. 50 Unfortunately, just as Roane Iron had 
begun to operate profitably in the Southern iron market, 
technological innovation altered preferences of rail 
consumers. Bessemer and open hearth steel making had been 
gradually perfected in the United States during the late 
1860s and early 1870s. In fact, as early as 1865, the 
first Bessemer steel rails were rolled in Chicago. This 
was followed by the founding of large Bessemer plants at 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in 1868 (Bethlehem Iron Company), 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania in 1871 (Cambria Iron), and 
Braddock, Pennsy~vania in 1872 (Edgar Thompson Steel 
Works). The Trenton Iron Company at Trenton, New Jersey 
was using the open hearth method to make steel rails by 
1868, and was supplying railroads in the Northeastern 
United States by 1870. 51 
Steel rails were stronger and more durable than iron 
ones. Since the late seventeenth century, iron makers had 
known that blister steel, a material stronger than iron, 
50The company struggled somewhat during the recession years of 1873 
and 1874, but continued to operate throughout the period. 
51Joseph G. Butler, Jr., Fifty Years of Iron and Steel (Cleveland, 
OH: The Penton Press Co., 1923), 56-60; Allan Nevins, Abram S. 
Hewitt, with Some Account of Peter Cooper (New York: Harper & 
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could be made by heating wrought iron sheets until the 
impurities were burned away. But blister steel was of 
uneven quality, and could only be produced in small 
amounts. Bessemer and Open Hearth innovations solved these 
problems, and made steel available in large amounts. 
Railroad managers realized that steel rails would allow the 
use of heavier and more powerful locomotives, larger 
freight trains, and permit more efficient overall 
operation. By the mid to late 1870s, the purchase of steel 
rails as replacements for iron by railroads was only 
limited by capital availability and rail supply. This left 
the Roane Iron Company in a undesirable position, as the 
railroads it used to supply switched to steel rails for new 
construction and replacement. In order to stay in the rail 
supply business, the company had to adapt. 
Iron to steel; Roane Iron Enters the steel Rail Market 
The Roane Iron Company endeavored to become the first 
enterprise to make steel in the South. The possibility of 
manufacturing steel rails was first discussed at a board of 
directors meeting in April of 1877, and the idea was 
accepted as a sound one. By July of 1877, Captain 
Chamberlain had traveled to steel works in Cleveland, Ohio, 
and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania investigating steel production 
methods. He had also met with Alexander Holley, a partner 
in the firm of Winslow, Griswold and Holley, which held Sir 
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Henry Bessemer's American steel-making patent and had built 
the first commercial bessemer steel plant in the United 
States at Troy, New York. 52 Chamberlain apparently 
preferred the Siemans-Martin (open hearth) over the 
Bessemer process for steel production at Chattanooga, for 
by April 1878 construction of a Siemans-Martin works was 
under way. 53 
The Siemans-Martin production process was a variation 
of the open hearth principle originally devised by Josiah 
Marshall Heath in 1845. It involved a regenerative 
furnace, which used the heat of combustion normally lost in 
hot chimney gases, in combination with the practice of 
charging scrap iron to dilute pig iron impurities. 54 The 
choice of the Siemans-Martin process was a logical one for 
the Roane Iron Company at this time. It did not require 
high quality pig iron as did the Bessemer process. High 
quality pig iron would have been prohibitively expensive 
given the company's existing iron ore supplies. The quality 
of output could also be more effectively controlled with 
the Siemans-Martins process, in contrast to the uncertain 
52RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, July, 10, 1877. Alexander Holley 
was instumental in the adoption of the Bessemer steel-making process 
in the United States. He helped to develop the first successful 
Bessemer converter in the United States at Wyandotte, Michigan in 
1865, and was also involved in the construction of the Cambria Iron 
Company's Bessemer works at Johnstown, Pennsylvania in 1867. 
53Ibid, April 17, 1878. 
54Leo F. Reinartz, "The Open Hearth Furnace - Part I" in History of 
Iron and Steelmaking in the United States (New York: American 
Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, 1961), 
75. The use of the regenerative furnace was patented by Sir William 
Siemans, a German-born English citizen in the early 1860s. The 
method of using scrap iron to dilute pig iron impurities was patented 
by the Martin Brothers of France shortly thereafter. Hence the name 
Siemans-Martin process. 99 
quality of each Bessemer "cast. 1155 One of the factors that 
was probably most important to Roane Iron was cost, and 
this also favored Siemans-Martin. The company probably 
wanted to build a fairly small facility, and the minimum 
size of an efficient open hearth plant was far smaller than 
that of a Bessemer plant. 56 
By early 1879, two Siemans ten-ton acid open hearth 
furnaces and associated equipment were installed at 
Chattanooga, and steel was being produced for the first 
time in the South (Figure 2.1). The inputs were pig iron 
from Rockwood, scrap iron, and a mixture of raw iron ore 
from Cranberry, North Carolina, Cartersville, Georgia, and 
Maryville, Tennessee. 57 This combination did not make high 
quality steel, however, and Roane Iron continued 
experimenting with the production process. The major 
problem was the high phosphorous content of the Rockwood 
pig iron, which _contaminated the steel manufactured from 
it. The acid process which the company was using did not 
remove phosphorous in the course of refining the iron; the 
phosphorous would simply not combine with the acid lining 
in the refining vessel. In the years to come, 
experimentation revealed that the basic process, in which a 
basic vessel lining was substituted for an acid one, solved 
this problem by allowing phosphorus to combine with the 
lining and be carried off in the slag. 58 Unfortunately for 
55Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt, 241-242. 
56Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 141. 
57chamberlain, A Brief History of the Pig Iron Industry, 138. 
58Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 141-142. 100 
Figure 2.1. 
The Chattanooga Rolling Mills Siemans-Martin 
Steel Facility 
Source: Sanborn Map Company, Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps 
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Roane Iron, this innovation did not come soon enough and 
the phosphorous content problem continually plagued the 
operation at Chattanooga, eventually causing its demise. 
Although 50,000 tons of steel rails were produced and sold 
over a four year period by Roane Iron, the constant 
problems with steel quality in combination with increased 
competition caused the company to close its Chattanooga 
operation in January of 1883. 59 
This was not the end of the Roane Iron Company's 
attempt at profitable steel production, however. The 
company apparently felt that the there was still a profit 
to be made in the steel rail market, and almost immediately 
after the Chattanooga shutdown in 1883 began inquiring 
about the Bessemer steel-making process. 60 By July of 
1883, Roane Iron had obtained permission from the Bessemer 
Steel Company to use the basic Bessemer process for a 
royalty of one dollar per ton of finished steel. 61 The 
switch to the Bessemer process, however, would require 
several prerequisites which the company did not have in 
1883. The first of these was a supply of fairly pure iron 
ore from which to make low-phosphorous pig iron. It had 
become apparent during the company's experiment with the 
open hearth process that the phosphorous content of iron 
ore found in Roane County was too high to make consistent 
quality steel. Ore quality was even more important in the 
59ooster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill," 53-54; RIC, Board of 
Directors Minutes, January 18, 1883. 
60RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 18, 1883. 
61Ibid, July 18, 1883. 103 
Bessemer process, and a new source would have to be found. 
The second was the availability of large-scale capital. 
The purchase of a Bessemer converter was much more costly 
than smaller-scale open hearth equipment, and would require 
larger amounts of capital than the company had ever before 
had to raise. 
The decision to produce steel using the Bessemer 
process forced the Roane Iron Company for the first time to 
look outside of its closed capital structure for operating 
funds. The company realized that it could not obtain the 
large amount of capital it would need through its 
traditional means of offering new stock issues to its 
limited group of existing stockholders. Thus, it looked to 
the national finance market for the capital needed to 
retool the Chattanooga facility. At this time, however, 
the company did not have a nationally-known business figure 
associated with it, and financial institutions did not 
generally loan large amounts of long-term capital to 
industrial enterprises. The Roane Iron Company needed a 
contact through which to gain access to finance capital. 
Roane Iron found this contact in native East 
Tennesseean Charles Mcclung McGhee. Charles McGhee had 
spent the majority of his adult life in Knoxville, 
Tennessee and since the pre-Civil War period had been 
involved in railroad development in the South. The 
company's initial connection to McGhee was through Hiram 
Chamberlain. The two men had met during the Union army's 
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occupation of Knoxville, when Chamberlain was chief 
quartermaster and McGhee was one of the city's most 
prominent businessmen. They had business dealings during 
this period, and apparently forged a profitable 
relationship, for they retained their association after the 
close of the war. 62 By the mid 1880s, McGhee was a vice 
president of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia 
Railroad (ETV&G), and was shuttling back and forth between 
Knoxville and New York City on business. 63 He was 
developing relationships with finance bankers through his 
railroad dealings that would prove valuable to Roane Iron. 
McGhee became involved with Roane Iron in the spring 
of 1882, when, for the first time, he became a stockholder 
and member of the board of directors. This was shortly 
before the decision was made to produce Bessemer steel at 
Chattanooga. 64 For almost four years after the 1883 
shutdown, the Chattanooga mill remained idle while Roane 
Iron made preparations and waited for the right time to re-
enter the steel rail market. By 1886, market prices had 
risen sufficiently to prompt the company to commit to 
production at Chattanooga. The board of directors voted in 
62william J. MacArthur, Jr., "Charles Mcclung McGhee, Southern 
Financier," (PhD Dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), 
199-200. MacArthur's dissertation provides a large volume of 
information on McGhee's financial and investment activity over his 
lifetime. 
63East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad, Board of Directors 
Minutes, Railroad Manuscript Collection, Newman Library, Virginia 
Polytechnic University. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad 
will hereafter be cited as ETVG. The Newman Library at the Virginia 
Polytechnic University administers the records of all of the railroad 
companies that were incorporated into the Southern Railway in 1895. 
64 RIC, Board of Direstor's Minutes, April 19, 1882. 105 
October of 1886 to raise $125,000 for the construction of 
the Bessemer works through the sale of bonds with the 
Chattanooga property as collateral. Chamberlain repeatedly 
requested and received McGhee's help in finding a lender to 
provide this capital. 65 The floating and sale of bonds was 
handled through the Central Trust Company of New York, one 
of the foremost financial institutions in the nation at 
this time. 66 McGhee lent invaluable assistance in the 
negotiations between Roane Iron and the Central Trust 
Company, as he had dealt with the trust company as a 
representative of the ETV&G Railroad. 67 
In the ensuing year, Chamberlain and the Roane Iron 
Company attempted to build an efficient steel production 
facility at Chattanooga. There were problems, however, 
with the quality of iron ore to which the company had 
access for steel manufacture. Roane Iron was forced to buy 
iron ore land in Carter County, Tennessee, and also to 
import pig iron from England for use in the Bessemer 
process. As Chamberlain himself explained the situation: 
I find it necessary to make a rail perfectly satisfactory [sic] 
that it is much better to use some English pig ... I think it 
better that we have some foreign iron very low in phospherous 
in our mixture ... we are making rails for the Cincinnati 
Southern and they are applying very serious drop tests to show 
the breaking or non breaking quality of the rail. To stand 
this test I think it better to use this English iron, or to use 
a small percentage of it. 68 
65chamberlain to McGhee, McGhee Papers, Mcclung Historical 
Collection, June 10, 1886, June 19, 1886, October 16, 1886, October 
23, 1886. All letter references made in this chapter are to the 
McGhee Papers. 
66RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 19, 1887. 
67ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes. 
68chamberlain to McGhee, October 25, 1887. 106 
McGhee did everything in his power to make Roane Iron's 
steel venture at Chattanooga a success, including providing 
business from the railroads with which he was involved. 
The ETV&G ordered steel rails from Roane Iron at McGhee's 
behest, as did the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, of which 
McGhee was president. 69 Roane Iron supplied these Southern 
railroads during 1887 and 1888, but repeatedly ran into 
problems with the quality of rails made at the Chattanooga 
mill. In February of 1888, the ETV&G rejected a shipment 
of steel rails from Roane Iron, because of imperfections. 
The unreliable quality of rails produced at 
Chattanooga caused the demise of Roane Iron's steel 
operation. The company was operating on such a thin margin 
that any temporary work stoppage was enough to prevent the 
payment of monthly bills. When the ETV&G suspended rail 
purchases, the company's major buyer was gone, and the mill 
had to be shut down. Although McGhee intervened for Roane 
Iron with the ETV&G in this case, the incident is 
indicative of the problems the company had with the quality 
of its steel rails. 
Eventually, Roane Iron's damaged reputation among the 
railroads and lower steel rail market prices dictated an 
end to steel production at Chattanooga. The company was 
operating at a loss during 1888 and 1889, and the board of 
directors recognized that the Chattanooga mills was the 
reason. A decision was made to attempt to sell the 
69MacArthur, Jr., "Charles Mcclung McGhee," 201-204. 107 
Chattanooga plant, and in late 1889 a group of buyers 
representating the Southern Iron Company became interested 
in the property. The sale of the mill was accomplished in 
October of 1889, for a price of $250,000. 70 Thus, the 
Roane Iron Company's attempt at finished steel production 
in the South was at an end, and the company retreated to 
the less risky production of pig iron at Rockwood. 
The Roane Iron Company from 1867 to 1889 was an 
innovative industrial enterprise, but with problems arising 
related to capital availability. Roane Iron's record as an 
industrial innovator during this period was impressive: it 
was the first iron manufacturer to use coke in the 
production of pig iron in the South (1868); the first 
company to produce steel of any type in the South at 
Chattanooga (1878); and the earliest enterprise to 
successfully manufacture Bessemer steel in the South 
(1887). The company, however, was in a constant struggle 
to obtain the capital to continue development and achieve 
its objectives. In this respect, it was representative of 
proprietary-competitive industrial enterprises that had 
closed ownership structures, and, consequently, limited 
access to capital. Throughout this period in the company's 
history, repeated attempts were made to obtain larger 
amounts of money for various purposes, mostly through the 
offering of new issues of stock to a small existing group 
of stockholders. For a while, this method worked and Roane 
70RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, October 16, 1889. 108 
Iron managed to operate and innovate on a razor-thin 
margin. When the company decided to undertake the Bessemer 
venture, however, a new strategy had to be employed. 
Existing stockholders did not have the resources to cover a 
new stock issue of that amount, and they were not about to 
relinquish control of the company. This is when Roane Iron 
enlisted the help of Charles McGhee, and initiated its 
dealings with the Central Trust Company of New York. 
Throughout Roane Iron's growth and experimentation, its 
production facility and community at Rockwood remained 
constants, and were influenced by the company's shortage of 
capital. 
Industrial Capital and Place Formation; 
Rockwood as Roane Iron's Company Town 
The Roane Iron Company's furnaces, and the settlement 
of Rockwood, were initially developed in an isolated and 
sparsely settled section of East Tennessee. The towns of 
Kingston and Loudon were more than 20 miles to the east, 
and the terrain in the western part of Roane County was 
rough and constraining. The location was secluded as well, 
as no railroads or even decent wagon roads passed through 
the area. Deposits of coal, iron ore, and limestone were 
abundant at and around the site, however, and the logic of 
transportation costs and industrial location guided Roane 
Iron's industrial development scheme. 
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The Roane Iron Company's actions with respect to the 
early development of Rockwood provide insight into its 
motives for community formation. The company did not sell 
any residential land in Rockwood, but rather rented housing 
to workers that needed it. 71 In the beginning, worker 
housing was built as close as possible to the furnaces, to 
minimize the distance employees would have to travel to 
work. Some of the earliest housing built by Roane Iron was 
a group of one room huts, known as "Welsh Row" located 
adjacent to the furnaces. 72 During this early period the 
Roane Iron Company spent a significant amount of capital on 
the construction of housing, as indicated by an 1870 
company inventory (Table 2.1) . 73 The company's housing 
policy suggests that it wanted to provide housing for its 
workers while maintaining control of land ownership. The 
return that the company expected on the housing was 
reliable labor in the mines and at the iron production 
facility, and rent payments which could be drawn directly 
from employee wages. 
Rental agreements included clauses forbidding the sale 
of dry goods. This tied in with another of the company's 
profit strategies, monopoly control of the sale of consumer 
71united States Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, 
Report upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital, 48th Congress, 
1st Session, November 11-28, 1883, 5 Volumes, Volume IV, 129. Report 
upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital will hereafter be cited 
as Report upon Labor and Capital. Hiram S. Chamberlain, president of 
the Roane Iron Company in 1883, testified ands was cited in this 
report. 
72Rockwood Times, December 18, 1924. 
73RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, June, 2, 1869, May 20, 1870. 110 
Table 2 .1. 
Inventory of the Roane Iron Company, May 20, 1870 
Item Capital Expended 
Real Estate $74,874.75 
Houses $52,198.50 
Engines & Cars $37,375.00 
Mines $13,670.00 
Furnace $61,845.00 
Machine Shop $2,289.41 
Blacksmith Shop $834.44 
Foundry & Patterns $1,541.05 
Furnace Shop $225.60 
Sundries $113,118.19 
Do Supplies $29,719.70 
Accounts $32,835.23 
Total Assets $428,702.86 
Source: Roane Iron Company, Board of Directors Minutes, May 
20, 1870. 
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goods at the company store. One of the earliest actions of 
the company was the founding of the company store in 1868, 
and the authorization of funds to stock it with goods. 74 
No other stores existed in the settlement during the 
company's first decade of operation. Thus, during the 
town's early years, the company effectively controlled 
employee trade through its restrictive covenants and the 
establishment of the company store. 
The Roane Iron Company did not develop a plan for 
Rockwood during its early period of operation. The company 
built housing based on immediate worker needs. When the 
iron operation increased its production, more employee 
housing was needed, and the company constructed more homes 
to be rented. Eventually, as construction continued this 
resulted in a block morphology around the furnace area, 
(Figure 2. 2) . 
The production facility at Rockwood was typical of 
coke-burning blast furnace operations of the era (Figure 
2.3). The facility site was located as far north as 
possible, abutting formidable Walden's Ridge. Tipples75 
were located adjacent to Walden's Ridge at mine openings, 
in which coal was sorted and loaded into railroad cars. 
The coal was transported in the cars the short distance 
down the tracks to rows of beehive coke ovens where the 
Bituminous coal was made into coke (Figure 2.4). The coke 
74 rbid, December 18, 1868. 
75structures at which coal was sorted and loaded into horse-drawn or 
railroad cars. Coal was sorted according to size in some instances, 
and excess rock was separated to be dumped in waste (culm) piles. 112 
Figure 2.2. 
Block Settlement Pattern in Rockwood, Tennessee 
Circa 1890 
Source: The Roane Iron Company, Rockwood: The Pioneer Iron-




1893 Map of the Roane Iron Facility, 
Rockwood, Tennessee 
Source: Sanborn Map Company, Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps 
Rockwood, Tennessee, 1893. 
Figure 2.4. 
Beehive Coke Ovens at Rockwood, Tennessee 
Circa 1890 
Source: The Roane Iron Company, Rockwood: The Pioneer Iron-
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was then used as fuel for the smelting of the iron ore, 
also obtained from the company's mines, in 65 foot high 
blast furnaces (Figure 2.5). Lime, which was needed as a 
flux to produce the desired chemical reaction, was also 
extracted and transported by rail from the company's kilns 
to the furnaces. The resulting product was pig iron, which 
was cast into ingots and stored in an adjacent yard until 
it could be transported to a buyer who would use it for the 
production of iron and steel implements. 
This production system was geared toward a division of 
labor, for which the Roane Iron Company attempted to 
procure a corresponding workforce at the isolated Rockwood 
production site. In large part the labor needed for manual 
work to be done around the coke ovens and blast furnaces 
was unskilled. Hiram Chamberlain expressed this during his 
1883 testimony in front of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, in which he described in general terms 
his assessment of the labor force required at Rockwood: 
"The labor employed there is of a cheaper class than that 
about rolling mills as a general thing, because there is 
more common labor employed directly about the furnace." 76 
There were some functions that could only be performed by 
skilled labor at Rockwood, however, and Roane Iron had to 
attract skilled workers to the isolated production site to 
operate sucessfully in the early years. Pools of skilled, 
experienced iron-industry labor did not exist in the Upland 
16Report upon Labor and Capital, 129. 119 
Figure 2.5. 
The Roane Iron Company Blast Furnaces 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 


















South in the late 1860s, thus Chamberlain explained that 
" ... directly after the war all skilled labor in our line 
was, of course, brought down from the North ... it is true in 
this country, as in the North, that iron-workers as a 
class, are foreigners -- are not Americans. They are 
Englishmen, Welshmen, Irishmen, and other foreigners. 1177 
Federal Manuscript census data show Chamberlain's 
descriptions of labor requirements at Rockwood to be 
accurate. Over 54 percent of workers residing in Rockwood 
in 1870 were unskilled blue-collar workers, while slightly 
less than 27 percent were skilled blue-collar workers. 78 
Only a small percentage of residents were involved in 
white-collar occupations, and most of those were related to 
the company operations (Table 2.2). 
The majority of employed persons in Rockwood in 1870 
were born in the United States, but ethnic groups performed 
different roles within the industrial division of labor 
(Table 2.3). The industrial occupations that required the 
most skill and experience (and which were the highest 
paying) were those in coal mining, and these jobs were 
dominated by workers from the British Isles. The coal 
seams within Walden's Ridge were vertically tilted, and 
77 Ibid, 133. 
78This data was compiled from the 1870 U.S. Federal manuscript census 
data for Rockwood. The classification is based on a scheme developed 
by Olivier Zunz for his study of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Detroit. See Olivier Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality: 
Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit, 
1880-1920 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 420-433 
(Appendix 3). 122 
Table 2.2. 
Occupational Breakdown of Rockwood, Tennessee, 1870, 1880 
Occupational Class 1870 1880 
Unskilled Blue-Collar 54.4% 69.0% 
Skilled Blue-Collar 26.9% 22.5% 
Low White-Collar 16.6% 7.9% 
High White-Collar 2.0% .6% 
Total Number Employed 193 316 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, 
Roane County. 
Table 2.3. 
Ethnic Breakdown of Selected Industrial Occupations, 
1870, 1880 
Population Coal Ore Iron Coke 
Group Mining Mining Furnace Ovens 
1870 1880 1870 1880 1870 1880 1870 1880 
Foreign-born 65.6 * 0.0 * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Native White 34.4 * 68.0 * 40.0 22.2 21.0 0.0 
Native Black 0.0 * 31.8 * 60.0 77.8 78.9 100.0 
Total Number 
Employed 32 * 22 * 17 27 19 5 
* Coal and iron mining could not be distinguished in the 
1880 census manuscript for Rockwood. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, 
Roane County. 
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mining coal from them required a considerable level of 
expertise. In 1870, of 32 coal miners in Rockwood, 
over 65 percent were English, Scottish, or Welsh. The 
remaining minority were white, United States citizens from 
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio. Of the 25 British Isle 
natives living in Rockwood with jobs in 1870, 21 (84 
percent) were working as coal miners for the Roane Iron 
Company. 
This pattern also extended to other representative 
industrial occupations. Jobs at the coke ovens, which 
involved long days of heavy labor working in high 
temperatures, were dominated by African-Americans. No 
foreigners worked at the coke ovens, and only a small 
minority of native whites were employed there (Table 2.3). 
Iron ore mining, considered to require less skill than coal 
mining because of the surface character of deposits, was 
also limited to certain groups. Native whites were the 
predominant group found in the iron mines, with a 
significantly smaller number of blacks involved in that 
occupation. Again, no foreigners had were employed in iron 
extraction. 
Rockwood developed as a decidedly more ethnically-
diverse settlement than Roane County as a whole. In 1870, 
over 14 percent of Rockwood residents were foreign born, as 
opposed to about one percent for the county as a whole 
(Table 2.4). In fact, 94 of the 148 foreign born residents 
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Table 2.4. 
Ethnic Breakdown of Upper Tennessee River Valley Towns and 
Roane County, 1870, 1880 
Rcckllllccd Kingston LClldCn Roane Cc. 
Population 
Group 1870 1880 1870 1880 1870• 1880 1870 1880 
Foreign-born 14.4 3.2 4.0 * trace * 1.1 0.9 
Native White 59.6 65.5 66.0 * 75.0 * 83.1 84.8 
Native Black 26.0 31.3 30.0 * 25.0 * 15.8 14.3 
* No data available 
• Data for the Loudon Civil Division, of which the town of 
Loudon was part. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, 
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870, 
337; Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880, 371. 
of the county lived in Rockwood at this time. 79 The Roane 
Iron Company made a concerted effort to attract desired 
foreign labor during its early period of operation; During 
the late 1860s and early 1870s General Wilder made several 
trips to England and Wales from which he brought back 
skilled workers. 80 The town also had a significantly 
larger proportion of black residents than other settlements 
in the county in 1870 (Table 2.4). This was also no 
happenstance. The company apparently preferred, and 
recruited, African-American workers for unskilled 
positions. Chamberlain explained Roane Iron's labor 
practices: 
As far as unskilled labor is concerned, we always employed 
colored men. All the heavy work about the rolling mill was 
done by colored labor, and the same is true of the heavy work 
about the mines .... Around the furnaces, the great bulk of 
labor is colored labor, and it is almost entirely so about the 
blast furnaces. As far as our experience goes, we have found 
it to be a good, reliable character of labor. I think it is by 
far the best labor in the South -- I mean native to the 
South. 81 
By 1880, the settlement of Rockwood had existed for 12 
years, and some significant changes had occurred both 
regionally and locally. Principal among these was the 
completion of the Cincinnati Southern Railway in 1879. The 
Cincinnati Southern stretched from Cincinnati, Ohio to 
Chattanooga, Tennessee and its route cut through Roane 
County and directly past Rockwood. The Roane Iron Company 
79u.s., Department of Congress, Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census, 
1870: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, Roane County; Compendium of 
the Eleventh Census (Government Printing Office, 1893), 507. 
80Nashville Daily American, May 15, 1875 cited in William H. Moore, 
"Rockwood: A Prototype of the New South," (Masters Thesis, University 
of Tennessee, Knoxville), 30. 
81Report upon Labor and Capital, 133. 127 
had invested large amounts of time and capital in trying to 
convince the Cincinnati Southern to construct this route, 
negotiating with the railroad since the early 1870s. 82 The 
successful completion of the rail line shattered the 
isolation that had characterized Roane Iron's early 
operations in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. The 
company no longer had to operate according to wet and dry 
seasons and water levels on the Tennessee River. Building 
materials, supplies for the company store, and other items 
could be shipped in as readily as pig iron could shipped 
out. The connection of Rockwood to the north-south rail 
line ended the community's initial pioneer phase, and 
linked it to more numerous potential customers and outside 
influences. 
The work regime prevalent in the settlement changed 
little during 1870s. By 1880, the blast furnace operation 
itself was larger, with the addition of a second furnace in 
1872. But the major differences evident over the decade 
were the proportional paucity of foreigners present in 
Rockwood, and the number of workers employed in skilled 
blue-collar occupations compared to 1870. By 1880, the 
82RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, July 10, 1872 and numerous others. 
The Cincinnati Southern was a municipal railroad financed and 
constructed by the City of Cincinnati. The major objective of the 
City in building the road was to establish a direct rail connection 
to southern markets, increasing its ability to compete with river 
cities such as Louisville, Kentucky. There was heated competition 
between the cities of Knoxville and Chattanooga to become the 
southern terminus of the Cincinnati Southern Railroad, in which the 
Roane Iron Company participated on behalf of the Chattanooga route. 
For an in depth discussion about the Cincinnati Southern Railway and 
route selection, see Biggs, The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A 
Municipal Enterprise." 128 
proportion of foreigners had decreased to slightly over 
three percent of Rockwood's population. In skilled blue-
collar occupations, they had been replaced to a large 
extent by native whites (Table 2.4). This was, more than 
likely, the result of the migration of the foreign-born to 
other mining and manufacturing areas, and the substitution 
of native whites that had acquired mining skills. The 
percentage of blacks living in Rockwood increased slightly 
over the decade, and they increasingly were the dominant 
labor source in the furnaces (Table 2.3, 2.4). The other 
employment pattern that was evident in 1880 Rockwood was 
the entrenchment of natives of Northern and Midwestern 
states such as Indiana, Ohio, and New York in the few 
white-collar jobs available in the town. 83 These white-
collar workers were, more than likely, close associates or 
relatives of principals in the Roane Iron Company, most of 
whom came from these states. 
The social landscape of Rockwood through 1880 seems to 
have been characterized by micro-scale segregation. White 
and black residents were most often clustered in groups by 
race. The dominant pattern was one in which blacks and 
whites lived on different streets or different blocks on 
the same streets. There were, however, instances of black 
and white men residing in the same boarding houses. In 
1870, some clustering was evident among the foreign-born, 
but this pattern had diminished by 1880, with foreign 
83 Tenth Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, Roane 
County. 129 
residences being almost totally intermixed with those of 
native whites. The 1880 census also shows the appearance 
of boardinghouses that housed workers involved in same-
class or closely-related occupations. For example all 
residents might be skilled blue-collar workers or coal 
miners. 84 
During the 1870s, the population of Rockwood grew with 
industrial production, and by 1880 the settlement was the 
largest in the Upper Tennessee River Valley (Table 2.5). 
In twelve years, Rockwood had grown into a larger urban 
place than Kingston or Loudon, settlements which had 
existed for more than half a century. The engine for this 
fast growth was industrial production, and its concomitant 
labor needs. Throughout the late 1860s and 1870s, the 
Roane Iron Company employed more than two-thirds of all 
working residents of Rockwood at occupations within its 
industrial complex.as 
A plan for the growing town was not filed with Roane 
County until 1887, 19 years after Roane Iron began 
operation (Figure 2.6). The plan shows the Roane Iron 
84Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth Census, 1880: 
Population Manuscripts. Because the population manuscripts of 
Rockwood for 1870 and 1880 do not include street names or house 
numbers, it is impossible to accurately map the residential location 
of persons listed. Therefore, the only accurate spatial inferences 
that can be drawn from the manuscripts are relational ones. 
85This includes coal and iron miners, furnace workers, coke oven 
workers, and other occupations that could be linked to company 
operations. Unspecified laborers were also included, because there 
is an overwhelming probability that they worked for the Roane Iron 
Company in some capacity. Unspecified laborers were distinguished 
from farm laborers in both the 1870 and 1880 Census manuscripts, 
supporting this interpretation. 130 
Table 2.5. 
Population of Upper Tennessee River Valley Towns, 1860, 
1870, and 1880 
Town 1860 1870 1880 
Rockwood 649 1,011 
Kingston 307 739 858 
Loudon * * 832 
* No data available 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, 
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870, 
337; Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880, 295; 
Compendium of the Eleventh Census, 1890, 380. 
Figure 2.6. 
The Roane Iron Company's Plan for the 
Village of Rockwood, 1887 
Source: Roane County Register of Deeds, Deed Book A-2, 233. 
complex (including coal mines, coke ovens and furnaces) at 
the far northwest corner of the settlement. This was where 
coal could be most easily and efficiently extracted from 
Walden's Ridge. The company-built Rockwood and Tennessee 
River Railroad snaked through the town in a southeasterly 
direction from the production facility and connected the 
furnaces to the Cincinnati Southern main line. The plan 
for the rest of the settlement, which stretched out onto a 
flat valley site to the south and east of the furnaces, 
incorporated the block pattern which had been incrementally 
created during the construction of early company housing 
(Figure 2.2). Hence, by waiting to formalize Rockwood's 
community plan until 1887, the company did not impose a 
predetermined morphology on the landscape, but developed 
the community in fits and starts of housing construction 
related to the production process. The 1887 plan was 
simply an articulation of the early nucleated pattern that 
the Roane Iron Company had unintentionally created, at a 
time later in the company's history when it was more 
established and had become more interested in the 
regularization of space under its control. 
Throughout the mid to late nineteenth century, the 
Roane Iron Company used paternalism as a means to attract 
and retain a labor force at the Rockwood production 
facility. The company assumed the responsibility of 
providing housing for a majority of the workforce, 
especially in the early years. Over the years it also 
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supported institutions that it felt were positive 
influences in the community, and that the labor force might 
desire. Roane Iron built a school house in Rockwood early 
on, and provided $25 a month for the building's upkeep. 
Later, when a new school building was constructed, the 
company donated $750 towards the project. A lot was also 
donated for a school for blacks in Rockwood. 86 A church 
was built with company funds soon after the furnaces 
opened, and was made available for non-sectarian services. 
On numerous occasions, Roane Iron donated lots in Rockwood 
to religious groups, so that they could build churches in 
the community. Social clubs such as the Masonic Lodge and 
the Independent Order of Odd Fellows were also supported by 
the company. 87 
The limits to Roane Iron's generosity were apparent in 
some of its other policies, however. Until the late 1880s, 
the company prevented outside commercial establishments 
from doing business in Rockwood, preserving the monopoly of 
the company store. Restrictive covenants against 
commercial activities in lease agreements were the major 
avenue through which this was accomplished. When a 
resident made a specific request to remove this restriction 
from his deed agreement in 1883, the motion was voted down 
handily by the board of directors, maintaining the 
86RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, October 22, 1874, January 22, 
1885, January 15, 1886, January 17, 1889. 
87Ibid, April 19, 1877, January 26, 1880, March 12, 1890, January 14, 
1874, October 16, 1889. 135 
monopoly.BB Roane Iron also paid its employees in scripB9 
if they desired, a form of currency issued by the company 
through the company store. Once a worker's wages had been 
paid in scrip, it could not be converted back into U.S. 
currency, and had to be redeemed at the company store for 
merchandise. The scrip system was a way for the company to 
siphon much of its payroll back into its coffers, while at 
the same time making a profit on the merchandise sold. 
Because the company store was the only commercial 
enterprise in Rockwood, it was possible for workers to be 
caught up in the scrip system, receiving little cash take-
home pay. The company also balked at paying for certain 
amenities which it felt were unnecessary. An example of 
one of these instances was when the board of directors 
voted against a motion by Hiram Chamberlain to build a 
reading room for employees at the furnaces. 90 
BBibid, July 18, 1883. 
B9some industrial companies, including the Roane Iron Company, 
offered scrip as an alternative to scheduled salary payments of U.S. 
currency. Scrip could be drawn at any time by an employee, and was 
subtracted from one's regular paycheck. Instances have been 
documented in which scrip was the sole method of payment in company 
towns, but this was not the case in Rockwood. 
90Ibid, January 15, 1886. 136 
&;!praisal 
The activities of the Roane Iron Company in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley in the period between the close of 
the Civil War and 1890 were representative of proprietary-
competitive industrial business methods. Although the 
company was incorporated from the outset, it was very 
closely held, and principal investors were involved in the 
management of production facilities. Until the late 1880s, 
the company depended on its small group of stockholders for 
expansion capital, operating with a closed ownership 
structure and limited capital availability. Roane Iron did 
make worthy attempts at technological innovation and 
vertical integration, but these many of these efforts were 
plagued by problems with production processes and raw 
materials as well as capital availablility. When the 
company did finally look to an outside source for capital, 
it did not change its ownership structure to any degree, 
but gained access to large-scale loan capital through an 
associate of Hiram Chamberlain. 
Roane Iron's development of Rockwood as a company 
community was influenced by its capital situation. In its 
early years, the company had barely enough money to get its 
iron production facility up and running in isolated western 
Roane County. The company provision of worker housing at 
this time was considered a necessity, and was built with 
little thought to planning or amenities. Over time, Roane 
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Iron repeatedly allocated its small amount of disposable 
capital to production processes and vertical integration, 
as opposed to the development of Rockwood. The company did 
what it felt had to be done to maintain a labor force at 
Rockwood, and not much more. Thus, it did not become very 
involved in trying to dictate the details of community 
development at Rockwood. This is reflected in the fact 
that Roane Iron did not draft a plan for its community 
until 19 years after its foundation. Because Roane Iron 
had neither the capital nor the inclination to rigidly plan 
and control the morphology and residential landscape of 
Rockwood from the outset, the patterns which emerged were 
largely a reflection of societal norms and the harried pace 
of industrial development. The result was a settlement 
segregated by class and race at the street and block 
scales, but in which no more pronounced segregation was 
planned by the company. This "hands-off" approach to 
company community formation would change in the Upper 
Tennesee Valley in the near future, with the operation of 
new types of companies and creation of urban places with 
new, distinct settlement patterns. 
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Chapter III 
FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION: LAND COMPANIES AND 
THE THIRD ROUND OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
The National capital Market situation in the Late 1ssos 
The maturation of American capital markets had an 
enormous impact on the business environment in the United 
States in the 1880s. Eastern capital markets had developed 
as a result of American railroads' need for capital. The 
market for rail securities began during the railroad boom 
of the 1840s, when rail companies for the first time needed 
more capital for construction than could be obtained from 
farmers and merchants living along their rail lines. Those 
seeking funds for new lines in the late 1840s increasingly 
came to New York City, which had emerged as the national 
financial center because of its low interest rates on 
borrowed capital. 1 During the same period, Europeans also 
began to look for investment opportunities in the United 
States in lieu of those in politically unstable European 
countries. To meet the needs of American railroads seeking 
funds and Europeans seeking investment opportunities, a 
number of importing and exporting firms in New York began 
to specialize in handling railroad securities. Some of 
1chandler, The Visible Hand, 91. According to Chandler, Philadelphia 
and Boston were the leading financial centers in the United States 
prior to New York during the first four decades of the nineteenth 
century. New York became the major national financial center after 
the late 1840s mainly because of a general capital shortfall among 
Boston lenders, which led to higher lending rates than were available 
in New York. 139 
these firms eventually dealt almost entirely in railroad 
securities, and became the nation's first specialized 
investment banking firms. As agents for a railroad, they 
sold its securities for a fee or on commission, acted as a 
transfer agent in New York, and advised on financial 
matters. At the same time, these firms also became agents 
for larger European investors who were interested in 
purchasing American railroad stocks and bonds. This supply 
and demand cycle of railroad capital was the impetus for 
the growth of the New York City capital market (as well as 
secondary markets in Boston and Philadelphia) by the mid-
1850s.2 
Responding to the needs of railroad financing, the New 
York financial district had become one of the largest and 
most sophisticated capital markets in the world by the 
outset of the Civil War. The volume of business brought to 
the New York Stock Exchange by the buying and selling of 
railroad securities brought about trading and speculation 
in its modern form. Where hundreds of shares had been 
traded weekly in the 1830s, hundreds of thousands of shares 
were traded in the 1850s. The modern call loan market 
began in the 1850s, as New York banks began to lend 
speculators money on call in order to provide funds for the 
interest they were beginning to pay on their deposit 
accounts. Skillful railroad securities speculators such as 
2Ibid. 140 
Jay Gould made their first fortunes in the market, and 
became nationally-known figures. 
The capital market spawned by railroad activity was 
thus fully developed and institutionalized by the late 
1880s. The railroad industry had matured by this time, 
however, and its heavy demand for capital relative to 
investment funds available had begun to diminish. Until 
this time, the market had been used almost exclusively by 
railroads and allied enterprises such as telegraph, 
express, and sleeping car companies. These had been the 
only enterprises that operated at a large enough scale to 
require large amounts of outside capital. The relative 
paucity of railroad demand for capital beginning in the 
late 1880s did, for the first time, open the capital market 
to other potential users. 3 
The Regional Economic and Transportation Situation 
in the Late 1ssos 
By the late 1880s, transportation in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley had improved markedly from the early 
post-war period. In 1887, Goodspeed's History of Tennessee 
reported that Roane County had " ... transportation 
facilities (that) are the best of any county in East 
Tennessee." 4 This was mainly because rail lines had been 
constructed in the region in the late 1870s and 1880s. The 
3Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securuties," 
107; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 92-93. 
4Goodspeed's History of Tennessee, 821. 141 
Cincinnati Southern Railway had been completed through 
western Roane County by 1880; and the East Tennessee, 
Virginia & Georgia Railway (ETV&G) also expanded into the 
region during the 1880s. The ETV&G first acquired a 
locally-owned, coal-extraction rail line (the Walden's 
Ridge Railroad) in the Spring of 1887. It then added 
trackage to the line, connecting it to the Cincinnati 
Southern Railway at Emory Gap and to the Knoxville & Ohio 
Railroad (already part of the ETV&G system) at Clinton. 
The major impetus of the ETV&G's rail development in the 
region was potential service to coal extraction areas, as 
its principals felt the Walden's Ridge line would have 
" •.• excellent connections to the coal fields of the 
Cumberland Mountains, and that the coal tonnage would 
justify acquiring it, and that the entire region is rich in 
iron ore, coal, limestone, and timber."5 The resulting 
network linked the Upper Tennessee River Valley to the 
national rail system, as well as the two largest urban 
markets in East Tennessee -- Chattanooga and Knoxville. 
The 1880s were a period of economic expansion and 
increasing industrialization in the South. In part this 
was related to the upturn of the national economy in 1879, 
after the depression conditions of the 1870s. The 
subsidence of the depression once again brought about a 
positive investment environment and served to free Northern 
5ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes, March 29, 1887, May 23, 1887. 142 
and European capitalists seeking Southern outlets for 
investment. Woodward, in his seminal volume Origins of the 
New South, also attributes industrialization in the South 
during this period to an alteration of economic principles 
by a majority of Southern society, stating: "Undoubtedly 
the will, ambition, and even the cupidity of a class of 
Southerners had much to do with the speeding-up of Southern 
industrialization. 116 
In any case, evidence of the South's increasing 
reliance on the industrial sector was abundant in the 
1880s. Southern cities were at the forefront of the 
industrial conversion. Several cities held large 
industrial expositions during the 1880s. Atlanta, Georgia 
held the International Cotton Exposition in 1881 and the 
Piedmont Exposition in 1887; Louisville, Kentucky hosted 
the Southern Exposition in 1885; and New Orleans, Louisiana 
administered 30 acres of exhibits at its Cotton Centennial 
Exposition of 1885. Each of these events touted the 
industrial development of the South, and was geared towards 
attracting outside capital and immigration. Production 
statistics in important industrial sectors such as iron-
making also indicate Southern industrialization was on the 
rise. By the late 1880s, the South was producing more pig-
iron than the entire nation before the Civil War. The 
capital invested in blast furnaces was also increasing at a 
6woodward, Origins of the New South, 113. 143 
faster rate in the South as a whole than in any Northern 
state during this period. 7 
The combination of an institutionalized national 
capital market, a positive business environment in the 
South as a whole, and a vastly improved regional 
transportation system in the late 1880s created an 
attractive situation in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
for potential investment. The Roane Iron Company had 
already proven that pig iron could be made successfully in 
the region under primitive conditions. Vast timber and 
mineral resources were known to be present in the area, but 
prior to the 1880s were relatively isolated from 
transportation systems and urban markets. By the late 
1880s, the region was well connected into the national rail 
system, and new capitalists began to see industrial promise 
in its varied mineral deposits, rivers, and timber covered 
ridges. 
The Arrival of sophisticated capitalism; 
Land companies in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
The capital that was funneled into the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley during the late 1880s and early 1890s came 
through the activities of land companies. Specifically, 
three land companies -- the East Tennessee Land Company, 
the Cardiff Iron & Coal Company, and the Lenoir City 
7rbid., 124-128; Victor S. Clark, The History of Manufactures in the 
United States (New York, 1929), 211-220. 144 
Company -- coordinated the industrial development, mineral 
extraction, and community building that took place in the 
region during this period. These companies were different 
than the previous industrial entities that had operated in 
the region with respect to organizational structure, 
financial methods, and development strategy. They were 
among those business enterprises that took advantage of 
available capital in the securities market of the late 
1880s, using it to purchase land and advance industrial 
development strategies in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
Their operation methods resulted in urban places that 
exhibited different morphologies than pre-existing 
settlements. 
Each of the aforementioned land companies began 
operation in the Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1889 or 
1890. The East Tennessee Land Company was the first of 
these, obtaining its charter from the State of Tennessee in 
April of 1889. The Cardiff Coal & Iron Company and the 
Lenoir City Company followed soon after, incorporating with 
the State in March and April of 1890, respectively. 8 In 
general, these companies had similar methods of operation. 
8corporation Records, State of Tennessee, April 21, 1889, March 18, 
1890, April 12, 1890. 145 
The East Tennessee Land Company 
The East Tennessee Land Company (ETLC) was formed by a 
group of notable capitalists from outside the immediate 
region. Frederick Gates, a New York native who moved to 
Chattanooga in the mid 1880s for health reasons was the 
driving force behind the formation of the company. Before 
his move to Chattanooga, Gates managed a large Diamond 
Match Company plant in Frankfort, New York. He also 
invested in real estate, and helped route the West Shore 
Railroad connecting New York City and Buffalo through 
Frankfort. While in New York, Gates had been a member of 
the Prohibition Party, and the party's candidate for New 
York Secretary of State in 1883. 9 It was upon the tenets 
of Prohibition that the East Tennessee Land Company was 
founded. 
While in Ch~ttanooga, Gates initiated a plan to 
combine temperence and business in an industrial-urban 
development scheme in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
Gates sought out friends and associates to invest in the 
venture, and with them created the East Tennessee Land 
Company. All of the eventual principals in the company 
were staunch Prohibitionists, and most were prominent 
politicians and/or businessmen. Perhaps the best known of 
these was General Clinton B. Fisk, former commissioner of 
the Freedman's Bureau for Kentucky and Tennessee, the 
9walter T. Pulliam, Harriman: The Town That Temperance Built 
(Maryville, TN: Brazos Press, 1978), 19-23. 146 
founder of Fisk University for freedmen in Nashville, 
Tennessee, and Prohibitionist candidate for President of 
the United States in 1888. 1° Fisk, a native of New York, 
was appointed president of the East Tennessee Land Company 
because of his prominence in the Prohibition movement, and 
was successful in attracting capital to the company. Other 
inaugural officers and directors of the company included: 
Dr. I. K. Funk and Adam W. Wagnalls, president and vice 
president, respectively, of the New York City publishing 
firm Funk & Wagnalls Company; 11 Ferdinand Schumacher of 
Akron, Ohio, a pioneer in the manufacture of oatmeal and 
president of the F. Schumacher Milling Company (predecessor 
of the American Cereal Company (1891) which later became 
the Quaker Oats Company (1901)); 12 John Hopewell, Jr. and 
Ernest M. Goodall, both members of prominent New England 
textile families and principals in the Sanford (Maine) 
Mills blanket manufacturing company; Walter C. Harriman, 
Jr., former United States Congressman from New Hampshire; 
William H. Russell, former attorney for the Louisville, New 
Albany & Chicago Railway and senior member of the 
Chattanooga law firm of Russell, Daniels and Garvin; 13 and 
Alphonso A. Hopkins, former Prohibition Party candidate for 
Governor of New York (1882), and well-known author and 
lODictionary of American Biography, Vol. 6, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1931), 413-414. 
11Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, 72-73; The National 
Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 23 (New York: James T. White 
and Company, 1925), 44. 
12Pulliam, Harriman, 54; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 294. 
13Pulliam, Harriman, 47-60. 147 
biographer of Clinton B. Fisk (1888) . 14 The influence that 
this distinguished group of men had in political and 
business circles was useful in facilitating the East 
Tennessee Land Company's operations in the region. 
The developmental strategy of the East Tennessee Land 
Company encompassed a wide range of activities within the 
region. In a bound, illustrated prospectus targeted at 
potential ·investors, the company explained: 
The East Tennessee Land Company will not expend its energies and 
its working capital in general mining or manufacture, nor in any 
miscellaneous fashion distributed over such broad territory. It 
is what its name indicates, primarily a Land Company, and having 
acquired magnificent heritage in lands, its one purpose is to 
turn these, by systematic development, to the best advantage 
possible. 15 
In more specific terms, the ETLC articulated the 
development activities that it believed would yield the 
"best advantage." Under a heading "Plans and Policy of the 
Company," the following items were listed: 
To sell 250,000 acres of farming land, reserving all mineral 
rights. 
To do this by systematic colonization. 
To establish a manufacturing city, at a strategic valley point. 
To establish an upland town, as a health resort and an 
agricultural outlet. 
To sell 3,000 acres of land in town and city lots. 
To develop 250,000 acres of coal and iron deposits. 
To do this largely through subordinate companies, organized under 
supervision of the parent Company, in which this Company shall 
hold controlling interest wherever control is essential to insure 
best results. 
14Ibid., 50; Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, 72-73. 
15Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company (New York: The South 
Publishing Company, 1890), 23. 148 
To secure from such interest in these companies, and from the 
royalties they will pay, a large and perpetual revenue. 16 
Thus, the role that the company envisioned for itself in 
the development process was as an overseeing body that 
would coordinate these wide-ranging activities. 
A large amount of capital was needed. The company had 
a sophisticated financial structure for the time period, 
and was organized from the outset to be publicly-owned. 17 
When it was incorporated in April of 1889, the amount of 
the company's capital stock was specified at $3,000,000. 
More than a half million dollars of its stock was 
subscribed before the organization of the company, 
indicating that this amount was probably bought by those 
that became its officers and directors. The ETLC planned on 
obtaining the rest of its stock capitalization from 
outsiders, and published its prospectus in 1890 to woo 
investors. Much space was devoted to convincing potential 
investors that the company's development scheme in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley was a sound investment: 
Whoever has carefully read and fully comprehended the pages 
preceding, must perceive how small is a capitalization of 
$3,000,000 on such a basis as has been described, compared with 
the capital of every other company of this kind. The capital 
stock of this Company represents actual value, without inflation, 
but does not approximate the entire values of the properties on 
which it is based. It was the intention of the projectors and 
16Ibid. 
17Navin and Sears point out that some of the largest manufacturing 
concerns of the 1880s were either family owned or incorporated and 
closely held. Examples include the Singer Manufacturing Company, 
Carnegie Steel Company, and the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. 
Although land companies were not industrials, they apparently were 
among the first American non-railroad companies to embrace the public 
ownership structure. See Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for 
Industrial Securities," 109-110. 149 
incorporators to shape this enterprise so that its stock should 
be as solid as that of a national bank. 18 
On the last page of the prospectus, potential stock 
purchasers were directed to inquire at the company's New 
York City headquarters, located in the Times Building. 
The company was also sophisticated with respect to its 
organizational structure and profit-making strategy. The 
organization of the ETLC was one of compartmentalized, with 
different development activities assigned to subsidiary 
companies. Casting itself in the role of parent company, 
the ETLC described its plan to use subsidiaries: 
... (the company) has organized, and will organize, other 
companies, with abundant capital drawn from its own individual 
membership and from investors outside, and to these subordinate 
companies it will transfer by lease the timber upon its lands, or 
the excess thereof beyond the need of settlers, and the minerals 
under them, devoting itself chiefly to surface development and 
improvement. 19 
The three subsidiary companies that the ETLC established in 
its first year were the East Tennessee Mining Company, the 
Harriman Coal and Iron Railroad, and the Harriman 
Manufacturing Company. The East Tennessee Mining Company 
leased all the coal and iron properties owned by the ETLC, 
and administered all coal and iron ore extraction 
operations on company lands. The Harriman Coal & Iron 
Railroad Company's function was to build rail lines over 
company lands, including a belt line around a proposed town 
site and branch lines into iron and coal extraction areas. 
The Harriman Manufacturing Company was to attract industry 
18Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 44. 
19Ibid., 23. 150 
to the ETLC's land holdings by providing from one-third to 
one-half of the start-up capital for desired firms, in 
exchange for significant stock holdings in them (Figure 
3.1) . 20 This profit strategy was advanced for the era. The 
acquisition of common and preferred stock in the ETLC's 
subsidiary companies, and in manufacturing concerns that 
received start-up capital from the Harriman Manufacturing 
Company was a major profit tactic. The ETLC explained this 
strategy to potential investors: 
The Manufacturing Company will thus hold a large interest, as 
it does already, in many substantial factories at Harriman, and 
through proper officers will exercise careful supervision over 
these, making sure they are conducted to the best possible 
advantage, and that all means within the power of the Harriman 
Manufacturing Company and the East Tennessee Land Company are 
used to promote their welfare and assure a wide market for their 
products. . 
This plan, it is believed, will carry to the utmost point 
yet attained, the spirit and method of co-operation among 
manufacturing establishments of different character, so that all 
shall work as one concern for their own interest, the interest of 
the town, and the consequent greater success of the parent 
company .... It follows that the stock to be held in each, by the 
Harriman Manufacturing Company, must be a profitable source of 
income to that Company, and must make its own stock return 
handsome dividends and increase handsomely in value. This is 
more certain because the stock which the Harriman Company will 
hold in many subordinate companies will be preferred stock, with 
six per cent dividend fairly assured upon it, by such preference 
from the start.21 
The organizational structure that the ETLC set up delegated 
many development responsibilities to subsidiaries, but 
ultimately insured that revenues would return to it through 
common and preferred stock dividends. 
The properties alluded to in the ETLC's prospectus 
were obtained during the first months after its 
20 Two Years of Harriman, Tennessee (New York: The South Publishing 
Company, 1892), 44-52. 
21 Ibid., 64-69. 151 
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incorporation in 1889. By March of 1890, less than a year 
after its incorporation, the company had purchased 268,124 
acres of land in the Upper Tennessee River Valley for 
$2,095,879.30. 22 The company got some of this money from 
stock sales, but also some from the national bond market. 
In late 1889 or early 1890, the ETLC negotiated a 
$1,000,000 bond issue with the Central Trust Company of New 
York, 23 which had administered trust conversions for the 
cottonseed oil {1884) and sugar {1887) industries, as well 
as bond issues for several American railroad companies. 24 
The bond issue allowed the ETLC to acquire large tracts of 
regional land, and to put its plan into operation. 
The ETLC characterized its development plan as multi-
faceted, its emphases were resource extraction, industrial 
development, and community building. The company expressed 
its belief in the relationship between the location of raw 
materials, industrial production and urbanization: 
The selling of city lots, where growth is rapid and where great 
industries congregate, is more productive of wealth than a gold 
mine. A dozen lusty young cities in the South might be named in 
proof of this, and these have but anticipated the great current 
of immigration from the North now fairly setting in ... Locate your 
town where railroads are, or are bound to be, and where minerals 
are abundant close at hand, and you may build as many as you 
please during the next decade without overdoing it. "The South 
is going to make the iron of this country for the next fifty 
22Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 43. 
23Harriman Daily Advance, January 30, 1893, January 31, 1893, 
February 14, 1893. 
24Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities," 
119; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 319-328; ETVG, Board of Directors 
Minutes, June 30, 1886, May 23, 1887. In the creation of a trust, a 
number of companies in a particular industry turned their stock 
certificates over to a board of trustees, receiving in turn trust 
certificates of equivalent value. Reasons for trust conversion in an 
industry usually were related to limiting competition and price 
fluctuations. 153 
years." So declared recently an iron manufacturer of the North. 
So believe the most sagacious men who have studied the iron 
problem North and South. Grant that they are right, and the 
wisdom of prudent town-building is granted as well. For iron 
will be made where it can be made cheapest; it can be made 
cheapest where iron-plants have place in close proximity to the 
iron mines, and where coal supplies exist in the same 
neighborhood. To establish furnaces, coke ovens and iron-works, 
and to open coal beds at any given point, is to create a town ... 
Considerations like these determined the East Tennessee Land 
Company to establish the CITY OF HARRIMAN. 25 
The City of Harriman was to be the centerpiece of the 
ETLC's industrial development scheme in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley. If the ETLC felt that community building in 
association with industrialization was a logical 
progression, it also recognized that the endeavor could be 
lucrative: 
... while so large a proportion of the East Tennessee Land 
Company's territory can be sold for agricultural purposes, and at 
handsome profit ... the Company expects to reap its chief gains, 
after those realized from coal and iron interests, from its work 
of town building.26 
The location chosen by the ETLC for its industrial-
temperence city was at Big Emory Gap, where the Emory River 
had eroded a narrow valley through Walden's Ridge. This 
site was approximately 80 miles northeast of Chattanooga 
via the Cincinnati Southern Railway, and 50 miles west of 
Knoxville via the Walden's Ridge division of the East 
Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway (Figure 3.2). The 
town was named Harriman, in honor of Colonel Walter C. 
Harriman, a Union officer who had operated in the area 
during the Civil War and father of ETLC director Walter 
Harriman, Jr. The original city site was on a large oxbow 
25Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 25-26. 
26Ibid., 25. 154 
Figure 3.2. 
Map Showing Harriman, Tennessee, Adjoining Cities 
and Railroad Connections 
Source: G.M. Connelly, City Directory of Harriman, 
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in the Emory River, with the Cincinnati Southern Railway 
directly to the west and the East Tennessee, Virginia & 
Georgia Railway to the north (Figure 3.3). A location 
chosen, the ETLC "staked out" a portion of the site on 
Christmas Day, 1889, and commissioned a plat for 
Harriman. 27 From this point forward, Harriman became the 
focus of the ETLC's development strategy in the region. 
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company 
The Cardiff Coal & Iron Company (CCIC) was also an 
enterprise conceived by Northern capitalists. The 
company's origin was rooted in an exploratory expedition 
taken by W.P. Rice and some of his associates to the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley in the Spring of 1889. Rice was a 
native of Maine who had been an executive with several 
financial institutions in Kansas City, Missouri during the 
1880s, and who also had presided over the establishment of 
the new industrial city of Fort Payne, Alabama in late 
1888. 28 Apparently Rice and his group were impressed with 
the area, for in the next six months they commissioned an 
agent to buy land in the region, and, by March of 1890, the 
Cardiff Coal & Iron Company had been incorporated. 
21Two Years of Harriman, 11-12. 
28 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890, May 7, 1890; W.P. Rice to J.F. 
Randolph, December 20, 1890, Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers, 
Roane County Heritage Commission, Kingston, TN. Rice was the 
president of the Fort Payne Coal and Iron Company during the late 
1880s and early 1890s. 157 
Figure 3.3. 
Local Map of Harriman City Site 
Source: G.M. Connelly, City Directory of Harriman, 
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In large part, the group of investors that became 
principals in the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company were from 
Rice's native New England. The initial president of the 
company was B.B. Smalley of Burlington, Vermont, president 
of the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad, vice 
president of the Burlington Trust Company, and former 
secretary of the National Democratic Committee. Other 
officers and directors from the New England region were: 
General Joshua L. Chamberlain, former four-term Governor of 
Maine and president of Boudoin College (Brunswick,Maine); 
Charles L. James, head of the Boston lumber firm James & 
Abbott, as well as partner in the finance banking firm of 
Cordley & Company; Samuel Pingree of Hartford, Vermont, 
former Governor of Vermont and member of the state 
legislature, as well as Chairman of the Vermont Board of 
Railroad Commissioners; John M. Whipple of Claremont, New 
Hampshire, a mentl:?er of the New Hampshire legislature; 
Carlos Heard, a partner in the Biddeford, Maine hardware 
firm of McKenney & Heard; and Henry C. Young, a junior 
partner in the Boston finance banking firm of Cordley & 
Company. 29 Some members of the inaugural board of 
directors were businessmen from East Tennessee, such as 
J.F. Tarwater, T.G. Montague, and Robert Pritchard. Each 
of these men was a regional business leader: Tarwater was 
head of the Rockwood iron-mining firm of Tarwater & Brown 
29 The Town of Cardiff, and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and 
Iron Company (Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, 1890), unattached insert; 
The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890. 160 
and a director of the Roane Iron Company; Montague was 
president of the First National Bank of Chattanooga; and 
Pritchard was the head of the Chattanooga law firm of 
Pritchard, Sizer, and Moore. 30 This combination of 
regional and national capitalists as administrators was 
used by the company as a selling point when the time came 
to cultivate investors. 
From the outset, the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company's 
development program in the region was focused on 
industrialization. The company's view of the worth of its 
land holdings in the Upper Tennessee River Valley was 
linked to resources and their utilization in production 
processes: 
The Allegheny Belt is full of coal and iron and limestone 
fluxes, and possesses other useful mineral resources in great 
abundance, with vast supplies of timber. It contains places 
where many manufactures (and the iron manufacture in particular, 
by reason of the richness of the ores and the facility of 
charcoal and coking coal) can be carried on to more advantage 
than anyplace else in the world ... 
With these preliminary considerations, (the Cardiff Coal 
and Iron Company) has selected a town site adjoining some of the 
richest mineral deposits in the great Allegheny Belt, two hundred 
miles nearer than Birmingham to Northern and Western markets, 
with the advantage of the good-will and hearty cooperation of the 
resident and neighboring population, combined with the experience 
of successful managers of similar enterprises in the South, as 
the guarantee for its steady development into a flourishing 
centre of industry.31 
The CCIC planned to administer most aspects of development 
on its land, including mineral extraction, the construction 
and management of some industrial facilities, and the 
development of a new city. That the company advertised its 
30ibid. 
31 The Town of Cardiff, 4-5. 161 
intention to use this approach is suggested in an early 
addition of The Cardiff Herald, the local newspaper: 
The Cardiff Coal & Iron Co., officered by men of national 
reputation, men whose good name is above reproach, has pledged 
itself to expend a vast amount in the development of our fair 
city. 
One million and two hundred thousand dollars in cash to be 
put into iron furnaces, coking ovens, rolling mills, rolling 
mills, planing mills, churches, store houses, water supplies, ice 
manufactories, etc., etc., ad infinitum. 32 
The CCIC's comprehensive development strategy 
required concomitant capital, which the company obtained 
through two avenues. The first was a public ownership 
structure. When it was incorporated in March of 1890, the 
company declared its capitalization at $5,000,000, 
consisting of 50,000 shares at a par value of $100 each. A 
prospectus, published to advertise CCIC stock to investors, 
emphasized the company's advantages over other similar 
enterprises. Under the heading "Personal and Financial 
Strength of the Company," the company suggested why it 
would succeed where others had failed: 
Unlike many of the corporations organized for Southern 
development, a number of the corporators of the Cardiff Iron and 
Coal Company consist of respected, wealthy and influential 
citizens of the neighborhood where the property is located, which 
is a local guarantee of the solidarity and success of the 
corporation, and of the friendship of the people and government 
of the State of Tennessee, that claims respectful attention. 
With them are associated representatives of capital and labor of 
other States, and men of approved experience in kindred 
enterprises; the whole making an aggregate of wise counsel, 
executive ability, and monetary strength such as has been seldom 
combined. Too many of the attempts at development in the South 
have been prosecuted by promoters without sufficient resources to 
counterbalance the mistakes inevitable from the lack of 
experience and absence of local associations. From the present 
undertaking, every such source of weakness is eliminated. 33 
32 The Cardiff Herald, April 30, 1890. 
33 The Town of Cardiff, 11-12. 162 
The second avenue through which the CCIC derived its 
initial "monetary strength" was from its association with 
the Boston banking firm of Cordley & Company. Two of the 
members of the company's board of directors -- Charles 
James and Henry Young -- were partners in the banking firm, 
and it is probable that capital for early land purchases 
came from it in association with the American Loan & Trust 
Company of Boston. 34 In fact, Cordley & Company was very 
much involved in land acquisition in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley, sending an agent to the region several months 
before the incorporation of the CCIC. 
Most of the property eventually acquired by the CCIC 
was actually purchased by Henry Young, the agent acting on 
behalf of Cordley & Company. Young went to Roane County in 
early 1890, and soon after began to survey land and 
investigate titles in anticipation of purchasing several 
large tracts . .]\ccording to a resident of Rockwood, who 
eventually purchased land from the CCIC: 
... Young represented himself as being a member of the banking 
house of Cordley & Co., of Boston, Mass., and that his said firm, 
in whose behalf he claimed to be acting, as well as upon his own 
account, was possessed of large means and practically unlimited 
credit, and that there was associated with him and them in said 
scheme and enterprise a syndicate of gentlemen of unlimited means 
and national repute, who would give to said enterprise all 
requisite attention and afford to it all requisite capital to 
carry to a full consummation all the plans and schemes of 
industry, enterprise and development .•• 35 
34The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890. 
35Haley & Ingram vs. Henry C. Young (No Date), Complainant Report, 
Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers, Roane County Heritage Commission, 
Kingston, TN., 1-2. 163 
By April of 1890, 50,000 acres of land in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley had been purchased by Young acting 
for Cordley & Company and the CCIC. During that same 
month, the CCIC assumed ownership of the land, issuing 
Young stock in exchange. Thus, the Cardiff Coal & Iron 
Company's initial land holdings in the region were 
accomplished almost entirely through the activities of 
Northern financiers. 
As with the East Tennessee Land Company, the focus of 
the CCIC's industrial complex was to be a planned urban 
settlement. The location selected for the city was on the 
Cincinnati Southern line, five miles north of Rockwood and 
approximately the same distance southwest of the new town 
of Harriman (Figure 3.4, 3.5). The town was named Cardiff, 
in hopeful anticipation that the settlement would emulate 
the bustling coal mining town of Cardiff, Wales. The city 
site encompassed 2,000 acres between Walden's Ridge on the 
northwest and a range of lesser ridges on the southeast. 
The CCIC explained the proposed city's advantageous 
location in relation to transportation and urban markets: 
... the company's possessions comprise lands not taken at hap-
hazard, but carefully chosen for their natural wealth and 
adjoining them the town site (chosen with equal care) at the foot 
of Walden's Ridge, in the fertile Tennessee Valley, traversed 
north and south by the Cincinnati Southern Railroad (the main 
highway of travel and transportation between Cincinnati and 
Louisville, the great cities of the Ohio Valley, and Chattanooga 
and Birmingham, the great cities of the mineral belt), and so 
situated in relation to the mountain gaps eastward, and also to 
those westward ... that it is sure to command the lateral lines of 
railroad communication which are multiplying in Northeastern 
Tennessee. 36 
36The Town of Cardiff, 8. 164 
Figure 3.4. 
Map of Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Properties 
Source: Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, The Town of Cardiff, 
and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company 
(Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, 1890). 
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Map Showing Location of Cardiff, Tennessee 
Source: Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, The Town of Cardiff, 
and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company 












The company also had definite ideas about how the internal 
structure of Cardiff should be arranged, and turned next to 
planning the urban landscape of the settlement. 
The Lenoir City Company 
The Lenoir City Company (LCC) was established by a 
partnership of Knoxville entrepreneurs and New York City 
financiers and businessmen. The early catalyst was E. J. 
Sanford, a prominent regional entrepreneur involved in a 
wide range of business undertakings in Knoxville and East 
Tennessee. In early 1890, Sanford was at the apex of his 
business career: he was president of the Knoxville drug 
firm of Sanford, Chamberlain and Albers, as well as the 
Mechanics National Bank of Knoxville; vice president of the 
East Tennessee National Bank; and on the board of directors 
of the Knoxville Woolen Mills, the Knoxville Iron Company, 
the Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing Company, and the 
East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway. 37 Sanford's 
ability to spur an urban-industrial development initiative 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley was directly related to 
his relationship with another successful East Tennessee 
native, Charles Mcclung McGhee. McGhee, a former resident 
of Knoxville, had as previously mentioned been involved in 
railroad development in the South since before the Civil 
37Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History 
of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville: East Tennessee Historical 
Society, 1946), 479-480. 169 
War. In 1886, he had moved from Knoxville to New York City 
in order to fulfill his duties with the East Tennessee, 
Virginia & Georgia Railway, of which he was a vice 
president in 1890. Although he left the area, McGhee 
maintained a continuing interest in development in East 
Tennessee, and remained an investor in several companies 
operating in the region (such as the Roane Iron Company). 
Sanford and McGhee had become close friends and business 
associates when they were Knoxville residents, and 
continued their business dealings after McGhee's departure. 
The two had frequently corresponded during the late 1880s, 
with McGhee inquiring about investment opportunities in 
East Tennessee and Sanford providing regional business 
news. 38 The Lenoir City development came to fruition 
through this correspondence. 
In June of 1887, Sanford suggested to McGhee that an 
urban-industrial development in East Tennessee would be an 
sound investment. McGhee rejected the idea for the moment, 
but expressed to Sanford what his role would be if it were 
ever undertaken: 
I fully agree with you in the views that you entertain with 
reference to the City ... and would like very much to see the 
enterprise undertaken and carried through. But I do not feel 
willing that our Syndicate should embark in the enterprise. We 
have as you say made a success and I do not feel like embarking 
in anything that will take the profits that we have already made. 
A capital of one million dollars would be required to ensure the 
success of a city and while I would be willing to put in $50,000 
38sanford and McGhee wrote to each other on a fairly steady basis 
during the late 1880s and early 1890s. A survey of these letters 
provides much useful information about businesses in Knoxville and 
East Tennessee during this period. See the McGhee Papers, preserved 
at the Mcclung Historical Collection in the Customs Building, 
Knoxville, Tennessee. 170 
as my part of the venture, yet the temper and spirit here is not 
now favorable to the giving of the other $950,000. I think if I 
would father the scheme and undertake to do so I could secure the 
needed amount of money but if I did so I would have to assume the 
management of it to some extent and would have to be become 
morally responsible to my friends who I would induce to go into 
it, this I feel unwilling to do. 39 
Without McGhee's leadership in obtaining outside financing, 
Sanford abandoned the idea for the immediate future. Less 
than two years later, however, the project was underway, 
and McGhee had enlisted his "syndicate" to fund and 
participate in the management of the company to be founded. 
The syndicate to which McGhee belonged was made up in 
large part of New York financiers and businessmen with whom 
he had become associated during his work with the East 
Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway. These men were 
among the most powerful and respected businessmen of their 
era, and most had begun their careers working for railroads 
in some capacity. Probably the best known of these was 
Samuel Thomas, president of the East Tennessee, Virginia & 
Georgia Railway at this time. 40 Also part of the syndicate 
with McGhee, Sanford, and Thomas were: Calvin S. Brice, 
vice president of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia 
Railway as well as president of the Lake Erie & Western 
Railroad; 41 Oliver H. Payne, a principal in the innovative 
Standard Oil Company in association with John D. 
39McGhee to Sanford, June 10, 1887; Partially quoted in MacArthur, 
Charles Mcclung McGhee, 227. 
40ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes, January 8, 1889 and numerous 
others. 
41Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1936), 31-32. 
Rockefeller; 42 and John G. Moore and Elverton R. Chapman, 
partners in the New York brokerage firm of Moore & 
Schley. 43 McGhee and Sanford also brought some of their 
Knoxville relatives and business associates into the 
enterprise. These were E.T. Sanford, J.M. Thornburgh, 
Calvin M. Mcclung, A.J. Albers, William P. Chamberlain, and 
T.H. Heald. Sanford and Thornburgh were prominent Knoxville 
law partners, while Mcclung, Albers, Chamberlain, and Heald 
were principals in some of the city's largest businesses 
(C.M. Mcclung & Co., wholesale hardware, Sanford, 
Chamberlain & Albers, wholesale and retail drugs; 
Knoxville Iron Company; and Black Diamond Coal Co., 
respectively) . 44 Thus, the Lenoir City Company was formed. 
Like the East Tennessee Land Company and the Cardiff 
Coal and Iron Company, the Lenoir City Company was planned 
from the outset to be a publicly-owned enterprise. Upon 
its incorporation with the state in April of 1890, the 
company declared $800,000 worth of stock, in the form of 
8,000 shares worth $100 each. The LCC planned to issue 
$400,000 of this to the public at par value. It added a 
new twist, however, to the sale of stock to the public. 
Each buyer received not only stock certificates, but also a 
42 Ibid., Vol. 7, 329-330; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 321-322. 
43Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, May 20, 1890; 
Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities," 
129. The board of directors minutes of the Lenoir City Company have 
been preserved and are available, as the company continues to 
maintain offices at Lenoir City, Tennessee. 
44Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890), 
4. C.M. Mcclung was McGhee's son-in-law, and E.T. Sanford was E.J. 
Sanford's son. 172 
lot or lots in a city development worth the value of the 
stock subscription. 45 To cultivate potential investors, 
the company assured them of the stability of its 
development and the advantages of its stock sale strategy: 
Lenoir City is not a "boom town"; it is not the effort of 
speculators to build upon some old, worn-out fields, a mushroom 
city that cannot withstand future financial storms, and by taking 
advantage of popular excitement to sell out the lots to outsiders 
at unreal and fancy prices, and then silently retire from the 
field, leaving the investors and so to speak, to "hold the bag," 
the poorer from their investment in everything except 
experience ... 
Having started out with this determination, they realize the 
fact, pointed out by reason, that the way to permanently utilize 
the unexcelled natural advantages of Lenoir City, is to offer 
this property to the public in such a manner that INVESTMENTS 
SHALL BE PROFITABLE TO THE INVESTORS, AND THAT EVERY INVESTOR 
SHALL BECOME DIRECTLY INTERESTED WITH THEM IN THE ENTERPRISE, and 
a zealous and co-operating agent in the upbuilding of the 
City."46 
Half of the proceeds of public stock sales were to be used 
to "pay for the original purchase of the property and debt 
contracted in the formation of the Company. 1147 This 
indicates that bonds were probably floated to fund the 
early activities of the company, although no primary 
evidence has been found to support this. 
The focus of the Lenoir City Company's developmental 
plans was its city development, to be "one of the 
healthiest, most attractive and prosperous manufacturing 
and commercial cities in the entire South." 48 The company 
based its expectations of industrial development largely on 
the proximity of its land holdings to the mineral resources 
of the Upper Tennessee River Valley. In its prospectus, 
45Ibid., 24-25. 
46Ibid., 23. 
47 Ibid., 25. 
48Ibid., 8. 173 
the LCC quoted iron-making experts of the period, I. 
Lowthian Bell and Abram S. Hewitt, stating that the 
Tennessee Valley was an ideal locale for iron production. 49 
It emphasized that industrial facilities locating in Lenoir 
City would have access to the region's vast coal deposits. 
In fact, the same syndicate that was involved in the the 
LCC had a controlling interest in the Coal Creek Mining and 
Manufacturing Company (CCMMC), an enterprise principally 
involved in coal extraction. The CCMMC at this time owned 
90,000 acres of coal lands in Anderson County, Tennessee, 
and the LCC planned to utilize the coal from this property 
to promote industry at Lenoir City. 50 The company was also 
cognizant of the site's transportation situation, noting: 
... Lenoir City will be the meeting point of two great trunk 
lines, where the two streams of immigration and capital flowing 
southward - from the Eastern and Middle States, by the East 
Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway; and from the valleys of 
the Ohio and Upper Mississippi rivers, by the Cincinnati-Southern 
Railroad - will unite and build up a great industrial center."51 
This combination of resource availability and 
transportation-connectedness served as the LCC's major 
selling point in convincing investors of the future success 
of its proposed development. 
The property that was purchased by the LCC for its 
development was part of the Lenoir Estate, which had been 
49Ibid., 12. 
50MacArthur, Charles Mcclung McGhee, 218-223. 
51Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1~90), 
11. 174 
ceded to General William Lenoir by the State of North 
Carolina for service in the Revolutionary War. 52 The 
proposed town site consisted of a 2,700 acre tract located 
on the north shore of the Tennessee River, near its 
confluence with the Little Tennessee River (Figure 3.6). 
The site was located on the main line of the East 
Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway approximately 23 
miles southwest of Knoxville and 88 miles northeast of 
Chattanooga. Soon after the purchase of the property, the 
LCC commissioned a detailed plat of the proposed urban 
area. The development of Lenoir City became the main 
subject of the LCC's activities, as it attempted to 
administer the growth of a "commercial and industrial 
center of the first importance. 1153 
Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City; 
The Planning. Selling. and Peopling of New communities 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
As the land companies operating in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley made the development of planned 
urban-industrial communities the focus of their activities, 
they were faced with decisions about the form and function 
52Ashley T. Hawn, "The Lenoir City Company, An Attempt In Community 
Devlopment," (Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), 
7. In part because of this land grant, William Lenoir was an 
influential figure in western North Carolina and East Tennessee 
during the late 1700s and early 1800s. His vast land holdings were 
passed on to his sons at his death in 1839, and they in turn were 
important figures in these areas for the balance of the century. 
Hence·, the name of the Lenoir City Company and Lenoir City. 
53Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890), 
12. 175 
Figure 3.6. 
The Lenoir City Company's Map 
of The Valley of East Tennessee 
Source: Lenoir City Company, Prospectus of the Lenoir City 
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of these settlements. Company housing was not incorporated 
into any of the community plans. Instead, the companies 
used infrastructure improvements and professionally 
designed community plans as selling points, and attempted 
to make its money on the sale of improved lots to buyers. 
In addition to residential tracts, the land companies were 
especially interested in selling land to manufacturing 
enterprises, which they envisioned would be the major 
employment bases of the communities. Thus, rather than 
model company towns, Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City can 
be more accurately described as model real estate ventures 
and model industrial communities. 54 
In planning and developing their model industrial 
communities, the land companies operating in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley uniformly drew upon urban sanitary 
reform ideals. With respect to city site choice, each of 
the companies justified its city location using the 
language of sanitary reform. 55 In describing the location 
of Harriman, the East Tennessee Land Company explained 
that: 
54The distinction between these terms is made because the land 
companies did not retain ownership of land in the subject communities 
and did not rent property as a profit strategy (as is often assumed 
when the term "company town" is used). 
55The sanitary reform movement was based upon an empirically-grounded 
explanation of origin and spread of infectious diseases, often called 
the "filth theory" by medical historians. Reformers, for instance, 
pointed to filth as the cause of numerous scourges -- among them 
yellow fever, cholera, typhoid, scarlet fever, and diptheria. Filth, 
depending upon the disease and the observer, could encompass such 
conditions as odors arising from decomposing organic waste, stagnant 
water, sodden ground, and absence of sunlight. See Jon A. Peterson, 
"The Impact of Sanitary Reform Upon American Urban Planning, 1840-
1890," 13-39. 178 
It is nearly 1,000 feet above sea level, and beyond the yellow 
fever range. Its location is cool in summer, warm in winter, and 
healthful all of the time. There the days are never tropically 
hot, and the nights are deliciously cool. 56 
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company used like terminology to 
describe Cardiff's situation: 
The town site of Cardiff lies like an undulating ocean at 
the foot of Walden's Ridge, and by it is protected from the March 
winds--those active agents and confederates of pulmonary 
diseases. It is an area within which malarial fevers and 
epidemic diseases have never been known. 57 
Similarly, the Lenoir City Company summarized the 
characteristics of the area in which its community was to 
be located: 
Lenoir City is situated in the Central South, 1000 feet above 
the sea-level, with a climate singularly equable and 
exhilarating, midway between the severity of the New England 
climate and the heat of the extreme South; lying north of 
epidemics, and south of blizzards. No hurricanes, cyclones or 
dangerous storms have ever been known in this section of the 
country; their forces are shattered on the outer wall of 
mountains that engirdles the East Tennessee Valley. All the 
conditions of a sanitarium are found here; elevation, pure air, 
healthful waters, and an atmosphere dry and bracing, acting as a 
tonic on debilitated persons. The elevated location of the City 
exempts it from the dangers of overflows and malarial diseases; 
its topography assures the advantages of perfect drainage. 58 
Each of the companies also translated this awareness of 
reform ideals into the development and planning of their 
urban industrial communities: urban infrastructure and 
services that were thought to positively impact the 
physical and mental health of humans were to be provided. 
The East Tennessee Land Company spelled out to potential 
investors and buyers that: 
56Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 35. 
51 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890. 
58Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890), 
19-20. 179 
The fixed policy of this Company, in town-building, is to 
establish all original town improvements--to lay the sewers, the 
sidewalks and the paving, to put in the water-works, and the 
lighting system, and the streetcar systern--and then to operate 
all these, and secure the profit thereon, through subordinate 
companies which it shall control, by retaining a majority of 
stock in each. 59 
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company reported through its 
mouthpiece, the Cardiff Herald: 
No where is greater care exercised in all matters relative to 
the health of a place than in Cardiff. Every precaution is 
taken, the utmost vigilance is observed in all sanitary matters. 
The sewerage system will be perfect, and the work already done 
indicates the policy to be followed. Health is of primary 
importance, and while nature has done her share for the place, 
sanitary science will keep abreast of the constantly changing 
condition of affairs here. 60 
Also: 
In establishing industrial towns, the advantages of a site 
from a business point of view too commonly decide the question of 
locality, while the inestimable value of health as a prime factor 
in the successful growth and development of all industrial 
centers is apparently lost sight of. No such mistake has been 
made in locating the town of Cardiff. It would be difficult to 
find anywhere in the South, or in fact, in the entire country, a 
site where the conditions necessary to the maintenance of a high 
standard of health prevail to a greater extent than they do 
here. 61 
Thus, the land companies recognized the infrastructural 
improvements that were to be part of their urban 
developments not only as promoting public health, but as 
being sound investments in a business sense. 
The land companies operating in the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley also incorporated moral reform measures in 
their urban places. Like many model company town builders 
before them, the companies felt that the work ethic and 
59Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, quoted in Pulliam, 
Harriman: The Town That Temperance Built, 31. 
6DThe Cardiff Herald, July 23, 1890. 
61Ibid., October 1, 1890. 180 
business success could be fostered by the promotion of 
temperance. The East Tennessee Land Company made a 
concerted effort to identify its development with the 
movement, dubbing Harriman "The City of Temperance" during 
its early advertising campaign. The ETLC explained in one 
of its publications: 
It is a well-known economic fact that sober labor, away from 
saloons, yields a positive percentage of gain to the capital 
employing it, over labor in a community where the liquor traffic 
is allowed. Statistics could here be cited were it necessary, to 
show that this is the fact, and that large manufacturing plants 
have actually yielded a much larger interest upon their capital 
in years when the liquor traffic around them was forbidden and 
abolished, than in years when the liquor traffic was permitted, 
but with the same financial conditions otherwise. By the policy 
of the East Tennessee Land Company the liquor traffic is 
prohibited in title deeds, and saloons can never be permitted, 
with their inevitable influences upon labor and its product. 62 
The Lenoir City Company echoed these sentiments in relation 
to city-building. In its prospectus, under the bold-letter 
heading "NO BAR ROOMS," the LCC justified its temperance 
policy: 
The promotors of this Company, as a matter of business, and 
for the protection and general welfare of the people already 
living on this property, and of those who will soon make this 
City the home of their families, and to prevent disorders and 
lawlessness, have determined to put into each deed executed by 
the Company a clause forfeiting the title if liquor shall ever be 
manufactured or sold on the premises conveyed. All manufacturers 
know that it is the convenient dram shop which does the most to 
demoralize workmen and impair their usefulness. 
This will be especially valuable to the Furnace plants and 
all other manufacturing enterprises that are now and soon will be 
established here. 63 
The emphasis of the companies was, therefore, on the 
creation of social conditions that would encourage stable 
62 Two Years of Harriman, 94. 
63Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 19. 181 
industrial workforces, facilitating efficient production 
and, in turn, the success of their urban-industrial places. 
The land companies made property and home ownership 
defining elements of the urban places they were developing. 
This was related to two goals which the companies were 
trying to attain. The first was intrinsic to the place-
making strategy employed in the development of urban 
settlements such as Pullman and Hopedale: that model 
company towns should be considered first and foremost as 
business ventures. The companies' investment in land and 
improvements could be recovered most quickly through the 
sale of lots. The second was related to the longer-term 
profitability of the urban developments: contributing to 
the creation of a favorable labor environment for 
industrial production. In relation to this, the East 
Tennessee Land Company wrote: 
No class of workingmen ever is so profitable to its employers as 
the class which can come and does come, by reason of its labor, 
into the ownership of its own homes, covets permanency of 
employment, strives after superiority, and seeks that mutual 
welfare which labor and capital should each assure to each. 
Already the number of homes owned at Harriman by the workingmen 
employed there surpasses, as is believed, that of any other town 
of like proportion. 64 
In making the decision to sell the lots in their cities, 
the land companies were forfeiting total property control 
for immediate monetary returns, while maintaining the 
ability to dictate the character of development that took 
place in them. 
64 Two Years of Harriman, 94. 182 
Spatial Strategies on the Landscape: The City Plans 
Because the land companies expected industry to be the 
basis of the growth and development of their cities, the 
plans that they commissioned for their cities took into 
account the needs of manufacturers and potential residents. 
The companies, operating under the increasingly accepted 
logic that skillful place-making could improve labor pools 
and industrial production, spent a considerable amount of 
the capital they had obtained in attempting to do so. But 
what spatial characteristics did the companies perceive as 
desirable for efficient industrial production? With total 
control over the planning process, one would assume that 
the companies employed spatial strategies in their city 
plans that they believed would assist them in achieving 
economic and social goals. 
The city pl_ans created by the land companies had some 
components in common (Figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9). One of 
these was a general grid pattern of streets and blocks, 
with service alleys bisecting most blocks. The grid 
pattern of subdivision was not distinctive, and suggests 
the companies' concern with ease of subdivision and 
obtaining large numbers of lots to sell in their city 
sites. Each of the plans also set aside large tracts of 
land for industrial use adjacent to railroad lines. 
Undoubtedly, this design feature was incorporated as an 
attraction to manufacturers considering location in the 
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Figure 3.7. 
Harriman City Plan 
Source: Roane County Register of Plans, Book C-2, 326-327. 
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Figure 3.8. 
Cardiff City Plan 
Source: Roane County Register of Plans, Cabinet 1, Slide 4. 
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Figure 3.9. 
Lenoir City Plan 
Source: Lenoir City Company, Prospectus of the Lenoir City 
Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890). 
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cities. Railside sites would make loading and unloading of 
raw materials and finished products easy and efficient, and 
would contribute to the low-cost operation of any 
industrial facility. 
The East Tennessee Land Company chose a tract within 
an oxbow of the Emory River for Harriman (Figure 3.7). The 
grid subdivision pattern was altered somewhat to fit the 
hexagonal shape created by the river and a proposed rail 
belt line. Some more distinctive urban reform-related 
elements of the plan were a block set aside for public 
buildings which faced Roane, Walden, Trenton and Morgan 
Streets, and the designation of an extensive public park 
(Block 36). Lots were not subdivided to uniform size 
throughout the city site. Residential lot sizes were 
significantly larger (50 x 190 compared to 25 x 1271/2) in 
an area bounded by Clinton, Union, Clifty, and Walden 
Streets, that occupied a ridge looking down on the rest of 
the area. 
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company's plan for Cardiff 
incorporated the grid plan in most of the area north of 
Georgia Avenue (Figure 3.8). The Cincinnati Southern rail 
line bifurcated the city site, and land was designated for 
a depot at a central location on the north side of the 
tracks. Lots sizes were larger to the south of Georgia 
Avenue, and in one section of this area, curvilinear 
streets and irregularly shaped lots were laid out. The 
design of this residential area contrasted sharply with the 
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subdivision pattern of the rest of the site, mimicking 
features of Olmsteadian model suburbs. 65 This area was 
also set apart by a change in street naming protocol, with 
streets named after American statesmen, politicians, and 
commanders rather than states or cities. 
The most distinctive feature of the Lenoir City 
Company's plan for Lenoir City was the provision for public 
space (Figure 3.9). Within the grid plan, public spaces 
such as Madison Square, Oakwood, The City Mall, the City 
Hall and Market, and The Piran Court Square interrupted the 
general pattern. This reflected an urban reform 
orientation towards open space as essential to maintaining 
public health. As in the other plans, some areas of the 
site were subdivided into larger lot sizes, including a 
sizable section in the northwestern part of the site and a 
smaller one in the extreme east adjacent to "The Strand." 
A block was also designated for public schools and other 
public buildings (Block 7). 
The companies' perceptions of their planned urban 
landscapes were articulated in advertisement literature. 
The literature indicates preconceived ideas about the 
arrangement of urban-industrial landscapes, and suggests 
intentional spatial stratification of land uses and 
65olmstead felt that the suburb should provide a setting for domestic 
life free of the commotion, crowding, and physical chaos that 
characterized the central areas of industrial cities. His suburban 
designs usuually featured curvilinear streets, large irregularly 
shaped lots, and public open spaces, as well as sewer and water 
systems. 191 
societal groups. The East Tennessee Land Company described 
Harriman in part in the following manner: 
Cumberland Street ... traverses the crest of the high ridge 
which runs across the town, and upon this street are many 
residences of an excellent class ... At the eastern end of this 
street ... stands the elegant home of Mr. Frederick Gates, in whose 
brain Harriman was conceived ... his home commands a splendid 
prospect of the city which he and his colleagues have 
established. 
Still another Cumberland Street home ... is the residence of 
Mr. S.K. Paige, President of the Paige Manufacturing Company, 
which vies with that of Mr. Gates ... in costliness and 
architectural design. From this, as from all residence sites in 
this part of town, a magnificent view of Emory Gap is had, with 
much of the town spread out below you upon the lower slopes . 
... Even the homes of the cheapest class, such as abound in 
the manufacturing district, upon Clifty, Sewanee, Carter, Emory, 
and other streets, are noteworthy for their neatness, and their 
general average as above homes of a similar class in other 
manufacturing places. 66 
It is obvious from this description that the ETLC 
envisioned different areas of the city site for various 
classes of residents. The ridge area was to be an upper 
class residential area, and the areas below on the 
periphery of the site adjacent to manufacturing facilities 
were to be for the working classes. The spatial 
delineation was clear enough in the company's eyes that 
specific streets could be associated with the residential 
areas of particular socioeconomic groups. Although not as 
specifically articulated, the other companies demonstrated 
similar methods of partitioning their urban landscapes. 
The Lenoir City Company summarized the features of its city 
site thus: 
By reference to the map of the Lenoir City site ... it will 
be seen that the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway 
traverses the central portion of the City from north-east to 
south-west, and that Town Creek flows through the central portion 
66rbid., 32-42. 192 
from north-west to south-east, at nearly right angles to the 
railroad, thus dividing the site into four quadrangular 
divisions. 
That portion which is north of the railroad and west of Town 
Creek will be the residence portion of the City, with several 
longitudinal and lateral streets near the railroad. The central 
and northern portions of this division consist of a succession of 
beautiful hills and vales covered with magnificent groves, which 
are most suitable for residential purposes. 
Upon that portion lying south of the railroad and west of 
Town Creek, on a river front at considerable distance from the 
City site, will be located the larger and heavier factories, such 
as blast furnaces, steel works, saw mills and lumber yards. 
Upon that portion lying south of the railroad and west of 
Town Creek, will be established woodworking plants, wagon spoke, 
handle and furniture factories, and canning establishments. On 
either side of Town Creek, cotton and woolen mills, and all kinds 
of textile factories will be located. 
The northern portion of the remaining division, lying north 
of the railroad and east of Town Creek, will be laid off into 
lots, and sold to operatives and wage workers on the most liberal 
terms. 67 
Again, the LCC had specific, preconceived ideas about how 
urban land was to be used prior to selling its land. 
Strategies to Realities: The Selling of Urban Land 
The land companies turned their perceptions and 
aspirations •into realities through their land sale methods. 
In the case of Harriman, initial sales were accomplished 
through a company-administered auction. The East Tennessee 
Land Company advertised its land sale in newspapers in New 
York City, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and throughout 
New England during January and February of 1890. From the 
company's offices at No. 96 Broadway in New York's 
financial district, letters and leaflets were sent to 
prospective buyers and investors (Figure 3.10) . 68 The 
67Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 21-22. 
68Pulliam, The Town That Temperance Built, 10. 193 
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Figure 3.10. 
Company Lot Sale at Harriman, 
Advertisement Leaflet for 
Dated 
East Tennessee Land 
January 23, 1890 
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ETLC's sale ran from February 26 to February 28, 1890 and 
attracted from 3,000 to 4,000 prospective buyers from all 
over the eastern United States. During the three day 
period, 574 lots were sold for a total of $604,703 (Figure 
3.11) . 69 Although the sale was conducted under an open 
auction format, there is evidence that the company was 
involved in determining the price at which lots were sold. 
According to an account of the sale: 
Just such a land sale was probably never seen before in this 
country, under such conditions, and its like may never be 
witnessed again. Faith in the Company's character, and 
confidence in the location of the town, had created enthusiasm of 
a remarkable degree ... It would have run the aggregate sales to a 
round million dollars, had not the Company sought in unusual ways 
to discount the speculative spirit, and hold men down to 
reasonable business bidding. 70 
What the ETLC determined to be "reasonable business 
bidding" was dependent upon its preconception of how space 
was to be used in Harriman. When the company became 
involved in the bidding process, it more than likely 
imposed prices that it felt were fair and appropriate for 
lots in various parts of the city site. Thus, the results 
of the ETLC's handling of the land sale were more than 
satisfactory monetary returns and the maintenance of 
company influence on land values and land use through 
intervention in the auction process. 
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company and the Lenoir City 
Company also attempted to influence land use in their city 
through their land sale methods. Each of the companies 
69 Harriman Daily Advance, April 8, 1890. 
70city Directory of Harriman, Tennessee, Volume I, 1892 (Chattanooga, 
TN: G.M. Connelly, 1892), 26. 195 
Figure 3.11. 
The Great Land Sale at Harriman, Tennessee 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 
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assigned values to lots in their cities before any buyers 
bid on them. Land in Cardiff was sold at an auction 
similar to that held by the East Tennessee Land Company. 
In addition to national newspaper advertisements, the CCIC 
commissioned at least one agent to travel to major cities 
of the United States and Canada soliciting buyers and 
investors in advance of the land sale. 71 The Cardiff sale 
began on April 22, 1890 and continued for three days. A 
total of thirty-five Pullman rail cars, bringing an 
estimated 4,000 prospective buyers from the New England 
states, New York, Cincinnati, Louisville, Atlanta, and 
several other cities arrived in Cardiff for the sale 
(Figure 3.12). By the end of the auction, the CCIC had 
sold over a million dollars worth of lots, for prices 
ranging from $500 to $7,000. 72 The method of sale was 
described by the CCIC: 
A definite price has been fixed upon each offered lot, which will 
be the maximum price for the Company to receive therefore. The 
lots will be put up at auction and sold to the highest bidder for 
whatever price they bring, whether it amounts to more or less 
than the maximum price, but all premiums (of $50 or any multiple 
thereof bid on lots) above the maximum price will be returned to 
the successful bidder in the stock of the Company, full paid and 
non-accessable ... 73 
71F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, August 23, 1890; F.R. Cordley to 
J.F. Randolph, September 3, 1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, 
September 10, 1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, September 15, 
1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, September 22, 1890; H.H. French 
to J.F. Randolph, September 22, 1890; H.H. French to J.F. Randolph, 
September 24, 1890, Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers, Roane County 
Heritage Commission, Kingston, TN. John F. Randolph was an agent of 
the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, and traveled widely in advertising 
the company's activities and soliciting investors. The letters cited 
above discussed Randolph's activities as agent, and were mailed to 
him on the job in Boston, Ottawa, Toronto, and Detroit. 
72Ibid., April 30, 1890. 
13 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890. 198 
Figure 3.12. 
The Cardiff Land Sale 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee. 

This method selling lots allowed the company to quantify 
its vision of how land should be used within the city site 
by placing apriori values on specific pieces of land. For 
instance, lots that the company thought should used for 
prime commercial sites or high-class residential areas 
would be assigned high prices, and those for lower-class 
worker housing lower prices. 
The Lenoir City Company treated urban land in 
essentially the same way in their development, although it 
did not conduct a public auction. The company assigned 
values to lots in advance, and placed those values on a map 
of the city site that was distributed with each company 
prospectus (Figure 3.9). Lots were not sold outright, per 
se, but were included as bonuses when a purchase of Lenoir 
City Company stock was made. The company described this 
process, which it dubbed the "Mutual Plan": 
A large tract of land belonging to the Company, lying in the 
center of the locality where the City is to be built has been 
already laid off in streets and lots, and an accurate map has 
been made of the entire property showing in detail these streets 
and lots. These lots have been estimated in value, the 
valuations being as nearly uniform as possible, after making 
allowances for the different locations and sizes of the various 
lots and the uses to which they can be put ... 
These lots ... are to be disposed of by the Company in 
connection with the $400,000 of stock, in the following manner: 
THIS $400,000 WORTH OF STOCK WILL BE SOLD TO THE PUBLIC AT PAR. 
EVERY PURCHASER OF THIS STOCK WILL, HOWEVER, RECEIVE NOT ONLY 
PAID-UP STOCK TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS SUBSCRIPTION BUT ALSO A LOT 
(OR LOTS) WHOSE ESTIMATED VALUE IS EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS 
SUBSCRIPTION.74 
Of course, the locations and sizes of lots within the city 
site were determined by the LCC when it imposed its plan 
14Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 24-25. 201 
upon the landscape, and the company had not wished to 
create a uniform settlement pattern when it subdivided the 
former Lenoir Estate. 
What kinds of urban places were created in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley by these land companies? 
Reconstruction of urban morphology and social l~ndscape is 
possible from the large and well-preserved collection of 
materials on the early development of Harriman, Tennessee. 
The Results of Land company Development Strategy; 
Harriman. Tennessee 
The first step in the East Tennessee Land Company's 
realization of its plan for Harriman was its land sale. 
Prices paid for city lots varied greatly, but generally, 
lot price variation corresponded to land uses which the 
company had envisioned (Figure 3.13). Lots that sold for 
less than $500 usually were located in the periphery of the 
original platted area, to the south of Carter Street and 
the east of Clifty Street, the area intended for "homes of 
the cheapest class" encompassing Clifty, Carter, and Emory 
streets. 75 The other instance of lots sold for under $500 
was in an area not shown on the original plat, i.e. west of 
the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway line. Lots 
bought for above $2,000 were located in the ridge area on 
Cumberland and Walden Streets, or along Roane Street to the 
75Information on lot sale prices was obtained from the Harriman Daily 
Advance, April 8, 1890. This information was cross-checked against 
Roane County deed records. 202 
Figure 3.13. 
Inaugural Land Sale Lot Prices, 
February, 1890 
Data: Harriman Daily Advance, April 8, 1890; 





K:,~~; ;;~•. :~J 
1001-2000 -> 2000 -Rail 
.,/"./ 
~ 
0 3 6 
204 
west. The ETLC had described the ridge area, and 
Cumberland Street in particular, as an upper-class 
residential area in its literature. Roane Street had been 
envisioned as the main commercial boulevard in the city, 
the company promising that it would "in due time [be] the 
central thoroughfare of Harriman ... [which] will approximate 
three miles in length. 1176 Thus the ETLC was successful in 
translating its envisioned land use regime into a 
stratified real estate market through its land sale. 
For all of the planning that went into the early 
development of Harriman, the East Tennessee Land Company 
was forced to add two residential areas only three months 
after the inaugural land sale. Apparently, the company 
realized that it had not made adequate provisions for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, needed in various 
industrial facilities, but unable to afford property in 
most of the originally platted city area. The two 
"additions" were laid out approximately one mile northwest 
of the original city site, separated from it by the East 
Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia line and a tract of 
unplatted, undeveloped land. The company explained the 
need for these additions: 
In May, 1890, an addition was platted one mile east for the 
special accomodation of workingmen who could not afford such 
prices as had been for a time established by the auction sale, 
and one hundred neat houses were built and occupied that year. 
It is known as Walnut Hills Addition, and forms a thriving suburb 
of the city proper, of which it is a corporate part. It has a 
school and a church, and number over 600 population. Oak View 
16Two Years of Harriman, 28. 205 
Addition joins it, nearer the ridge, where colored residents have 
grouped themselves, with their own churches and schools ... 77 
Two important ideas were expressed in this description of 
the additions. First, the new residential areas were 
"additions," subordinate and apart from Harriman. They 
were separated from the original city site by a mile buffer 
and had their own institutions such as schools and 
churches. Second, these new areas were developed for 
defined groups of people. Walnut Hills was a residential 
area for the lower paid blue-collar white working class 
(workingmen), while Oak View was the section where any 
African-Americans working in the city would "group 
themselves." This initial ommission of working-class 
residential areas from the plan gives an indication of the 
ETLC's priorities: they were more concerned with making 
money from sales of urban land than they were in creating 
the labor conditions needed for industrial production. 
Construction of the city began in the months before 
the land sale and intensified in the months after it. 
Initially, temporary shacks were built to house workers and 
businesses in the settlement (Figures 3.14). This 
"Shacktown" area was gradually abandoned as permanent 
structures were constructed. The ETLC graded the entire 
city site, and carved streets and blocks out of the 
previously undeveloped landscape (Figure 3.15). In its 
first two years of operation, the company expended over 
$50,000 in street improvements; established municipal 
77 rbid., 24-26. 206 
Figure 3.14. 
Shacktown, 1890 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee. 
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Figure 3.15. Development of the Harriman City Site 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 
N Collection, Kingston, Tennessee. 
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electric power and water infrastructure; funded the 
construction of a public school building at a cost of more 
than $6,000; constructed an exposition building to be used 
for public meetings; began construction of a public sewer 
system; and completed construction of an imposing company 
headquarters building. 78 The East Tennessee Land Company 
headquarters building was designed to be a symbol of the 
permanence and future prosperity which Harriman would 
attain. According to the company, it was: 
... a substantial brick and stone structure, erected upon 
square reserved for public buildings ... The four Norman towers 
of the office building give it a peculiar appearance of grace 
and strength combined. It is pronounced the finest building of 
any kind in Roane County, and the finest private office 
building in the State. 79 
By 1892, the ETLC reported that nine industrial 
enterprises had located in Harriman, as the result of the 
activities of the Harriman Manufacturing Company. The 
largest of these was the Lookout Rolling Mills, which had 
formerly operated in Chattanooga, and employed 250 to 300 
workers (Figures 3.16). Other production facilities 
included a furniture factory, a machine works, a brick 
works, an agricultural implement factory, a tack factory, 
and a tool works. Several of these had previously been in 
operation in other locations such as Knoxville, 
Chattanooga, Lancaster, Ohio, and Auburn, New York. The 
stock held by the Harriman Manufacturing Company in these 
18city Directory of Harriman, Tennessee, 30; Harriman Advance, March 
1, 1890. 




Figure 3.16. The Lookout Rolling Mills, Harriman, Tennessee, 1891 
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph 
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee. 
industries in 1892 was $268,000. 80 After two years of 
applying its development strategy, the ETLC seems to have 
been successful in building an industrial base in Harriman. 
Interpreting Harriman 
Also in 1892, the first and only Harriman city 
directory was produced. Its publisher, G.M. Connelly, 
proclaimed: 
The upbuilding of a great city will undoubtedly be the result of 
the united labors of the cormnunity which so liberally supported 
the publication of Vol. I, of the Harriman City Directory. No 
town of double the population has ever exhibited such enterprise. 
The book is as complete in its arrangement as all large 
directories. 
The East Tennessee Land Company at this time must have seen 
the city directory as just another symbol of Harriman's 
urban legitimacy. The "enterprise" of Harriman's early 
population and the ETLC in encouraging and cooperating with 
Mr. Connelly in the publication of the directory, besides 
lending credence to Harriman as an emerging industrial 
city, has served another purpose which they never could 
have foreseen. It provides the only data available to 
interpret the social landscape created by the East 
Tennessee Land Company in Harriman. 
In 1892, the Harriman City Directory announced that 
Harriman's population had grown to 3,762 from one farm 
family in January of 1890. The directory reported the 
name, address, occupation, and race of each head-of-
aolbid., 72-76. 212 
household in the city in 1892. Analysis of these data show 
that Harriman was a spatially-stratified urban settlement 
with respect to class and race in 1892. When the heads-of-
household in 1892 Harriman are grouped into social classes 
according to occupation, a distinct residential pattern is 
evident (Figure 3.17) . 81 The central ridge area of the 
original city site was dominated by high-and-low-status 
white-collar residents; very few unskilled or skilled blue 
collar workers lived in this area. On the periphery of the 
original city site, somewhat lower in elevation adjacent to 
the industrial district, were the streets on which skilled 
blue-collar and low-status white-collar workers 
predominated. A small number of unskilled blue-collar 
headed families also lived in this peripheral area. By far 
the largest number of unskilled blue-collar heads lived in 
Walnut Hills and Oak View Additions to the west of the 
railroad tracks. Some skilled blue-collar workers lived in 
this section, as well as a small number of low white-collar 
workers. No high-status white-collar heads lived west of 
the railroad tracks. 
The visual perception of a residential separation of 
classes is supported by statistical testing. Two and three 
area Chi-Square analyses of 1892 Harriman show non-random 
proportional distributions of occupational class groups. 
The two area analysis was performed using the originally 
platted area east of the East Tennessee, Virginia and 
81As in Chapter II, Zunz's occupational classification scheme was 
used to place residents in class groups. 213 
Figure 3.17. 
Occupational Class Map of Harriman, Tennessee, 1892 
Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance 
Maps, 1895. 
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Georgia tracks, and the later platted additions to the west 
of the tracks (Figure 3.18). The two-area analysis shows a 
significant overrepresentation of unskilled blue-collar 
heads in the area to the west of the tracks, and a 
significant underrepresentation of both the high and low 
white-collar class groups (Table 3.1). 82 The results are 
reversed in the analysis of the original plat area, with an 
overrepresentation of low and high white-collar heads, and 
a marked underrepresentation of unskilled blue-collar 
workers (Table 3.2). These disparities translate into 
significant Chi-Square values for each area, indicating a 
non-random proportional spatial distribution of the class 
groups. The three area analysis was performed using the 
following areas: a core area of the original plat, bounded 
by Carter Street on the south and Clifty Street on the 
east; a peripheral area of the original plat, separated 
from the core area by the same streets; and an area to the 
west of the railroad tracks (Figure 3.19). A significant 
underrepresentation of unskilled and skilled blue-collar 
heads is evident in the core area, as is an 
overrepresentation of low and, especially, high white-
collar workers (Table 3.3, 3.4). The most striking 
residential pattern in the periphery was a paucity of 
82statements of over or under representation of class groups are made 
in reference to the number of given class group heads-of-household 
expected under an assumption of random proportional spatial 
distribution. This assumption is made when using the Chi-Square 
analysis. 216 
Figure 3 .18. 
Study Areas for Two-Area Chi-Square Analysis 
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Table 3.1. 
Chi-Square Calculation (2 Area Analysis) 
(Area West of Tracks) 
Obs. Exp. (O-E) (O-E)2 
unskilled blue-collar 64 
skilled blue-collar 37 
low white-collar 9 


















x2 = 84.14 
Table 3.2. 
Chi-Square Calculation (2 Area Analysis) 
(Main Plat) 
Obs. Exp. (O-E) (O-E) 2 
unskilled blue-collar 13 
skilled blue-collar 79 
low white-collar 90 


















x2 = 41.44 
219 
Figure 3.19. 
Study Areas for Three-Area Chi-Square Analysis 
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Table 3.3. 
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis) 
(Area West of Tracks) 
Obs. Ez:p. (O-E) (O-E)2 
unskilled blue-collar 64 
skilled blue-collar 37 
low white-collar 9 
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Table 3.4. 
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis) 
(Core Area) 
Obs. Ez:p. (O-E) (O-E)2 
unskilled blue-collar 3 
skilled blue-collar 21 
low white-collar 43 
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unskilled blue-collar heads compared to expectation (Table 
3.5). Again,the Chi-Square value for each area was 
significant, indicating a nonrandom spatial distribution of 
class groups. 
The spatial distribution of 1892 Harriman residents by 
race shows a pattern of almost complete residential 
segregation (Figure 3.20). The vast majority of African-
Americans lived west of the railroad tracks in Oak View 
Addition. 83 In fact, there was only one instance of 
African-Americans living to the east of the tracks in the 
original city site, where a boarding house for single men 
was located. Thus, the ETLC's vision of Harriman as a 
racially segregated industrial city was indeed a reality in 
1892. 
Taking Harriman Apart 
Although Harriman was spatially stratified to a large 
degree by class84 , the stratification was not uniform. An 
investigation of the spatial relationships between 
individual class groups provides insight into the type of 
urban community that Harriman was in 1892. Index of 
83The 1892 Harriman City Directory did not give exact street 
addresses for residents of Oak View Addition. It did, however, 
designate Oak View as a residence area for heads-of-household, which 
gave a general indication of residence location. 
84 The grouping of heads-of-household into occupational class groups 
is also useful in discerning income earning levels of particular 
occupations based on previous research. This makes the analysis of 
spatial stratification by income group possible, in addition to class 
groups per se. See Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality. 223 
Table 3.5. 
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis) 
(Peripheral Area) 
Obs. Exp. (O-E) (O-E)2 
unskilled blue-collar 10 
skilled blue-collar 55 
low white-collar 48 
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Figure 3. 20. 
Residence By Race, Harriman, Tennessee, 1892 
Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance 
Maps, 1895. 
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residential segregation analyses, utilizing the same areal 
divisions as in the Chi-Square tests, were conducted to 
explore these relationships (Tables 3.6, 3.7). Both the 
two and three area analyses show the residential 
distributions of low white-collar and skilled blue-collar 
workers to be most similar (16% and 28%, respectively), and 
the distributions of low white-collar and unskilled blue-
collar to be most dissimilar (44% and 64%) •85 Overall, the 
distribution of unskilled blue-collar heads was the single 
most dissimilar when compared to those of the other class 
groups in both analyses. When compared to the residential 
distributions of high and low white-collar workers, the 
pattern of unskilled blue collar workers was very 
concentrated west of the railroad tracks (Figures 3.21, 
3.22). There were very few cases in which unskilled blue-
collar heads lived on the same block with white collar 
heads. The residential patterns of skilled and unskilled 
blue collar heads were more similar, especially in Walnut 
Hills Addition where there were numerous instances where 
households of these classes were on the same block and 
adjacent to each other (Figure 3.23). However, the most 
similar residential patterns were exhibited by skilled 
blue-collar heads and low white-collar heads, who often 
lived on the same blocks, especially on the periphery 
streets of the original site (Figure 3.24). This indicates 
85The index of residential segregation is a variation of the index of 
dissimilarity areal association measure. It is a measure of 
differences between areal associations and, therefore, an inverse 
measure of areal association. 227 
Table 3.6. 
Index of Residential Segregation by Occupation Class 
(2 Area) 
1 
1 unsk. blue-collar 
2 skil. blue-collar 28% 
3 low white-collar 









* percent value denotes the amount of one occupational 
class group that would have to be moved to to be 
integrated with another given occupational class 
group 
Table 3.7. 
Index of Residential Segregation by Occupation Class 
(3 Area) 
1 
1 unsk. blue-collar 
2 skil. blue-collar 41% 
3 low white-collar 
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Figure 3.22. 
Residential Patterns of Unskilled Workers and Low-White 
Collar Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892 
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Figure 3.23. 
Residential Patterns of Unskilled Workers and Skilled Blue-
Collar Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892 
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that these groups had similar earnings levels, enabling 
them to buy land in the same areas of the city. It also 
suggests that residential spatial stratification in 
Harriman was perhaps based more on income level than on 
class group. 
The East Tennessee Land Company envisioned Harriman as 
an industrial center that would grow into an important 
regional city. The company's vision included sanitary and 
urban reform ideals, and temperance provisions that would 
make for a healthy and productive urban-industrial 
workforce. When the company was faced with decisions 
relating to the spatial layout of its model industrial 
city, it chose to create an urban landscape that was 
segmented by income and race. The ETLC's plan became 
reality through its administration of urban land sales, and 
the selective provision of infrastructure and capital. By 
1892, Harriman's sociospatial landscape mirrored the 
company's perception of the industrial division of labor 
that should exist in a manufacturing center. Unskilled 
blue-collar workers and African-Americans, those who would 
provide the majority of industrial labor, were placed in 
their own separated enclaves. This imitated the spatial 
situation which had become dominant in northern cities with 
respect to foreigners and free blacks drawn by industrial 
employment opportunities since before the Civil War: 
segregation. 86 Thus, the East Tennessee Land Company had 
86c. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), 17-21. 237 
created a socially and racially segregated industrial city 
in the Upland South, years before a Jim Crow law was ever 
passed in the state of Tennessee. 87 
The ETLC and the other land companies were not able to 
continue to operate at the large scale that they had begun 
their activities in the late 1880s. Their impressive 
development schemes were interrupted by circumstances in 
the early 1890s; grand plans were put on hold, modified, or 
abandoned as optimism gave way to economic depression. 
87The first Jim Crow law in Tennessee, involving streetcars, was not 
enacted until 1903. Laws pertaining to residential segregation by 
race were not intiated in the South until 1910. Ibid., 97-101. 238 
Chapter IV 
RESULTS OF INDUSTRIAL-URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE UPPER TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY 
A Change in the National Economic Situation; 
The Financial Panic of 1893 
The economic downturn that affected the entire country 
during the early to mid 1890s impacted the land companies 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley as well. The Panic of 
1893, during which the New York Stock Exchange endured 
several severe drops, initiated a depression that lasted 
for more than three years. It was one of the most severe 
depressions in American history. 
The decade of the 1890s opened with the nation 
approaching the end of a business-cycle expansion. Foreign 
trade had been favorable since the mid-1880s, and European 
capitalists had invested large amounts of capital in 
railroads, cattle ranching, and other business enterprises. 
Employment was increasing, output was growing, and general 
economic conditions were positive in the United States. 1 
The generally positive conditions that existed in the 
country through 1892 belied significant harbingers of 
economic downturn. There was a significant recession in 
England in 1890, marked by the failure of the large and 
prestigious Baring Brothers investment banking house, a 
1Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United 
States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 271-272. 
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pioneer merchant banking founded in 1763 which had long 
served as an intermediary between British investors and 
American entrepreneurs. 2 By November of 1890, the Baring 
House had overextended itself in Argentine speculation. 
Argentina collapsed, leaving Baring Brothers with a large 
amount of its resources locked up in now-worthless land and 
securities. Although the Bank of England bailed Barings 
Brothers out, the near-failure of the country's foremost 
banking house shocked European investors. This caused a 
run on gold by English investors, many of whom liquidated 
their stock holdings in American companies. 3 The result 
was a net loss of $68 million in gold exported from the 
United States in 1890. 4 
Another destabilizing situation by 1890 was the 
struggle for bimetalism. Congress had passed a measure in 
1873 that discontinued the further minting of the standard 
silver dollar. 5 The United States had also returned to a 
policy of specie payments in 1879, following passage of the 
Resumption Act by Congress in 1875. 6 The result of these 
2Joseph Wechsburg, The Merchant Bankers (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Company, 1966), 99-102. 
3Richard Kellett, The Merchant Banking Arena (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1967), 118-123. 
4Harry N. Scheiber, Harold G. Vatter, and Harold U. Faulkner, 
American Economic History (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), 
307. 
5rn 1873, the silver dollar was worth $1.02 in gold and it was no 
longer profitable to coin it. Silver was scarce at this time and 
very little had been presented to the mints for coining. Congress's 
action was not highly controversial at this time, and passage of the 
act was seen as merely as legislative recognition that silver dollars 
were not being coined. 
6At the close of the Civil War, the United States was suffering from 
the effects of inflationary methods of war finance. Paper money had 
been issued to the extent of over $400 million, and in addition a 
part of the war effort had been financed through sales of government 
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two bills was a contraction of the currency supply in the 
United States. Events of the next few years would serve to 
ally the two constituencies alienated by these policies: 
the inflationists and the silver interests. Inflationists 
were those who were opposed to the devaluation of currency 
and credit contraction for a variety of reasons. Debtor 
farmers of the Western states fighting against declining 
foodstuff prices and manufacturers eager for cheap money to 
finance expansion and pay off previously incurred long-term 
debt were the principal inflationist groups. The silver 
interests became active in the mid-1870s, when the 
situation with regard to silver changed rapidly. During 
the early to mid 1870s, Germany, Holland, Sweden and Norway 
adopted the gold standard and the Latin Monetary Union 
(France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and Greece) limited 
the coinage of silver. These developments in combination 
with the discovery of large silver deposits in Nevada 
created a glut of bullion on the market, causing prices to 
drop sharply. 
American silver interests reacted to these price 
drops, becoming increasingly politically active and calling 
for the reinstatement of silver coinage in the United 
securities to national banks. In the early aftermath of the war, the 
general sentiment in Washington was that paper money should be 
retired by the federal government in order to permit a return to 
price and income levels of the pre-war gold standard. This sentiment 
was soon challenged, however, led by farmers fighting against 
declining foodstuff prices and manufacturers eager for cheap money to 
finance expansion and pay off previously incurred long-term debt. 
This struggle delayed the passage of the Resumption Act until 1875, 
when the "inflationists" were temporarily defeated. 241 
States to increase the demand for silver and raise prices. 
Political pressure from the inflationists resulted in the 
passage of the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, which provided 
for the purchase of not less than two million dollars and 
not more than four million dollars a month worth of silver 
bullion to be coined into silver dollars. 7 To the 
disappointment of inflationists, however, the Bland-Allison 
Act failed to halt the decline in the value of silver or 
the downward trend of prices during the twelve years that 
it was in force. Because of this, the inflationists kept 
up their pressure for governmental purchase of more silver, 
and in 1890 were successful in lobbying for the passage of 
the Sherman Silver Act. The act required the Secretary of 
the Treasury to purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver 
bullion a month, and in payment for it issue Treasury notes 
redeemable in either gold or silver. The silver purchased 
under this act was almost the entire output of American 
mines, and approximately double that required by the Bland-
Allison Act.8 
By the early 1890s, the silver movement and Europe's 
general economic downturn threatened the maintenance of the 
gold standard in the United States. The amount of silver 
to be purchased under the Sherman Act was too large to be 
readily absorbed by the United States Treasury, as notes 
issued for silver were more often than not redeemed for 
7Kenyon E. Poole, "Money and Banking, 1865-1919" in Harold F. 
Williamson, Ed., The Growth of the American Economy (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 554-555. 
8American Economic History, 305-306. 
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gold at a later date. Through this process, $156 million 
in Treasury Notes was added to the national money supply 
between 1890 and 1893, leading to a significant loss of 
gold from the national reserve over this period. At the 
same time, skittish European investors were withdrawing 
their capital from American companies at a heightened pace 
as their confidence in the American economy and the dollar 
waned. In 1893 alone, the United States suffered a net 
loss of $87 million in gold exported. 9 
The dwindling supply of gold caused by the Sherman 
Silver Act and foreign withdrawal of capital from the 
United States had dire consequences. In 1893, for the 
first time since the reinstitution of the gold standard, 
national gold reserves dropped below the traditional $100 
million which many people regarded as the minimum treasury 
reserve. The breaking of the $100 million reserve barrier 
began speculatiop that the gold reserve was in jeopardy, 
causing trepidation among businessmen and investors who 
regarded maintenance of the gold standard as paramount. As 
this speculation continued, the net result was a general 
loss of confidence in the soundness of the dollar. 10 
During the early months of 1893 there was a sharp 
downward trend in stock prices on the New York Stock 
Exchange, as a rush ensued to dispose of stocks, bonds, and 
other securities. Loss of confidence in the monetary 
system also produced runs on banks, especially in the South 
9rbid., 307. 
10An Economic History of the United States, 272. 
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and West. In turn, these banks called on larger eastern 
financial institutions for their reserves. These demands 
strained the capital reserves of these foremost financial 
institutions, creating a situation in which loans became 
almost impossible to obtain and the hoarding of gold and 
currency was common. 11 
Large-scale business failure characterized the 
economic downturn in the United States in 1893. Two of the 
most troubling examples of this were the Philadelphia & 
Reading Railroad, which went into receivership in February 
of 1893, and the National Cordage Company which followed in 
May. These corporations were among the foremost businesses 
in the United States, and their failures did not bode well 
for the national economy. In fact, more than 15,000 
commercial failures involving liabilities of $346.8 million 
occurred during 1893. In addition, more than 600 banking 
institutions and 74 railroad corporations failed during the 
same year. The Panic of 1893 was followed by three years 
of economic depression, during which business failures were 
accompanied by falling agricultural prices, high 
unemployment levels, and declining industrial production. 
It wasn't until the latter part of 1896 that the depression 
began to break, as the Silverites were defeated and a shift 
11Harold M. Somers, "The Performance of the American Economy, 1866-
1918" in Harold F. Williamson, Ed., The Growth of the American 
Economy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 652-653. 244 
in the balance of foreign trade stemmed the outflow of gold 
from the national reserve. 12 
Boom Turns to Bust; National Pepression and the 
Land companies of the JJ-'!per Tennessee River valley 
The economic depression that was under way by 1893 had 
profound effects on companies operating in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley. In fact, the only large industry-
related company in the region that remained in its pre-
depression form by 1896 was the Roane Iron Company. The 
mid-1890s held failure and reorganization for the others, 
ended the large-scale infusion of capital into the region 
that had characterized the late 1880s and early 1890s. 
The first casualty was the Cardiff Coal and Iron 
Company. The Cardiff Company, begun with such bright 
aspirations, soon found the economic conditions of the 
early 1890s to be prohibitive. During its land sale in 
April of 1890, the CCIC sold over a million dollars worth 
of property in its city site. This total was never 
collected. Buyers were only required to pay one-third of 
the total purchase price at the auction, with the other 
two-thirds due in six months and one year, respectively. 
As economic conditions grew steadily worse during the year 
following the sale, a significant number of property buyers 
defaulted on their installments. At the same time, the 
12American Economic History, 306-307; An Economic History of the 
United States, 272. 
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CCIC's creditors were demanding payment on the large loans 
which the Company had taken out to purchase land. The 
change in the national and regional economic environment 
left the CCIC in a bad situation. During its early period 
of activity in 1889 and early 1890, conditions were 
positive, and the Company had acted on the assumption that 
these conditions would continue. By mid-1891 it was 
obvious, however, that investors were retaining their 
capital in times of increasing uncertainty. This left the 
CCIC with bills and no money to pay them with. Its plan of 
paying off its debts with the proceeds of continued land 
sales was no longer viable. The company was sued by land 
buyers and creditors during 1891. The former sued for 
improvements and infrastructure not provided to the city 
site as promised, the latter for loan payments not made on 
time. The CCIC went into receivership in June of 1891. 
These events limited Cardiff's future. The CCIC had 
begun just early enough to appear to be a profitable 
venture, but too late to develop a solid base before the 
economic downturn. Most of the company's grand plans were 
stopped by the receivership. This created more suits by 
investors and land purchasers who felt that the company had 
not made good on its pledge to "build" the town and provide 
it with certain infrastructure (a blast furnace, graded and 
paved streets, water and sewer systems, a hotel). Charles 
Haley's description of events was representative of the 
opinions held by Cardiff investors: 
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Of the large amount of money agreed to be expended ..• only a 
small amount was spent, just enough to fool the bidders at the 
public sale in April, and to cajole the buyers into paying the 
six month notes maturing in September and October following. 
Then the whole work was abandoned. The hotel which had been 
partially constructed was left uncovered and exposed to the 
elements, the streets washed into gullies, the trenches for the 
furnace filled up whole fraud and sham has been blown up and 
dissipated. 13 
Although Haley was no doubt biased about the initial 
intentions of the Cardiff company, he accurately described 
the situation in the town in 1892. Most of the 
infrastructure that the CCIC was supposed to have built was 
not completed before the company's financial troubles in 
mid-1891. This led to the abandonment of several projects 
and the completion of few. Because the development and 
growth of the city was predicated in large part upon 
projects initiated by the company, this situation made its 
future tenuous. 
Events associated with the Panic of 1893 proved to be 
the end of the CCIC and the City of Cardiff. The company 
had survived its two years in receivership mainly on the 
strength of proceeds from the sale of coal mined on its 
lands to iron production facilities in East Tennessee. The 
effects of the Panic caused many of these facilities to 
decrease production or shut down completely, creating a 
corresponding reduction in demand for coal. This was 
devastating to the CCIC, since income from land and stock 
sales had been almost nonexistant since mid-1891. The 
company declared bankruptcy and discontinued operations in 
13Haley and Ingram vs. Henry C. Young, Complainant Report, 12-13. 
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the Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1893. A Chattanooga 
publication described Cardiff in 1895: 
... the collapse came, and today the town does not contain 
twenty people. The only signs of it that can be seen are a few 
deserted stores, rain-washed streets, overgrown with grass and 
weeds and the electric light poles which ornament the vacant 
fields. 14 
In the end, all of the ambitious plans made for Cardiff 
were for naught, as the planned city did not last long 
enough even to rate a mention in the federal census of 
1900. 
The East Tennessee Land Company and the City of 
Harriman also were adversely impacted by the economic 
conditions of the early 1890s. The ETLC and its planned 
city had benefitted from an early start in the region 
(April 1889), and because of this had been able to complete 
several projects associated with the development of 
Harriman by 1893 (the ETLC Building, several business 
buildings along Roane Street, the Belt Line Railway, street 
grading on the city site, among others). Between 1890 and 
1892, the company was fairly successful in obtaining 
capital through its land sale (held in early 1890) and the 
sale of stock. A decision made in mid-1890 to raise 
additional money for the development by obtaining one 
million dollars worth of first mortgage bonds through the 
Central Trust Company of New York was one the ETLC would 
regret in the years to come, however. The company used 
this money to finance improvements for the City of 
14Chattanooga Tradesman, XXXII (1895), 116. 
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Harriman, and to subsidize the establishment of its 
satellite companies and new industries and businesses. 
Unfortunately, neither the satellite companies or the new 
industries and businesses earned sufficient profits in the 
ensuing years to pay even the interest on this large 
mortgage. By late 1892, the ETLC found it very difficult to 
meet payments on the loan. 
In September of 1892, a program was initiated called 
"The Million Dollar Plan" which was an attempt to 
recapitalize the company through the issuance of first-lien 
and second-lien preferred stock. The goal of the plan was 
to sell this stock, use the proceeds to pay off the Central 
Trust bonds, and return the company to a sound financial 
situation. The company declared the plan an overwhelming 
success in January of 1893, when it informed the public 
that it had received subscriptions for the entire one 
million dollar amount. The account of this announcement in 
the local newspaper indicates the amount of importance 
attributed to the plan: 
The Directors have satisfied themselves that the subscriptions 
to the new stock are bonified and can be relied upon. They are 
further satisfied that the One Million of Dollars which these 
will yield will meet the entire bonded and floating 
indebtedness on the Company, and relieve its immense properties 
from incumberance ... the success of the Million Plan is 
immediate, the effects of it will be increasingly shown, and 
the final results should tell wonderfully for the benefit of 
Harriman and all concerned in its future15 
The events of 1893, however, dampened enthusiasm for 
the Million Dollar Plan. Although the stock offered by the 
15Harriman Daily Advance, January 27, 1893. 
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ETLC had technically been fully subscribed, the subscribers 
had not paid the money to the company by mid-1893. This is 
when the most extreme drop in the stock market took place, 
and when financial institutions were under the most demand 
for capital. The Central Trust Company demanded payment 
from the ETLC, and when it was not forthcoming, filed suit 
in federal court. This resulted in the company's filing 
for bankruptcy in November of 1893. Receivers over the 
next four years sold off the ETLC's assets, in an effort to 
recoup any money that could be paid to creditors. Thus 
1893 marked the end of significant development activities 
by the ETLC in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
The City of Harriman was able to survive, however, due 
to its strong start and the determination of its 
predominantly Prohibitionist population. Although many 
industries shut down during the Panic, some, including the 
railroads operated throughout the depression. Remaining 
residents also initiated other institutions during the 
depression period that brought activity to Harriman. 
Prominent among these was the founding of the American 
Temperence University in 1894, which was housed in the 
former ETLC building. In the ensuing years, as many as 250 
students attended the University, to learn in an 
environment free from "smoking, gambling, theft, lying, 
profanity, obscenity and drunkeness. 1116 
16Louise Davis, "Town Built for Teetotalers," The Tennesseean 
Magazine, Sunday, November 19, 1972, 16-18. 250 
Lenoir City was the latest of the land company 
developments to be initiated, and because of this did not 
find itself in as dire a debt situation as its 
predecessors. The Lenoir City Company was not incorporated 
until April of 1890 and its stock and land sale was not 
held until September of the same year. This later start 
proved important because the LCC was able to perceive 
impending economic conditions to some extent, and avoid 
larger-scale speculative spending and debt accumulation. 
By June of 1892, however, the company was experiencing 
problems paying on the debt that it had accrued. Sales of 
property had been much slower than expected, and the board 
of directors attributed this to "the unusual and stringent 
conditions of the money market." 17 Charles Mcclung, a 
prominent Knoxville businessman, came to the company's aid 
and paid the debt, effectively removing the lein from its 
property. 18 The situation did not improve in the next six 
months, however. Company records indicate that by November 
of 1892, the LCC had sold only 144 of the 3,448 lots 
platted in Lenoir City. 19 
Lenoir City ultimately survived the depression of the 
1890s because of the work and dedication of E.J. Sanford 
and Charles McGhee. Sanford, the originator of the Lenoir 
City scheme, took responsibility for overseeing many of the 
early activities of the company. He, more than anyone, 
17Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, June 1, 1892. 
18Ibid. 
19 rbid., November 12, 1892. 
worked to make the development successful in an uncertain 
economic environment. His dedication to the project was 
reflected in a letter to his friend McGhee in 1891: 
I have not yet lost faith in Lenoir, and I feel it will all 
work out yet, although as I stated before I have had more 
disappointments in it than in than any other business attempt 
in my life. 20 
Besides his financial influence, McGhee spent considerable 
time attempting to attract industry to Lenoir City. His 
biggest success, and probably the savior of the development 
during the 1890s, was the Lenoir Car Company. McGhee 
convinced J.H. Bass, an experienced rail car producer from 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, to locate a new facility in Lenoir 
City. He then went to the board of the Lenoir City Company 
and made a strong suggestion that a fifty acre tract of 
land adjacent to the ETV&G mainline be given to the Car 
Company. 21 The Lenoir Car Company immediately became the 
major employer in the town, and remained so for the next 
thirty years. 
Each of the land companies ceased large-scale 
operations after the economic downturn of 1893. The late 
1880s and early 1890s had been a watershed for investment 
because of the positive national economic situation, and 
the corresponding availability of development capital. In 
the years following the Panic of 1893, the American economy 
was unstable at best, and financial institutions and 
investors were skittish about any type of speculative 
20E.J. Sanford to C.M. McGhee, November 27, 1891. 
21 Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, March 13, 1893. 
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venture. In addition, by the mid-to-late 1890s it had 
become apparent that the characteristics of the local iron 
ore deposits would hinder the region in becoming a major 
iron and steel production center. Thus, the land company 
investment era ended in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
The Roane Iron Company remained in business the 
longest of any of the subject companies in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley. It managed to produce pig iron at 
Rockwood continuously through the depression of the mid-
1890s, although production slowdowns took place. Even 
after the depression had ended, however, Rockwood did not 
become a major regional production center for iron or 
steel. The reason for this was articulated by Hiram 
Chamberlain in his October, 1887 letter to Charles McGhee 
when he stated "I think it better that we have some foreign 
iron very low in phosporous in our mixture. 1122 Chamberlain 
knew that the high phosphorous iron ore in the Rockwood 
area could not make high quality steel. This was a 
significant problem for Roane Iron in the ensuing decades 
because it precluded the company from making cost-
competitive iron and steel products. Theoretically, it 
could be done, but only with iron ore from another source 
with a lower phosphorous content. Although the company 
experimented with using outside iron ore, each of these 
attempts was abandoned because of prohibitive cost. Because 
it could not produce for the emerging market for steel 
22chamberlain to McGhee, October 25, 1887. 
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products, the Roane Iron Company remained a small regional 
producer, and Rockwood a small industrial town in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley. The potential that Hiram 
Chamberlain and James Wilder dreamed of when they began 
their endeavor, was realized at a place farther down the 
Tennessee Valley -- Birmingham, Alabama. 23 
The Roane Iron Company continued operations until 
1929. The company experienced a period of prosperity 
during World War I, when iron products were needed for the 
war effort. This demand disappeared after the war, 
however. Freight rates on the transport of its pig iron to 
the northeast rose rapidly, decreasing competitiveness. 
The southern iron market was dominated by production at 
Birmingham, which was higher-quality and lower-cost. Roane 
Iron endured several mine disasters during the mid-1920s, 
which resulted in lost lives and worker compensation 
payments of more than $200,000 (over one-fifth of the total 
capitalization of the company). These circumstances, in 
concert with plunging iron market prices in 1929, caused 
the company to suspend operations for good in January of 
1930. 24 
23one of the major advantages of the Birmingham production site was 
the availability of large deposits of low phosphorus iron ore, which 
was favorable for steel production. 
24william Howard Moore, "Rockwood: A Prototype of the New South," 
M.A. Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1965. 
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The Results of Industrial capital Investment in the 
Upper Tennessee River valley; The Modification of Economic 
and settlement Patterns in the Early Twentieth century 
The settlement patterns which had emerged from the 
agricultural economy in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
prior to 1860 were altered by industrial capital investment 
during the study period. In 1880, twelve years after the 
Roane Iron Company began operation, Rockwood was the most 
populated urban settlement in the region (Table 4.1). By 
1900, Harriman supplanted Rockwood as the largest city, and 
both were more than triple the size of the river towns of 
Loudon and Kingston. These two periods of capital 
investment etched a completely new settlement structure in 
the region in less than thirty years. 
The transformation of the economy of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley between 1870 and 1900 was also 
drastic. In 1870, the value of farm products in the study 
area was more than two and a half times that of 
manufactured products (Tables 4.2, 4.3). This situation 
persisted through 1880, although the ratio of the value of 
agricultural products to manufactured products decreased. 
In 1890, the value of manufactured products exceeded the 
value of agricultural products for the first time. This 
was mostly the product of investment by the Roane Iron 
Company, as the land companies were just beginning 
operation when the census was conducted. By 1900, a major 
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Table 4 .1. 
Population of Upper Tennessee River Valley 
Towns, 1860-1900, 1990. 
Town 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 
Cardiff 430 
Harriman 716 3,442 
Lenoir City * * 
Loudon * * 832 942 875 
Kingston 307 739 858 * 548 
Rockwood 649 1,011 2,305 2,899 







Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, 
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870; 
Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880; Compendium of 
the Eleventh Census, 1890; Compendium of the 
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economic shift was evident, as the value of manufactured 
products exceeded $2.4 million, and more than doubled the 
value of agricultural products. From 1870 to 1900, 
industrial employment increased more than five-fold from 
160 workers to 911 in the study region (Table 4.2). 
The Geography of Capital Flight: 
The Upper Tennessee River valley in the Twentieth century 
The introduction of industrial capital into the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley during the period between the close 
of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century created rapid 
and intense change in the region's landscape, economy, and 
settlement pattern. The withdrawal of much of this capital 
in the years after 1893 also had ramifications for the 
region's future. The Upper Tennessee River Valley became a 
"played out" region; land companies ceased or slowed 
operations, proposed production facilities were never 
built, develpment schemes ended abruptly. The economy of 
the region in this post-depression 
period became oriented towards activities that were labor 
intensive, as opposed to capital intensive. 
Small-scale industry employed significant numbers of 
workers in the region following the demise of the land 
companies. In Harriman, several of the smaller companies 
initiated during the land company era (wood products and 
agricultural implements) remained in operation. In Lenoir 
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City, the Lenoir Car Company, a producer of railroad 
passenger cars and equipment, became the major employer for 
forty years after its establishment in 1893. Farther down 
the valley, the City of Rockwood continues to be sustained 
largely by the Roane Iron Company. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
the hosiery and textile industries became increasingly 
important in the Upper Tennessee River Valley. In 1905, a 
local businessman named J.F. Tarwater established the 
Rockwood Hosiery Mills in Rockwood, Tennessee. 25 Seven 
years later, in 1912, the Harriman Hosiery Company was 
incorporated in Harriman by Taewater and his associates. 26 
The hosiery industry was labor intensive, and both mills 
employed primarily women. This type of small-scale, low-
wage industrial activity would prove to be important to the 
region's future, as the hosiery mills became the largest 
employers in these cities by the 1930s. 
In rural areas of the Upper Tennessee River Valley, 
mixed farming, mining, and lumbering were the dominant 
activities. Farming had been important in the river 
bottomland areas of the region since its initial 
settlement. Coal mining and logging were initiated during 
the industrial and corporate capital phases, and continued 
as relatively small quantities of these raw materials were 
transported to production areas outside of the region. In 
the twentieth century, the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
25Moore, "Rockwood," 45-46. 
26Pulliarn, Harriman, 501-503. 
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increasingly became a resource exporting area rather than a 
production area. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established 
by the United States government in 1933, was charged with 
"the unified development of the [Tennessee] river, its 
tributaries, and the whole watershed area. 1127 
Specifically, TVA was to undertake policies that would: 
improve the navigability and provide flood control on the 
Tennessee River; provide for the reforestation and proper 
use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; facilitate 
agricultural and industrial development in the Valley; and 
create a corporation for the operation of government 
properties at or near Muscle Shoals, Alabama. 28 As part of 
its development program, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
built two dams in the Upper Tennessee River Valley -- Watts 
Bar Dam and Fort Loudon Dam. Watts Bar Dam was constructed 
approximately ten miles downstream from Rockwood, while the 
Fort Loudon project was located at Lenoir City. The short-
term effects of this federal investment were increased 
availability of jobs, an influx of population and a 
concomitant increase in demand for goods and services, and 
an economic boost for the region. This boom period only 
lasted a few years, however, as construction jobs ended and 
TVA technical and support staff left the region. The dams 
did make the Tennessee River navigable during the entire 
course of the year, and provide flood control. However, the 
27Govan and Livingood, The Chattanooga Country, 450. 
28rbid. 
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long-term impact on the overall economy of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley was negligable. 
In the modern era, the Upper Tennessee River Valley is 
a relatively isolated region. Thousands of people per day 
drive through it on Routes 40 and 75, yet very few ever 
stop within its boundaries. Little has changed since 1940, 
because little capital has been invested in the region in 
the last fifty years. The Upper Tennessee River Valley of 
the 1990s is a region shaped by small-scale, local capital. 
Rockwood, Harriman, and Lenoir City -- the cities 
established during the latter nineteenth century are the 
regional central places in 1995. They possess 
characteristics of typical American small towns -- such as 
discount stores and fast food restaurants but remain as 
relicts from a time when the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
was an attractive region for industrial capital investment. 
They remind us of the adaptability of capitalism -- how 
capital investment can be diverted from one place to other. 
Chapter V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
summary 
This study has detailed the primacy of outside 
investment in the economic and settlement pattern changes 
which took place in the Upper Tennessee River Valley during 
the period between 1865 and 1910. The analysis has 
revealed two distinct periods of advanced capitalist 
investment: the first between the close of the Civil War 
and 1885, during which the Roane Iron Company began 
operation in the region; and, a second which encompassed 
the late 1880s and early 1890s, during which three land 
companies initiated development activities. 
At the outset of the study, two major themes were 
identified as essential to linking regional transformation 
and place-making in the Upper Tennessee River Valley to the 
way in which capital was accumulate~ and utilized. These 
were: 1. Access to Capital and Urban-Industrial 
Development; and 2. The Involvement of Business 
Organizations in Making Places. The first theme relates to 
the ability of business organizations to obtain capital to 
perform desired tasks. During the first period of capital 
investment in the study region, capital availability was 
limited by the ownership structure of businesses, as well 
as the limited access to large-scale loan capital centered 
263 
in major cities of the Northeast. In the second period, 
however, companies that operated in the region were more 
successful at securing large amounts of capital through 
more open ownership structures, and connections they had to 
the New York and Boston money markets. 
Access to capital ties into the second theme of 
business involvement in the creation of urban places, 
because capital availability in some part determined 
spatial strategies and what types of urban-industrial 
development were feasible. The extent of involvement and 
investment in the creation of places was a reflection of 
the goals that the companies hoped to achieve by producing 
housing, services. planned developments, and commercial 
functions. Analysis of the companies that operated in the 
study region during the post-Civil War to turn-of-the-
century period reveals that varied development and place-
making strategies were employed, creating distinct urban 
morphologies and social patterns on the landscape. Each of 
these contributed to the regional transformation that took 
place in the Upper Tennessee River Valley during the 
period. 
These themes provide a basis for addressing some 
specific questions that were posed at the outset of the 
study. Among these were questions regarding the origin of 
the capital used for industrial development in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley. Most of the development was funded 
by capital from outside of the region. The earliest 
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factory-scale industrial activity at Rockwood in 1867 was 
initiated by a group of former Union soldiers exposed to 
the region during wartime. These former soldiers funded 
development at Rockwood by bringing a small group of 
Indiana and Ohio investors into the scheme. The impetus 
for this initial capital investment was the availability of 
resources needed for iron production. Iron ore, coal, and 
lime deposits were present in and around Walden's Ridge. 
John Wilder and Hiram Chamberlain -- experienced iron 
makers -- recognized the juxtaposition of these resources 
as significant, as they had observed the new coal-fuel iron 
smelting process in the North. Thus, for the first time, 
the Upper Tennessee River Valley became attractive to 
investors of industrial capital based on the needs of 
current technology. 
Policies enacted by the state government in Nashville 
in the aftermath of the war facilitated industrial 
development in Tennessee in the early post-war period. 
William Brownlow's reconstruction administration was the 
first in Tennessee to encourage industrialization. During 
the mid and late 1860s, legislative bills were introduced 
specifically inviting outside industrialists and 
capitalists to invest in the state. State associations 
were founded for industry and immigration, to aid and 
encourage industrialization. This created a positive 
environment for industrial investment, in that projects 
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such as the one conceived by Wilder and Chamberlain were 
sought after by the state government. 
The development that took place during the second 
period of investment in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
was also funded by outside capital. This development was 
predicated on regional conditions that had emerged during 
the preceding decades. One of these was the successful 
operation of the Roane Iron Company's facility at Rockwood. 
Roane Iron had proved that pig iron could be produced for 
profit in the region in the years after 1867. This was 
very important for the agents of change during the second 
period of investment -- the land companies -- because it 
was evidence that the industrial activity which was to be 
the basis of their city developments could and would become 
a reality. A second condition which served as an impetus 
to the capital investment of the late 1880s and early 1890s 
was the construction of railroad lines in the region. By 
1880, the Cincinnati-Southern line was completed through 
western Roane County connecting Cincinnati, Ohio with 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. The East Tennessee Virginia & 
Georgia Railway expanded into the region as well during the 
latter 1880s, acquiring the locally-owned Walden's Ridge 
Railroad and expanding it to connect with the Cincinnati-
Southern and the Knoxville & Ohio Railroads. The existence 
of a well-developed rail system made the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley attractive to further investment because 
transportation access was perceived to be integral to the 
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success of industrial enterprise and new city developments. 
The East Tennessee Land Company expressed this investment 
logic in their prospectus: 
The railroads now built and building and projected, would make 
Harriman grow like the lustiest young town in all the West, 
were there no mineral interests to give it impetus and growth. 
And these railroads must bring to it a wealth of timber, of 
produce, of iron and of coal soon rivaling the resources of any 
long-established town ... 1 
The outside capital that was invested in the region 
during the second period came through the activities of 
land companies. These land companies -- the Cardiff Coal 
and Iron Company, the East Tennessee Land Company, and the 
Lenoir City Company -- had innovative organizational and 
financial structures for the period. They were organized 
as public entities, and sold stock to the public as a means 
of obtaining operating capital. They also were able to 
access major capital markets to obtain trust certificates 
and mortgages that provided large amounts of capital. The 
land companies gained access to capital markets through the 
influential businessmen that were their principals. Men 
such as Clinton B. Fisk, Ferdinand Schumacher (the East 
Tennessee Land Company), W.P. Rice, B.B. Smalley (the 
Cardiff Coal and Iron Company), Charles McGhee and Samuel 
Thomas (the Lenoir City Company) had previous experience 
with the capital market from their railroad and industrial 
dealings. All of these men were native northerners except 
for McGhee2 , and they were outsiders who were involved in 
1Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 33. 
2Although a native of Knox County, during the late 1880s and early 
1890s Charles McGhee lived in New York City and was a vice president 267 
developing the region for profit. Thus, again during the 
third period of investment, northerners were the major 
organizing and orchestrating forces behind the development 
of the Upper Tennessee River Valley. 
Although development that took place during both 
periods of investment was instrumental to the regional 
change that took place between 1865 and 1910, the character 
of development during the periods differed somewhat. 
During the early period of investment, the Roane Iron 
Company was the principal business organization 
administering development. Roane Iron was an incorporated 
entity, but a small group of businessmen owned and managed 
it. Because of this the company had a limited capital 
base, and its objectives corresponded with this situation. 
The company concentrated its efforts on the construction 
and operation of an iron production facility in the Upper 
Tennessee River yalley. Other development activities by 
Roane Iron were subordinate to and resultant of the 
operation of blast furnaces at the Rockwood site. This 
included iron ore and coal mining, the construction of spur 
rail lines, the provision of worker housing, and ultimately 
community formation. The activities of land companies 
during the second period of investment contrasted with this 
pattern. They attempted to coordinate and administer many 
projects as part of an overall development strategy. These 
of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway. This situation 
made him one of a very small group of native East Tennesseeans during 
this period who were in a position to influence development in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley. 268 
projects included mineral extraction, industrial 
production, railroad building, and community planning. The 
availability of large amounts of start-up capital made this 
comprehensive development strategy possible. Land 
companies did not concentrate on industrial development 
alone, but diversified their efforts from the outset in 
order to make money from many activities. Thus, 
development administered by business entities during the 
second period was larger-scale and more diversified than 
that of the earlier period. 
The differences in the development approaches of 
companies operating in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
during the two investment periods were also manifested in 
their urban place-making strategies. A major distinction 
that can be made is the degree of planning that went into 
company-funded urban development during the respective 
investment periods. Evidence indicates that during the 
first investment period, the Roane Iron Company did not 
plan the urban landscape of Rockwood in advance. In fact, 
the Roane Iron Company did not file a plan for Rockwood 
until 1887 19 years after the it began producing iron at 
the site. As a result, during its early years, the 
community was developed in unplanned spurts of housing 
construction related to the labor needs of iron production. 
The morphology that emerged from this activity over time 
was a block pattern, created as streets and residence areas 
were hastily added to the initial nucleation. This urban 
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development pattern is similar to one documented by 
Gillenwater in his study of coal towns in the Pocahontas 
Coal Field of Southern West Virginia. He noted that some 
unplanned coal towns exhibited block morphologies, 
especially those which were located in level valley areas, 
such as Rockwood. 3 
The Roane Iron Company maintained ownership of land in 
Rockwood during the first twenty years of the settlement's 
existence, and provided housing for mine and mill workers. 
The production site was isolated, and the company viewed 
housing construction as a necessity to maintain needed 
labor for production. The return that Roane Iron expected 
on this investment was reliable labor in the blast 
furnaces, and rent payments which were drawn directly from 
paychecks. A company store was also established early on, 
to serve the population of Rockwood. Roane Iron owned and 
operated the store, which was the only retail outlet in the 
settlement during the 1860s and 1870s. Thus, the Roane 
Iron Company's development of Rockwood followed the 
nineteenth century early pioneer company town pattern: the 
company owned the land, built housing, and operated 
businesses in an effort to contribute to the success of 
some more important primary activity, such as industrial 
production or resource extraction. 4 Roane Iron did not 
3Mack H. Gillenwater, "Cultural and Historical Geography of Mining 
Settlements in the Pocahontas Coal Field of Southern West Virginia, 
1880-1930," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 
1972, 55-61. 
4shifflett, Coal Towns, 48-51; Shifflett has identified three general 
stages in the development of southern Appalachian coal company towns:270 
have the capital or inclination to pre-plan Rockwood or to 
make the settlement a model industrial city. The company 
developed Rockwood as a necessary by-product of the 
operation of the iron production facility. 
The urban places developed by land companies during 
the third investment period were planned in advance of any 
settlement or industrial activity. Rather than by-
products, they were to be the centerpieces of development 
schemes, and major sources of profit for the companies. 
Land within the these cities was to be sold by the 
companies rather than rented. The land companies took much 
time, effort, and capital in the initial planning process 
in order to make their new cities desirable for investment. 
These efforts included the incorporation of popular 
environmental and sanitary reform concepts -- such as wide 
streets, public open spaces, water systems, sewer systems, 
electric light systems, and street grading and 
macadamization. The strategy behind the inclusion of these 
features was twofold: they were to make land within the 
cities more desirable and saleable to potential investors 
and residents; and make the cities themselves ideal places 
for industrial activity because of the positive affects 
such environments would have on industrial workers. 
The city plans that were commissioned by the land 
a pioneer or frontier stage, during which towns were first being 
built in isolated resource extraction areas; a second paternalistic 
stage, in which operators paid more heed to the needs of the laborers 
and provided more infrastructure and amenities; and a third phase in 
which production decreases and the towns age and decay leading up to 
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companies were products of specific notions about how urban 
areas should be structured. Environmentalism and sanitary 
reform ideas were part of this, as were ideas about how 
space should be allocated and defined within the city. In 
their commercial literature, the land companies described 
in detail how land was to be used. Commercial, industrial, 
public, and residential areas were defined in the planning 
process in an effort to develop cities "superlative in all 
respects." In addition, the residential areas were further 
defined, as the companies delimited specific residential 
areas for particular class and income groups, and developed 
subdivision patterns and pricing schemes to correspond with 
these. 
Analysis of the City of Harriman shows that 
significant spatial separation existed between class and 
race groups living in the urban settlement. Evidence also 
indicates that that the companies had preconceived ideas 
about who was to live where, and how land was to be used 
generally in the cities. The explanations for these 
patterns is tied to the profit strategy employed by the 
companies. 
Scrutiny of land company place-making initiatives 
indicates that they were model real estate ventures. That 
is, the utmost concern of the companies was to sell land, 
and to obtain the maximum profit in doing so. 
Infrastructure improvements and aesthetically pleasing 
designs were used as selling points. So, too, was the 
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availability of land for the variety of skill groups that 
would settle in industrial cities. The companies wanted to 
sell everyone as much property as they could afford. An 
oversight made by the East Tennessee Land Company in the 
development of Harriman lends insight into this process. 
The company sold land in its original town site for prices 
ranging from $400 to $7,550 throughout 1890. The average 
price per lot during this period was $1050. The ETLC soon 
realized that these prices were prohibitive for semi-and-
unskilled workers that were going to be needed for labor in 
production facilities. In response to this, two new 
residential additions were established, approximately a 
mile to the west of the original town site. Walnut Hills 
and Oak View Additions were to be residence areas for white 
blue-collar workers and blacks, respectively. The 
intriguing question is "Why weren't these residence areas 
provided in the original plan?" The answer to this 
question lies in the profit strategy of the East Tennessee 
Land Company. The company was more concerned with selling 
higher-priced land to people who had money to buy it, than 
it was with providing housing opportunities for industrial 
workers. This was a very different approach than that used 
in industrial company towns, where providing shelter for 
industrial labor was the primary impetus for place-making. 
Thus, the principal profit-making strategy of the land 
companies was linked to the urbanization process itself. 
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The social landscape that emerged in land company 
cities was in large part a product of this profit strategy. 
There is no doubt that the companies had preconceived ideas 
about the spatial structures of their urban landscapes. 
These ideas were not, however, primarily related to hatred 
or prejudice. They were based on profit potential. The 
companies wanted to make money selling land to a variety of 
income groups, and planned their settlements accordingly. 
The companies did separate these residence areas spatially 
within their plans, drawing on patterns that were prevalent 
in northern cities. This was especially true with respect 
to unskilled blue-coller workers. However, the fact that 
wholesale class segregation was not in effect is 
illustrated by the fact that low white-collar workers and 
skilled blue-collar workers (different occupational class 
groups with comparable income levels) had similar residence 
patterns in Harriman. This indicates that spatial 
segregation by income group existed in land company cities, 
and that this was a product of profit motive, rather than 
some more sinister social control agenda. 
With respect to blacks living in Harriman, spatial 
segregation was almost total. In all probability, the East 
Tennessee Land Company had not initially contemplated that 
blacks would be living in its planned city. When the 
company realized that blacks would be needed as part of the 
industrial workforce, it had to deal with the issue of 
providing housing areas for them. The company's solution 
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was Oak View Addition, a residential enclave separate from 
white housing areas. It is important to note, however, 
that the ETLC did recognize the right of blacks to have 
community institutions such as churches and schools, which 
was more than was available for them in many areas of the 
South during this period. The motive for the spatial 
separation of blacks from the main city area was basically 
the same as that for the separation of white unskilled 
blue-collar workers -- the maintenance of harmony, and 
property values, in the model real estate ventures. 
conclusions 
While this study aimed primarily at proving the 
importance of phases of capitalism in determining the 
characteristics of regions, two further, and from a 
theoretical perspective, less anticipated findings emerged, 
ones which might inform further study. These relate to 
characteristics of capitalism and how they play out within 
regions. 
The Maturation of capitalism and Regional Development 
The results of this analysis indicate that as 
capitalism went through the three phases (from mercantile 
to industrial to corporate) in the study region, it became 
more intimate. That is, it gained the ability to act more 
directly to inform and alter regional characteristics. 
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This was a product of increasing amounts of capital 
available for investment within the region, as well as the 
increasing vulnerability of the range of regional 
activities to organization by and for profit. 
Capitalism during the mercantile phase provided a 
market for goods. Although the mercantile phase introduced 
changes in the economy and the everyday lives of people in 
the region, these changes were indirect. Merchants took 
what local producers had to offer, and gave them things in 
return. 
By the industrial phase, capitalism was directly 
organizing industrial production. This had a significant 
impact on the economy of the region (increasing orientation 
towards industrial rather than agricultural production) as 
well as the lifestyle of its population (industrial workers 
vs. yeoman farmers). The Roane Iron Company bought large 
amounts of land, initiated resource extraction, and 
employed those resources in a manufacturing process to 
produce higher-value commodities. In carrying out these 
activities, the Company also provided employment for 
hundreds of workers, built the housing where they ate and 
slept in their time away from the mills and mines, and 
administered the store where they bought their food. 
In the corporate phase, capitalism penetrated regional 
life to an unprecedented level. The land companies 
purchased large amounts of land, planned cities, and 
pursued development strategies designed to make money from 
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the many activities associated with urbanization. The 
companies employed these strategies to take advantage of 
all possible profit niches, but their results reached 
beyond these. In addition to further altering the regional 
landscape and economy, corporate capitalism went one step 
further to consciously influence a major aspect of human 
identity -- culture. 
Analysis reveals that land company place-making 
initiatives were based on specific ideas about what urban 
places should be, and how their residents should live their 
lives. These ideas had their origins in identifiable 
social movements that were emerging in the United States 
during this period. In effect, the land companies 
propagated these ideas, and made them fundamental aspects 
of their place-making efforts, in an attempt to assure 
their success. 
With respect to the development of industrial cities, 
the land companies used similar approaches. Each of the 
cities was to be a temperance settlement, with no 
consumption or production of alcoholic beverages permitted. 
Alcohol consumption was equated with "disorder and 
lawlessness" 5 by the companies, while temperance was felt 
to encourage "sober labor ... [which] yields a positive 
percentage of gain to the capital employing it. 116 Thus, 
temperance was to be a means of preserving law and order in 
5Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 19. 
6Two Years of Harriman, 94. 
the cities, while at the same time increasing industrial 
efficiency and profit margin. 
The land companies also uniformly invoked several 
tenets of the sanitary reform movement in the development 
of their urban places. These included aspects such as 
sanitary site selection, the provision of sewerage systems, 
water systems, paved streets, and parks. Sanitary site 
selection was felt to provide "all of the conditions of a 
sanitarium ... elevation, pure air, healthful waters ... ," 
which would prevent disease and sickness. 7 Water, sewer, 
and street systems as companents of the built environment 
were also part of efforts to maintain "high standard(s) of 
health," and prevent sanitation problems that had emerged 
in American cities during the previous decades. 8 The 
companies were aware not only that these infrastructural 
improvements would be effective in creating a more sanitary 
and safe urban environment, but that they were expected and 
desired by the people who might invest in their cities. 
The model of urban development employed by land 
companies in the study region emcompassed what Boyer refers 
to as "the two faces of urban moral reform in the 1890s." 9 
One of the faces, or strategies, of reform was the coercive 
approach, in which measures were aimed at individuals in 
order to uproot vice and impose a higher standard of civic 
virtue. The goal was to undertake social control measures 
1Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 20. 
8The Cardiff Herald, July 23, 1890. 
9soyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 175. 278 
that would preclude the urban problems that had become 
commonplace in other American cities. Boyer describes the 
temperance movement as "the quintessential coercive 
reform," in that the saloon was viewed as a major bastion 
of urban vice. 10 The second "face" of urban reform 
utilized by the land companies involved consciously 
planning the city's physical environment as a means of 
elevating its moral tone. The aim of positive 
environmentalism was not to destroy urban vice through 
rhetoric or legal repression, but "by creating the kind of 
city where objectionable patterns of behavior, finding no 
nuture, would gradually wither away. 1111 This normally 
involved the provision of parks, playgrounds, and 
facilities for concerts, lectures, and art exhibits. In 
many instances, sanitary reform ideals were also included 
as components of positive urban environments, with a 
relationship being drawn between cleanliness, health, and 
the character of city dwellers. 12 
The increasing intimacy displayed during the corporate 
phase has both positive and negative results. Results that 
could be considered positive in the Upper Tennessee River 
Valley were things such as sanitary living conditions, 
infrastructure provision (water supply, sewage, streets, 
lighting), introduction of technology, and well planned 
urban areas. On the other hand, control of local 
lOibid., 181-182. 
llrbid., 221. 
12Peterson, "The Impact of Sanitary Reform," 13-39. 279 
conditions during the corporate phase increasingly shifted 
from the indigenous population to non-local business 
organizations. Regional culture traits and complexes were 
coopted and characterized as inferior to outside ideas and 
innovations. Whether the results were positive or 
negative, advanced capitalism meant increasing intimacy in 
a regional context. 
The Role of Human Agency and Happenstance in the 
Emergence of capital Phases 
The findings of this study indicate that although 
individual actions are important in determining when 
capital phases become prevalent in particular regions, they 
seldom prevail over broader circumstances. There are 
several examples of the importance of human agency in the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley. The Reconstruction era in 
Tennessee provided opportunities for industrial development 
that did not exist previously. Governor William Brownlow 
initiated an industrial development program that encouraged 
outside industr~alists to invest and produce in Tennessee. 
Men such as John Wilder and Hiram Chamberlain invested 
their industrial capital in the state partially because of 
this business environment. Wilder and Chamberlain, in 
turn, more than likely would not have been exposed to the 
Upper Tennessee River Valley had it not been for the 
historical circumstances of the Civil War. Thus, the 
inception of factory production and the industrial 
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capitalist phase would have occurred under different 
circumstances. 
A singular example of the impact of individual action 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley is Charles Mcclung 
McGhee. McGhee was an individual who played a tremendous 
role in the development of the region. It is safe to say 
that had it not been for his actions, the development 
pattern that emerged in the study region would have been 
very different. McGhee was unique because he was a native 
East Tennesseean who had connections to some of the most 
important and influential businessmen in the United States. 
He used these connections to direct development capital 
into the Upper Tennessee River Valley. For example, during 
the early-to-mid 1880s McGhee was instrumental in assisting 
the Roane Iron Company obtain New York funding for the 
production of steel at Chattanooga, as well as rail orders 
from the railroad companies with which he was involved. 
Roane Iron's expansion into steel production would have 
been impossible without these loans, and it is very 
unlikely that the Company would have gotten them without 
McGhee's aid. The same is true of the steel rail orders. 
Later, in 1890, McGhee again became personally involved in 
a development scheme in the Upper Tennessee River Valley 
the Lenoir City Company. In this instance, McGhee 
convinced a group of his New York business associates 
(members of his syndicate), to invest in the Lenoir City 
urban-industrial scheme. Again, it is doubtful that the 
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Lenoir City Company would have gotten off the ground were 
it not for McGhee's assistance. 
Other individuals were also very important in the 
establishment and operation of land companies in the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley. Entrepreneurs such as Ferdinand 
Schumacher, B.B. Smalley, Joshua Chamberlain, Samuel 
Thomas, Calvin Brice, and Oliver Payne were veterans of the 
business world. They were higher-ups in large American 
railroad companies and large industrial entities, and had 
access to sources of capital in New York City and 
experience with innovative ways to accumulate capital. When 
these men made the decision to become involved in business 
ventures in the Upper Tennessee River Valley, the region 
became connected to these sources of capital, and was 
altered significantly as a result. 
Having acknowledged the importance of human agency in 
ushering in capi~alist phases, it is appropriate to 
recognize its limitations. The individual actors operating 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley began with much greater 
aspirations than were ever realized there. If they had 
been able to orchestrate capitalist development completely, 
the region would have become a major national industrial 
center -- however, it didn't. This is because the 
individuals who were important in bringing capital 
investment to the Upper Tennessee River Valley could not 
alter more basic technological or economic trends emerging 
in the United States. Factors such as the switch from iron 
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to steel and the depression of the 1890s were powerful 
enough to cause regional development schemes to fail 
despite the best efforts of people such as Hiram 
Chamberlain, Charles McGhee, Frederick Gates, and E.J. 
Sanford. Thus, happenstance operating at many levels could 
further or negate the efforts of capitalist actors. The 
success stories were wrought of the coincidence of the 
efforts of capitalists and circumstances at many other 
levels. 
Though the subject companies and cities of the Upper 
Tennessee River Valley were losers in this capitalist 
competition, they provide valuable information about the 
capital and place-making connection. Capital accumulation 
methods were important to urban place-making, in that 
development opportunities and options were determined by 
capital availability. The land companies analyzed in this 
study were found to utilize new and effective ways of 
obtaining capital, which was used to develop urban places 
for profit. Land companies were peculiar in this respect, 
and may have been the earliest business entities to attempt 
to accrue profit mainly from the urbanization process. This 
may provide the impetus for further research, in that 
little has been written on land companies, and evidence 
indicates that many such companies operated in other areas 
of the American South during the study period. 
In the 1990s, the products of these companies remain 
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley as well as places such 
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as Middlesboro, Kentucky, Fort Payne, Alabama, Anniston, 
Alabama, and South Pittsburg, Tennessee, among others. 
There are probably many more that endure on the landscape, 
most of which resulted in similar short-term economic 
failure, left as backwater regions and localities. They, 
like the towns of the Upper Tennessee River Valley, have in 
all likelihood become small local urban places in regions 
on the margins of the twentieth century capital landscape. 
However, in the century between the study period and the 
present, capitalism has increased its capacity to influence 
everyday life. In the last decade of the twentieth 
century, capitalism can go almost anywhere in the pursuit 
of profit. It can work in backward areas as well as 
advanced ones in the form of chain retailing (K-Mart and 
WalMart), fast food restaurants (McDonald's and Burger 
King), and mini-marts (Circle Kand 7-11). Thus, life-
shaping capitalism has returned to the Upper Tennessee 
River Valley and other similar regions in the modern era, 
however, arguably without the urbane refinement of the 
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OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION ADAPTED FROM ZUNZ (1982) 
High White-collar occp,pations 
physician, lawyer, dentist, merchant, architect, 
large business owner 
Low White-co11ar occp,pations 
clerk, salesman, bookkeeper, insurance agent, 
civil engineer, schoolteacher, contractor 
Skilled Blue-collar Qcgp,pations 
carpenter, machinist, iron puddler, iron molder, 
plumber, railway engineer, cabinetmaker, 
printer, blacksmith 
semiskilled and unskilled Blue-Collar Occupations 
laborer (various), janitor, porter, watchman, 
policeman, peddler, messenger, domestic, waiter 
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